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Abstract	
The European Commission, in an attempt to enhance its democratic 
decision-making, engages in an institutionalised dialogue with 
representative EU advocacy groups. However, one important strand of 
interest group scholars argues that as a result of recognition, groups 
professionalise and lose their representativeness. They argue that as a 
result the positions put forward by EU groups no longer represent the 
interests of their members and supporters, because these have no or little 
say in the formation of EU positions. It follows that the European 
Commission’s strategy is doomed. 
This thesis challenges the argument that EU advocacy groups 
necessarily lose their representativeness as they become professional. Such 
a position relies on overly narrow conceptions of representativeness and 
professionalisation, ignoring organisational differences. First, 
representation does not rely only on member participation. Second, the 
representative claims of advocacy groups also have to be accepted by 
members and supporters as representing their interests. Third, 
professionalisation is more than bureaucratisation and has to include the 
application of new media technology for the dimensions of 
representativeness. 
These insights suggest the claim that groups necessarily lose their 
representativeness as they become professional has to be qualified. 
Drawing on the analysis of documents and websites of five EU 
environmental groups and their member groups, as well as interviews 
conducted by the author, this thesis demonstrates the limitations of the 
existing literature. The findings show that the implications of 
professionalisation for representativeness vary according to organisational 
structures and strategies. The thesis also exemplifies how the new media 
can increase representativeness. Finally, it affords new insights into how 
advocacy groups contribute to democracy in the EU and beyond.  
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1	 Introduction	
The European Commission, in an attempt to enhance the democratic 
quality of its decision-making, is trying to bridge the gap with civil society – 
that is bringing the EU closer to the citizens – in new ways. One of its 
strategies is to undertake an institutionalised dialogue with representative 
EU advocacy groups active in the general interest. 
However, one important strand of interest group scholars argues that 
the professionalisation of EU advocacy groups negatively affects their 
representativeness (on a threshold of media performance 
professionalisation see Frantz 2007; Frantz and Martens 2006; Saurugger 
2005). In this literature professionalisation refers to a process whereby 
groups put in place structures, procedures and,practices, such as the 
employment of full-time expert staff, in order to become more effective 
organizations. Some interest group scholars point to a lack of member and 
supporter participation (see Saurugger 2008 for an overview; Sudbery 
2003, 87; Warleigh 2001, 2004). Others argue that the institutionalisation 
of advocacy groups leads to the centralisation and bureaucratisation of 
organisational structures and the creation of elite leadership remote from 
members and supporters, in other words grassroots interests (Kohler-Koch 
2010, 111; Kohler-Koch 2008; Warleigh 2001). According to these 
approaches, EU positions put forward by EU groups in Brussels no longer 
represent the interests of their members and supporters, because they 
have little or no say in the formation of EU positions (Sudbery 2003, 87; 
Warleigh 2001). The conclusion of these scholars is that the European 
Commission’s attempt to enhance the democratic quality of its decision-
making through the engagement with EU advocacy groups is doomed. 
This thesis challenges the argument that EU advocacy groups 
necessarily lose their representativeness as they become professional. The 
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traditional argument fails to take into account organisational differences. 
First, the traditional assumption of what makes a group representative is 
based on a narrow and out-dated understanding of representation. 
Secondly, the traditional argument overlooks an important dimension to 
representativeness. The ‘representative claims’ (Saward 2006) of advocacy 
groups rest not only on how positions are formed (acceptability 
dimension), but also on whether members and supporters accept the 
advocacy group as representative (acceptance dimension) (based on the 
definition of government legitimacy drawing on Kielmansegg 1971, 368 in 
Dingwerth 2007, 14).  
Third, the traditional argument is based on an overly narrow 
conception of professionalisation, which is mostly restricted to 
bureaucratisation (though social movement literature broadens the term 
professionalisation to include network structures Kriesi et al. 1995 in 
Saurugger 2005, 267). This understanding of professionalisation is almost 
by definition at the cost of member participation. It assumes that 
institutionalisation, bureaucratisation and co-optation of group structures 
and strategies are necessary and inherent elements of the process. 
However, the connections between these processes need at the very least 
to be argued for or empirically demonstrated, not simply asserted. 
Fourth, the new media has altered modes of communication, 
participation and representation. Professionalisation in the application of 
new media technology thus carries important implications for both – 
professional use of new media may not require hierarchialization, 
bureaucratisation or co-optation, for example -- but particularly for the 
acceptance dimension of representativeness. The traditional conception of 
representation is derived from theories of representative democracy and 
precisely electoral representation, based on member participation in 
formal decision-making structures. However, political parties function 
differently to advocacy groups due to their mission, organisational 
structures and constituencies. The traditional assumption of 
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representativeness is based on what Mansbridge calls ‘promissory 
representation’ in context of electoral representation. In a promissory 
representation a group leadership is elected and supports policy positions 
as promised in the electoral campaign. The leadership has then to keep 
these promises made to its members during its term in office. In this case, 
if a group becomes more professional in the bureaucratisation sense, 
leading to the creation of expert staff taking decisions disconnected from 
grassroots membership, the representativeness of the group or position is 
hampered. However, as Mansbridge argues, there are various types of 
representation also in electoral representation. Mansbridge’s four types of 
representation are promissory representation; anticipatory representation, 
where a group leadership supports policy positions anticipating support of 
members and supporters in hindsight; gyroscopic representation, where 
the policy position is formed based on the groups’ own knowledge and 
expertise in the field and on the groups’ principles and common sense; and 
surrogate representation, where a group represents interests beyond its 
member- and supportership and positions are formed based on empathy 
with the beneficiaries (Mansbridge 2003; qv Halpin 2006 on advocacy 
groups). 
By applying Mansbridge’s typology to case studies of EU 
environmental advocacy groups, this thesis shows that those advocacy 
groups that represent a cause tend not to have promissory or anticipatory 
representation structures, but rather are gyroscopic and surrogate. 
Environmental groups form their positions based on scientific research and 
expertise on the ground, not because members and supporters have 
formed and formally voted on a position. The nature of the environmental 
cause they represent explains why the acceptability dimension here is 
gyroscopic. In addition, the acceptability dimension is surrogate, because 
they stand in for the environment and future generations, which 
themselves have no voice.  
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Taking into account the dimensions of representativeness implies that 
judging the representativeness of a group is predicated on two aspects: 
firstly, what a group bases its position formation on (organisational 
strategies and structures), which in turn affects the importance of and the 
indicators by which the acceptance dimension can be judged. In promissory 
representation it is the vote by the members which expresses the 
acceptance of the position(s) and leadership. In anticipatory representation 
it is the re-election which expresses the acceptance of the position(s) and 
leadership. In the case of gyroscopic and surrogate representation, the 
acceptance dimension is a separate act of the acceptability dimension and 
is all the more crucial for the judgement of representativeness, precisely 
because the support by members and supporters has not been expressed 
during the formation and vote of the position. Although regular 
subscriptions to a group, number of volunteers, donations or ‘Facebook 
likes’ and tweets indicate the general acceptance of the group’s principles 
and positions, judging the acceptance dimension of a specific position in 
environmental groups requires more precise indicators. Acceptance can be 
judged based on the support expressed by signing offline and online 
petitions and campaigns, volunteering for specific issues, giving project-
specific donations, taking campaign action such as writing to or ringing 
MPs, liking and sharing Facebook events and campaigns or tweeting about 
campaigns and positions. 
The findings presented in the chapters that follow show that the 
indicators by which the acceptance dimension can be judged further 
depends on the organisational type, for example whether the EU group is 
an umbrella group of a network of independent advocacy groups, such as 
BirdLife Europe, or whether the EU group is the EU representation of a 
European or global advocacy group, such as the WWF European Policy 
Office. In the case of the WWF the acceptance dimension can be assessed 
by the number of supporters within Europe, since members and supporters 
have a sense of belonging to a global group with a global mission and 
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strategy. WWF-UK supporters understand that they belong to a group that 
is active EU-wide and globally. In the case of Birdlife, supporters of its 
national member groups such as the RSPB in the UK or the NABU in 
Germany do not necessarily realise that their groups are members of an EU 
umbrella representing their interests in Brussels. Here the judgement of the 
acceptance dimension is more complicated and requires the study of EU 
and national groups’ communication structures and whether or not 
supporters are aware of their group’s EU activities and supportive of these. 
However, the acceptance dimension in Birdlife is partly expressed by their 
group memberships, who have the choice of being members of the 
umbrella and agreeing with Birdlife acting in their name.  
Analysing the acceptance dimension, especially in a network of 
independent groups, would therefore require empirical investigation that is 
beyond the scope of the thesis. This thesis analyses EU groups and their 
organisational members (national member groups) with the aim of 
revealing the gaps in the literature and paving the way for further research. 
Whilst the case studies indicate levels of supporter acceptance, more 
systematic research needs to be carried out.  
The differentiation of representativeness has crucial consequences 
for the implications of professionalisation. Firstly, the narrow understanding 
of professionalisation in the traditional sense of ‘bureaucratisation’ carries 
implications primarily for groups whose acceptability dimension is based on 
the traditional promissory representation. Here positions of a group are 
formed by the participation of members in a formal decision-making 
structure. The absence of the vote of members in formal decision-making 
structures in the promissory case negatively affects the representativeness 
of the position, or the representative claim. In the case of gyroscopic and 
surrogate representation on the other hand, the bureaucratisation or 
rather the absence of member and supporter participation in the formal 
position formation does not matter, since the position is formed based on 
scientific evidence and expertise on the ground (gyroscopic) and empathy 
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(surrogate) and because the acceptance dimension is a separate act from 
the acceptability dimension. Still, the informal communication with 
member groups is important in order to qualify the position formation 
based on experience on the ground. A crucial factor in gyroscopic and 
surrogate representativeness is that professionalisation may actually play a 
positive role in furthering the acceptance dimension: professionalisation in 
new media technology facilitates the mediation – and indeed the 
judgement - of support. In the case of promissory and anticipatory 
representation new media technology provides additional and more fluid 
and spontaneous channels for formal and informal participation in position 
formation as well as channels of group responsiveness to member and 
supporter attitudes (i.e. membership surveys: Maloney 2009, 283f). 
The thesis promotes the communication of different academic 
strands in assessing the representativeness of groups. The traditional 
argument does not consider research in the representation literature on 
electoral representation (cf Mansbridge’ representation typology (2003), 
Sawards’ ‘representative claim’ (2006)) or indeed in the advocacy group 
field itself (cf Halpin’s group legitimacy typology for representative claims 
(2006) and Strolovitch’ affirmative advocacy (2007)). The traditional 
argument moreover ignores research in the cultural, communication and 
media studies on the impact and potential of new media technology for 
organisational structures and strategies (cf Castells 2001; Ward and Gibson 
2009) and hence the dimensions of representativeness.  
The above argument on the dimensions of representativeness and 
professionalisation suggests that the professionalisation of advocacy groups 
does not necessarily lead to a loss of representativeness. Indeed in some 
cases it has the potential to enhance representativeness. The Commission’s 
strategy to enhance its democratic quality through engaging with advocacy 
groups active in the general interest thus is not doomed.  
The thesis carries implications for the interest group literature as well 
as the broader theories of democracy. Groups do not necessarily have 
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internal democratic representation structures, but they can nevertheless 
enhance the democratic quality of EU decision-making, because they are 
representative of the voices within civil society which they introduce to the 
policy debate (cf Maloney 2009, 284). Representation has so far been 
based on the restricted and uncritical assumption that representation is 
one-dimensional and only functions through upward electoral mandates. 
This study engages with progressive literature in the fields of electoral 
representation, advocacy groups, media and communication which have 
been largely unconnected and by applying these to environmental 
advocacy groups shows that representation is in fact multi-dimensional and 
varies according to organisational forms and strategies. This is not to say 
that the traditional representation through membership-logic or the 
bureaucratisation argument do not hold true anymore. They continue to be 
important insights into our understanding of interest group representation. 
But traditional conceptions of democracy are too narrow and restricted, 
ignoring the dynamics of organisational diversity and voice. Democratic 
theories do not only have to open up to supplementing channels of the 
peoples’ voices, but also to rethinking traditional forms of representation. 
The research questions “do EU groups necessarily lose their 
representativeness as they professionalise?” and “is the loss of 
representativeness a result of professionalisation and specific to advocacy 
groups in the general interest, or is it due to organisational logic?” led the 
thesis. The originality of the thesis is that it approaches this question by 
differentiating between types of group representation and by distinguishing 
the acceptability from the acceptance dimension of representativeness. It 
connects progressive political party and interest group literature with the 
existing professionalisation argument. By doing so the thesis specifies and 
revises general assumptions of the effects of professionalisation on 
representativeness in the traditional literature. Furthermore, the thesis 
updates the definition of ‘professionalisation’ by going beyond the limited 
conception of bureaucratisation and includes the usage of new media 
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technology. It thereby revisits and specifies the potential effect of 
professionalisation on group representativeness under the consideration of 
the different group and representation types. It is an original contribution 
to how group representativeness should and may be judged, not only, but 
in particular in the context of EU group professionalisation.  
The thesis first reviews the literature on the representativeness and 
professionalisation dichotomy in EU groups in chapter one. It then 
challenges the traditional assumptions of representativeness and 
professionalisation, suggesting revised conceptions of the latter in chapter 
two. Chapter three determines the specific research questions that the 
thesis tries to answer, generates hypotheses and maps out the methods 
utilised to conduct the research and answer the questions. Chapters four 
(water policy) and five (emission reductions policy) apply the thesis’ 
conceptions and methodology to five EU groups in two specific policy cases 
in order to evaluate their representativeness and test the hypotheses. They 
analyse the findings of the case studies and their implications for the 
representativeness of professional EU environmental groups as well as for 
the assumptions in the traditional literature. Chapter six concludes with 
specific implications for the representativeness of environmental advocacy 
groups as well as broader implications for the interest group literature and 
theories of democracy. It further outlines the significance of the research 
for (EU) politics and environmental advocacy groups themselves.    
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2	 EU	recognition,	professionalisation	
and	representativeness	
One important approach of the interest group literature argues that 
as EU groups are recognised as consultation partners in EU politics, they 
professionalise and as a result lose their representativeness (Kohler-Koch 
2010, 111; Kohler-Koch 2008; Saurugger 2005; Sudbery 2003; Warleigh 
2001). The following chapter first presents the European Commission’s 
(hereafter Commission) attempt to develop a genuinely democratic input 
into its decision-making and the theoretical basis for the strategy, which 
assumes group representativeness. It then portrays the argument in the 
literature that recognition leads to professionalisation and thus a loss of 
representativeness and the underlying theoretical and empirical 
conceptions and their history. It concludes by suggesting that groups are 
more diverse than the representativeness literature assumes and that 
professionalisation is broader than bureaucratisation, but also includes 
recent developments in new media technology application. Consequently, 
the thesis asks for a revision of the impact the professionalisation of EU 
groups is suggested to have on their representativeness.   
The	traditional	argument	about	a	
professionalisation-representativeness	
dichotomy	
The following section explains why the EU strategy is based on group 
representativeness. The interest group literature assumes that this 
representativeness is based on the participation of members in internal 
decision-making which is hampered by the professionalisation of internal 
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organisational structures (Kohler-Koch 2010, 111; Kohler-Koch 2008; 
Sudbery 2003; Warleigh 2001). EU groups, as they become recognised and 
professionalise thus lose their representativeness. This has negative 
implications for the Commission’s strategy to improve its democratic 
quality of decision-making. 
The	European	Commission’s	strategy	
In order to improve the inclusiveness of its decision-making, the 
Commission has embarked on a strategy to bridge the gap with civil society 
via interest groups, such as groups advocating in the general interest – here 
defined as advocacy groups (White Paper on Governance 2001).1 This 
strategy is predicated on the assumption that advocacy groups are 
representative organisations where the leadership reflects the interests of 
the members.2  
The Commission has always sought stakeholder consultation in order 
to receive expertise and legitimacy. However, particularly since the general 
democratic deficit debate surrounding the EU, along with the crisis of the 
Santer Commission, the Commission, as a bureaucratic actor, has tried to 
apply new strategies to enhance its democratic legitimacy (Saurugger 
2008a, 151).  
One aspect of the democratic deficit raised by the literature3, and by 
the Commission itself, is the Commission’s (and indeed the EU’s) distance 
                                                      
1 The principle ‘to integrate the people of Europe’ has guided the European integration since its 
beginnings that is the foundation as the European Community (European Commission 2001, 32). The 
Commission explains that even though the EU is neither like a national government nor can it 
“develop or deliver policy in the same way as a national government” (European Commission 2001, 
32), people still expect the EU to do politics similarly to their national political institutions. Quoting 
the Commission, the EU has to meet citizens’ expectations, though in different ways. “[I]t must build 
partnerships and rely on a wide variety of actors” (European Commission 2001, 32).  
2 Representativeness of civil society organisations is stressed several times in the White Paper on 
Governance (European Commission 2001) as a core criterion for the consideration of their input. The 
role of civil society organisations is further elaborated in the Commission’s Communication “Towards 
a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue” (European Commission 2002). 
3 See in particular the debates on input legitimacy, governance ‘by the people’ and participatory 
democracy (cf Joerges et al. 2001).  
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from civil society (European Commission 2001).4 One solution to which 
high democratising potential has been attributed by Commission officials, 
as well as academics, is seen as the need to engage with civil society via 
civil society organisations (European Commission 2001; Greenwood 2007; 
Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007; Saurugger 2008; Steffek et al. 2008). This 
strategy is linked to participatory theory, which holds that groups act as 
democratising agents. Here advocacy groups’ democratising potential, in 
the form of stimulating political and civic engagement, is conceived as 
balancing out assumed deficiencies in modern representative democracy 
structures (Maloney 2006, 99). Interest group pluralism provides enhanced 
participation opportunities by recognising diverse interests in the form of 
interest groups, whose opinions can then be taken into account in the 
decision-making processes, alongside the traditional mechanism of 
parliamentary or assembly votes (Czempiel and Rosenau 1992; Schulze 
1994). Participation is based on the ‘principle of democratic self-
governance’ (qv European Commission 2002, 5), which implies that all 
affected interests must have equal opportunities to represent themselves 
in the decision-making process of these decisions (Steffek and Nanz 2008, 
10).  
The implicit assumption is that advocacy groups are representative 
organisations where the leadership reflects the interests of its members 
and supporters. Groups channel grassroots interests and opinions across 
the EU into Commission decision-making and thus bridge the gap between 
the Commission’s politics and European civil society (for reviews see 
Armstrong 2001; Greenwood 2007). At the same time, a better 
understanding and communication of EU issues and the Commission’s work 
is thought to enhance identification with the EU and ultimately 
engagement in and support for the Commission’s work – in other words the 
Commission aims to enhance its democratic legitimacy by making its 
                                                      
4 It is the Commission’s mandate to consult civil society widely in the process of policy formation 
(European Communities 1997).   
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decisions based on a broader set of general interests and through genuinely 
democratic group input.5 As part of its strategy, the Commission has set up 
a lobby register and has published a number of guidelines for civil dialogue 
and consultation (European Commission 2001; 2002; 2008).  
Moreover, the institutional approach of the EU to engage with EU 
umbrella groups encouraged a growth in the number of group ‘partners’, 
which increasingly demand to be included as central protagonists in EU 
governance (Broscheid and Coen 2007). The EU has seen a mushrooming of 
EU level public interest associations as well as a booming participation in 
consultations and forums since the 1980s and in particular during the 
1990s and early 2000s (Kohler-Koch and Buth 2009).6 These increasing 
numbers have stoked a discussion for a revised strategy of group regulation 
amongst practitioners and scholars alike, re-visiting questions of the criteria 
for consultation and, crucially, of the representativeness of groups. 
The representativeness argument applies to two levels. Most scholars 
evaluate the assessment of groups’ democratising qualities through access 
and representation in formal participation mechanisms based on equal 
chance of access at the population (system) level (Kohler-Koch and Finke 
2007, 214).7 Representativeness in this approach is mainly couched in 
terms of the balanced or imbalanced representativeness of interests at EU 
level, often criticising the dominance of economic and large interests to the 
disadvantage of general interests (for a review see Saurugger 2008, 1281-
1284). Equally important, however, is the implication of recognition for the 
                                                      
5 The European Commission in its White Paper on Governance (European Commission 2001) 
expresses its wish for itself and the EU as a whole to be a legitimate, democratic player that is 
respected and understood by the citizen. To achieve this, it strongly emphasises the need to improve 
effectiveness of all governance processes with, within and amongst EU institutions on multiple 
levels. 
6 From 1986 to 1990 the number of interest groups at EU level was estimated to have increased 
from around 600 to around 3000 by Anderson and Eliassen 1993). 
7 The reform contains efforts to improve effectiveness, relevance and coherence of EU policies. 
Criteria for the evaluation of equal chance of access are the accessibility of the political process, the 
openness and transparency of consultations, the thresholds of access regarding different kinds of 
interest associations and the turnout of all actors involved. As criteria for the analysis of equal 
representation of group in (the always issue specific) consultations Kohler-Koch and Finke define the 
approximation of the respective ‘policy-relevant cleavage structure’ (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007, 
216). 
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vertical organisation of group interests, their behaviour and hence their 
ability to bridge the gap. As yet this field is still under-researched, though a 
number of scholars have recently started to investigate this gap. Those 
studies that do look at the internal organisational structures of opinion 
formation and representation within groups and their networks tend to 
take on the perspective of parliamentary democracy and hence base 
representativeness on the existence of formal member participation 
mechanisms (Kohler-Koch 2010, 111; Sudbery 2003; Warleigh 2001).  
The reformist approach bases policy proposals on a bottom-up 
approach via civil society involvement, including a reform, or rather 
adaptation, of EU governance aiming at opening up the EU policy-making 
process in order to get more people and organisations involved in shaping 
and delivering policy (European Commission 2002, 5)8  In the reform 
documents 9  the Commission emphasises its “duty” to consult and 
consultations are understood to improve the quality of the Commission’s 
input as well as output (European Commission 2002, 5). Engagement in the 
Commission is specific to the different policy areas, because 
implementation of consultation practice is left to the different DGs and 
because the emergence of topics at EU level varies from issue to issue.10 
However the Commission’s recent reform is aimed at a more coherent 
approach to consultation across Directorate Generals and potentially with 
other EU institutions and has made it obligatory for EU advisory bodies to 
hold consultations with groups (European Commission 2001). 
                                                      
8
 Cooperative principles such as plurality, equality and transparency in the decision-making process 
and cooperative procedures are set as priorities. 
9
 Several steps form part of the EU governance reform aiming to better structure the EU’s 
relationship with civil society, most importantly the ‘principles of good governance’ (European 
Commission 2001), ‘general principles and minimum standards for consultation’ (European 
Commission 2002) and enhanced transparency (European Commission 2008). 
10
 The environment for example was first recognized as an area of competition for the EU in the 
Single European Act (1987). The Aarhus convention, adopted 1998 and taking effect 2001, provides a 
legal basis not only for the EU but for all UN member states to ensure the provision of access to 
environmental information, the facilitation of public (including its own organisations) participation in 
environmental decision-making processes and access to courts regarding environmental issues 
(access to justice). 
22 
 
The civil dialogue includes a broad-ranging number of actors 
considered to be civil society organisations11, amongst them general 
interest groups. The Commission bases the definition of group 
representativeness on “encompassingness (peak federations) and 
geographical coverage (funnelling [member states’] groups into a single 
voice)” (Greenwood and Halpin 2007, 200).12 The interests of groups that 
are considered representative are considered to be more significant in 
terms of input to policy formation by the Commission. The issue of 
representativeness is addressed by the criteria for the identification of 
relevant groups. Firstly, there are general criteria: groups must be affected, 
involved in the implementation process or have a direct interest. In the 
case of consultations with limited access “for practical reasons” (European 
Commission 2002, 11), such as participation of groups in advisory bodies or 
at hearings, the Commission refers to more detailed eligibility criteria for 
the civil dialogue, which have been defined by the Economic and Social 
Committee. Amongst other criteria, groups have to “provide for 
accountability to its members; have authority to represent and act at 
European level” (Sub-Committee European Governance (White Paper) 
2002).13 Thus representativeness is judged by a group being accountable to 
its members, suggesting a principle-agent relation. This in the literature 
                                                      
11
 “[O[rganisations [...] include: the labour-market players (i.e. trade unions and employers 
federations - the "social partners"); organisations representing social and economic players, which 
are not social partners in the strict sense of the term (for instance, consumer organisations); NGOs 
(non-governmental organisations), which bring people together in a common cause, such as 
environmental organisations, human rights organisations, charitable organisations, educational and 
training organisations, etc.; CBOs (community-based organisations), i.e. organisations set up within 
society at grassroots level which pursue member-oriented objectives, e.g. youth organisations, 
family associations and all organisations through which citizens participate in local and municipal life; 
and religious communities” (European Commission 2002, 6). 
12
 In practice, however, it is not clear whether representativeness is measured according to the 
number of members, the geographical inclusiveness or according to the recognition at national level 
(Saurugger 2008, 1282). 
13
 “In order to be eligible, a European organisation must: exist permanently at Community level; 
provide direct access to its members’ expertise and hence rapid and constructive consultation; 
represent general concerns that tally with the interest of European society; comprise bodies that are 
recognised at Member State level as representatives of particular interests; have member 
organisations in most of the EU Member States; provide for accountability to its members; have 
authority to represent and act at European level; be independent and mandatory, not bound by 
instructions from outside bodies; be transparent, especially financially and in its decision-making 
structures” (European Commission 2002). 
23 
 
implies groups’ representativeness is judged by their ability to include 
membership in formal participation structures.  
At the same time the Commission establishes the need to consider 
the impact of policies on other areas such as environmental interests, any 
need for ‘specific experience, expertise or technical knowledge’ and 
demands to maintain a balance between different actors.14 
Thus the Commission’s discourse addresses EU advocacy groups, who 
are assumed to be representative of their members, in order to enhance its 
democratic qualities. In practice, however, Commission officials seem rarely 
to be aware of the existence of their own NGO governance guidelines with 
regards to representativeness. The impression derived from interviews 
conducted by the author with both Commission officials and groups is that 
the Commission is guided less by testing representative criteria and more 
by the reputation of groups (interviews with Commission officials, 2010; 
interviews with environmental groups, 2010/2011). Similarly, in the 
European Parliament there is no formalisation of interest representation 
(see Bouwen 2007; Kohler-Koch 1997). The Council in particular works with 
groups on an apparently grace-and-favour basis rather than through a 
structured dialogue with clear conceptions of representativeness (Beger 
2004, 4).  
                                                      
14
 For obvious reasons of efficiency and effective cooperation it is undesirable for the Commission to 
consult everyone on everything. However, acknowledging the “challenge to be adequate and 
equitable” and the risk of biased participation, the Commission expresses the wish to reduce the risk 
of one-sided involvement of arguments and privileging access for particular groups. For these 
reasons, the Commission called for “clear criteria” to identify “target groups of relevance” for 
consultation (European Commission 2002, 5). Concerned with its credibility, in the governance 
reform documents the Commission not only emphasises its own duties in a closer partnership, but 
also demands responsibility and accountability from groups (European Commission 2001). The 
governance reform documents, including the Transparency Initiative, also turned the attention of the 
debate towards the transparency and accountability of groups in response to co-optation concerns 
through special treatment and funding. Part of the move towards group responsibility and 
transparency is the voluntary register for ‘lobby groups’ in an attempt to provide a better overview 
on who lobbies, where group financing comes from, who their members are, what fields they are 
active in or how many staff work for them. Moreover, the register serves as online database which 
the Commission and potentially other EU institutions can refer to when in need of expertise. Even 
though the register is voluntary, the Commission expects any interest groups carrying out “activities 
[…] with the objective of influencing the policy formulation and decision-making processes of the 
European institutions” to register. Any registrant is also requested to comply with the code of 
conduct or any comparable rules. If a group does not register or supply the Commission with 
transparency through other means, its consultation input is treated as that of an individual. 
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History	of	the	Commission’s	strategy	
At EU level, the broader interest group debate was instigated by the 
introduction of the Single European Act in 1987 and its official mandate to 
develop and institutionalise a European Social Dialogue15, culminating as 
legal commitment in the Lisbon Treaty (Saurugger 2008, 149).16 However, 
this was initially and principally about investigating the role of groups as a 
driving force of European integration, with emphasis on social and private 
actors (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007, 210).17 The Commission introduced 
new consultation instruments, including specific funding schemes, 
depending on the European Commission Directorate Generals and their 
staff. Public interest associations generally were not consulted by the 
Commission; however environmental associations and consumer 
organisations were the exception, because they “were perceived to be 
directly affected by and important for the efficient design of common 
market policies” (2007, 209), also excepted were some human rights and 
women’s groups. The literature at the time observed the relations and 
processes between European regulatory bodies and interest group 
leadership and criticism was being directed at too autonomous 
bureaucracies and leaderships as well as strong national groups (See 
                                                      
15 
In the 1980s an “official mandate to develop and institutionalise a European Social Dialogue […] 
was included in the Single European Act in 1987 and officially introduced in the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992” (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007, 210). 
16 
Two aspects have been major drivers for a more open, inclusive and transparent integration of 
groups: One, bureaucratic forums looking for power and legitimacy and two, the crisis of the Santer 
Commission, which provided an “institutional window of opportunity” (Saurugger 2008a, 151). 
17 
In general, during the first decades of European integration, engagement of stakeholders in EU 
politics was aimed at improving the quality of the Commission’s policy proposals and focussed on 
actors interested in economic integration: European confederations of trade and industry 
associations, employers’ associations, professional associations and trade unions (Kohler-Koch and 
Finke 2007, 209). Important changes were the ‘more persistent social dialogue’ and the introduction 
of the ‘principle of partnership’ and the term ‘social partners’. This was not only valid for EU level 
consultations, but also – in accordance with the prominence of cohesion and regional policy at the 
time - for the dialogue with private and social partners at the national and sub-national level 
(Hooghe 1996). The development of the relation between the EU and society is summarized by 
Kohler-Koch and Finke (see also Greenwood 2007, Smismans 2005), who detect a ‘generational’ 
change from a hierarchic and technocratic approach in the 1970s/80s to ‘partnership by invitation’ in 
the 1980s/90s and to emphasise on democratic legitimacy and ‘full partnership’ and a more 
heterarchical conception of societal groups as ‘partners’ since the 2000s (Kohler-Koch and Finke 
2007, 209-212).
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Greenwood, Grote and Ronit for an overview up to 1992). Whilst attention 
in the 1990s was on the interest group system as such and its role and 
design for European integration (Greenwood 1992; Greenwood 1997; 
Streeck and Schmitter 1996), in the decade of the 2000s a debate evolved 
looking at the relationship of the EU and society and the democratising 
agency of groups in the frame of the EU’s and Commission’s democratic 
legitimacy - ‘bridging the gap with civil society’ (cf Smismans 2005, 77). 
After the Santer Commission, which was forced to resign after allegations 
of fraud, the EU entered a time of reconsideration regarding its governance 
and future. Romano Prodi (president of the European Commission 1999-
2004) encouraged the concept of civil society with respect to a wider 
inclusion of interests on the one side and deeper participation 
opportunities at all levels of the political process on the other (Kohler-Koch 
2010, 102f). In its Governance Paper of 2001, the Commission argues there 
is increasing distrust and/or a lack of interest towards EU institutions 
amongst citizens and moreover citizens feel that the EU is remote and too 
intrusive at the same time. In the 2000 Communication on the European 
Commission and groups and the White Paper on Governance (European 
Commission 2001) the Commission made clear that civil society dialogue is 
an “attempt to legitimate itself and its functions” (Smismans 2005, 74) 
(Smismans 2003, 481) see also (Smismans 2005, 77). In order to boost 
citizens’ confidence the Commission proposed to get the EU closer to the 
people. This opened the way to cooperation with general interest groups 
and the focus shifted from representative to participatory democracy 
(Saurugger 2008a, 151). The failure of the Maastricht Referendum in 
Denmark and its near failure in France in 1992 also led the Commission to 
deviate from its narrow focus on the improvement of the quality of policy 
output and to also consider member states’ acceptance of its policies. This 
is where the strategy ‘bringing the EU closer to the people’ emerged; 
“propagated at the 1996 Turin Summit [it] became the norm to follow by all 
EU institutions” (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007, 210). This meant a renewed 
interest in the democratising agency of interest groups, in particular those 
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active in the general interest. The ‘civil dialogue’ was hence introduced, 
initially in the field of employment and social affairs in 1996, where the 
Commission facilitated the establishment and funding of the umbrella 
association for EU general interest associations active in the latter field, the 
Social Platform. 
The attention of EU participatory scholars turned predominantly to 
the Commission, since its mandate to represent the common interest of 
the EU means it has to engage with stakeholders. 18  Because the 
Commission has the right to initiate legislation and the Parliament enters 
the legislation process at a rather late stage, the Commission has also been 
the main institutional focus of groups’ activities in their attempt to 
influence political decision-making. It is thus not surprising that it is the 
Commission 19  (as bureaucratic actor) that explicitly calls for the 
enhancement of democratic legitimacy through bridging the gap with civil 
society (European Commission 2001; for empirical studies (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2002, 402); Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007, 217).20 The interest group 
literature has hence been prioritising the scrutiny of characteristics and 
impact of access conditions on the democratic credentials of the 
Commission. 
As European integration was originally and primarily about economic 
integration, the Commission’s intention was to get support to push through 
its social policies with the help of the social partners and special interests 
                                                      
18
 The EU Economic and Social Committee, as institutionalised advisory body of the EU, also interacts 
with groups, though historically and primarily with economic and social partners. For the EU 
Economic and Social Committee it is the fight against its marginalisation in the European polity as 
well as the definition of its own role that made civil society a useful tool for them (cf Smismans 2005, 
77). However, though it institutionalised its engagement with public interest associations, the 
inclusion remains random (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007, 209). 
19
 For an example see DG Environment: groups are considered valuable for EU decision making “since 
they have a good understanding of public concerns on the environment. Their presence is important 
to provide a sound balance in relation to the interests of other actors. European NGOs are valuable 
in co-ordinating and channelling the views of national organisations and citizens as input to the 
decision making process. For the development and implementation of policy, they also participate in 
preparatory work and expert groups and conduct research and studies. Another example of an area 
where NGOs play an important role is awareness raising and environmental education” (DG ENV 
funding website, accessed 28/12/2009: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ngos/index_en.htm). 
20
 See in particular the debates on input legitimacy, governance ‘by the people’ and participatory 
democracy (cf Joerges et al. 2001).  
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(cf Smismans 2005, 77). As a result, though the Commission’s mandate is to 
consult a broad range of civil society organisations, it - still - attaches 
particular importance to the role of traditional social partners, trade unions 
and employers associations, “because of their representativeness” 
(European Commission 2002, 6, footnote 7).21  
Recognition	 leads	 to	 professionalisation	 and	 a	 loss	 of	
representativenes	
However, according to one influential body of literature, the 
Commission’s strategy is inherently flawed, because it is assumed that 
recognition and representativeness are incompatible. Recognition co-opts 
EU advocacy groups who then cease to be representative of their members, 
or grassroots (Kohler-Koch 2010, 111; Sudbery 2003; Warleigh 2001). In 
particular, the professionalisation of advocacy groups that results from a 
formalised relationship may hamper representativeness, thereby 
undermining their democratic agency and hence the claim of the 
Commission to democratic legitimacy (Frantz 2007, Maloney 2009, 
Saurugger 2008, Kohler-Koch 2008). 
After initial high hopes concerning advocacy groups’ ability to bring 
the EU closer to the citizens (Greenwood 1997), theoretical debates on the 
potential of the Commission’s strategy were followed by empirical studies, 
revealing practical difficulties with the groups’ abilities to bridge the gap. 
EU groups themselves are found to professionalise their structures in 
similar levels of hierarchy to the EU, ranging from the local activist group to 
the EU umbrella level, and hence criticism is made that groups have the 
same bureaucratic problems of bridging the gap within their own 
organisations and networks that the Commission is struggling to overcome. 
In order to enhance democratic input via the group linkage function, the 
Commission aims to enhance the aggregation and channelled 
                                                      
21
 EU register of interest representatives (accessed 22/06/2009: 
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/welcome.do). 
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representation of mostly issue-based22 (sectoral) interests (see Greenwood 
2007 for an encompassing study of EU interest groups). The representation 
of groups in the EU is consequently highly hierarchically organised and 
streamlined. Groups are highly institutionalised and mostly organised in 
confederations with multi-level and transnational organisational (EU) 
membership (Greenwood 2007, 342). Communication with the Commission 
is only guaranteed within the EU umbrella and the communication with 
indirect member group levels and networks (national and subnational 
members) has been emphasised by the EU as the groups’ own 
responsibility (Opinion on ‘European Governance – a White Paper of 20 
March 2002; CES 357/2002). Basically, the Commission is thought to be 
trying to improve its communication and democratic quality with the help 
of groups who themselves have problems including grassroots in internal 
communication and opinion formation (Kohler-Koch 2010, 111; Sudbery 
2003; Warleigh 2001). It is often criticised that these elite groups are not 
internally democratic themselves and thus cannot improve the democratic 
credentials of the Commission either (Warleigh 2001, 623). At the 
individual group level, empirical studies criticise the Commission’s strategy 
as flawed, due to changes in internal organisational structures as a result of 
recognition demanding professionalisation. Interest groups in general are 
seen to professionalise as they adapt to the perceived access structures of 
the EU interest representation system (March and Olsen 1998; Saurugger 
2006). Part of these access conditions are factors such as recognition 
mechanisms, choice and selection of groups the EU engages with and 
regulating mechanisms, such as funding and privileged access which may 
have a reverse impact on groups and their ability to represent the diverse 
voices of civil society (Greenwood 2007; Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007; 
Saurugger 2008; Maloney 2009).  
                                                      
22 
A minority of groups have a territorial focus.
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Groups thus professionalise, because they are required to be experts 
in order to have access to the Brussels game, and they have to be 
professional in response to the Commission’s demands for expertise. Both 
pressures for expertise are considered to lead to groups’ organisational 
structures and strategies becoming more professional (Frantz and Martens 
2006, 62–77). 
Any system that includes certain groups in the design but leaves 
others out, presents them with the need to decide between being ‘in' or 
'out’. To be influential, lobbyists have to have a very sophisticated 
understanding, of and connection to, EU institutions and EU member 
states, because power is more dispersed in the EU (Hull 1993, 85). At the 
same time, the EU’s multileveled and segmented institutional context 
makes it difficult to identify general patterns of interest mediation (Eising 
2007, 356). Moreover, the mushrooming of EU groups (Kohler-Koch and 
Buth 2009) and their increasing demand to be included as central 
protagonists in EU governance (Broscheid and Coen 2007) has increased 
the competition for ‘ear-time’ amongst groups and further increased 
pressures for expertise. This includes the advocacy groups’ very own wish 
to have political influence in a situation of competition with other big 
interests groups, such as business groups, over who is heard and who 
affects the outcomes (Bosso 2003). This in turn requires a focus of group 
resources on the Brussels game, which is assumed to be at the expense of 
internal member participation. In practice most groups try to balance 
lobbying and mass mobilisation strategies. However, group literature fears 
recognition might tip the balance towards lobbying at the cost of mobilising 
member participation. Groups adapt their organisational orientation to 
these political and institutional conditions of influence. Groups intensify 
their EU lobbying efforts where EU regulation is in place and divide their 
labour according to the EU policy cycle, including lobbying in the very early 
stages of the policy cycle (Eising 2007, 356). Greenwood points out that EU 
regulation is offering many incentives for institutionalised participation 
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‘disincentivising’ mass mobilisation; encouraging elite, often confederated 
groups (Greenwood 2007, 356). Groups are considered to become 
streamlined and to be moving away from grassroots representation. In 
other words, groups put the majority of their time and resources into ‘logic 
of influence’ activities at the cost of ‘logic of membership’ (cf Schmitter and 
Streeck 1999). Groups at EU level have to be well structured and efficient to 
fulfil the Commission’s expectations and function as representative 
promoters of civil society interests as well as ‘schools of democracy’ 
(Maloney 2009a, 2). This principle however is assumed to be at odds with 
the requirements of groups to act in a representative and democratically 
legitimate manner (Maloney 2008; Maloney 2009; Kohler-Koch 2008a; cf 
Saurugger 2006). According to the professionalisation argument, groups 
tend, due to lack of financial and human resources, to prioritise 
effectiveness over member participation. In other words, they seek to 
improve their responsiveness to decision-making bodies and their ability to 
deliver an opinion rapidly. They thereby strengthen the EU’s policy output, 
but do not necessarily increase democratic input (Sudbery 2003, 75).  
In this context, a further school of interest group scholars discusses 
functional representation, as opposed to the representation of (political) 
values, resulting from the European Commission’s own search for 
legitimacy (Smismans 2003) and competencies (Bouwen 2007, 278), or the 
design of the Commission’s consultation regime (Quittkat and Kotzian 2011, 
416). These authors engage with the question of how group 
professionalisation impacts the legitimacy of EU democracy, particularly 
referring to input and output legitimacy (Bouwen 2006; Greenwood 2007b; 
see also Scharpf 1999). Since this thesis’s main concern is with 
representativeness, it relates only tangentially to legitimacy, or indeed to 
functional representation. The representativeness of groups is an important 
aspect of their organisational legitimacy, however, the two concepts are 
distinct and different (Steffek/Hahn 2010, 8). For the concept of legitimacy 
of non-governmental organisations, see Risse (2006), Schrader and Denskus 
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(2010, 29-54); for democratic legitimacy as a category for assessing the 
conduct of non-governmental organisations, see Steffek et al (2010, 100-
128); and on procedural legitimacy, see Beisheim and Dingwerth (2010, 74-
99). 
Other empirical scholars consider that recognition by the Commission 
neglects group representativeness and in fact does not value 
representativeness and political representation via groups, but instead 
values expertise. 23  Hence it promotes expert groups with “useful 
information and leverage” (Warleigh 2000, 239) over groups representing 
citizens or shared values (Warleigh 2000, 239). Klüver detects a biased 
access to EU consultations and influence of Commission decision-making in 
favour of resourceful and professional groups (2012). Further instigators of 
professionalisation are the Commission’s demands for rapid responses 
(Heggli 2010: 247). The Commission’s reform papers express the demand 
for professional representation: “[i]n order to be eligible, a European 
organisation must: provide direct access to its members’ expertise and 
hence rapid and constructive consultation” (Sub-Committee European 
Governance (White Paper) 2002).  
Effective organisation and efficient representation of interests is thus 
a prerequisite for access and voice at EU level. These professionalisation 
demands are thought to have an impact on organisational structures and 
strategies by empirical interest group scholars (Frantz and Martens 2006, 
62–77). A professionalisation of groups is detected at the international (cf 
Keck and Sikkink 1998, on the EU: Lahusen and Jauß 2001; Saurugger 2006) 
as well as at national levels (Jordan and Maloney 1997; Kristan 2007; Frantz 
and Martens 2006, 62-77). In addition to their political message, good 
                                                      
23
 Saurugger argues EU level participation is still linked to EU forms of interest representation which 
is strongly influenced by the EU’s institutional need for expertise and legitimacy and less by the idea 
of creating new forms of political representation at EU level (2008, 1286). Sudbery’s fieldwork 
revealed a similar response from Commission officials who affirm that the inclusion of civil society is 
to achieve effective results and the argument to ‘bring in the citizen’ is simply for rhetoric (Sudbery 
2003, 92). 
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performance and marketing as well as political campaign management, in 
particular lobbying, are said to have moved to the centre of group 
activities, thereby neglecting grassroots connections and membership 
communication (Jordan and Maloney 1997; Lahusen and Jauß 2001; Frantz 
and Martens 2006, 62-77; Frantz 2007). Frantz and Martens describe how, 
over the last two decades, the internal organisational structures and 
strategies of non-governmental organisations have changed from voluntary 
organisers of temporary protest events towards business-style enterprises. 
Groups employ qualified full-time staff that have a professional rather than 
grassroots approach to their portfolios. They employ specialist staff with 
knowledge of very technical and EU agenda issues. Groups are well-
organised: they pursue political-strategic planning, consider conditions of 
political processes, and aim to market their own brand. Ultimately the 
perceived danger is that groups strive for organisational survival, rather 
than for the realisation of political content (Frantz and Martens 2006, 75ff). 
The fear is that this will lead to segmented and hierarchically structured 
civil society elites detached from their grassroots (Saurugger 2006; Kristan 
2007, 63).  
Professionalisation is visible in changes of organisational shape, 
structures and strategies affecting size, relations and composition of groups 
and their efficiency. One main criterion of professionalisation is size, both in 
financial, as discussed above, and human resource terms. 
Professionalisation is not only defined in groups managing large funds, but 
in particular managing discretionary funds (Saurugger 2006), over which 
the membership has little or no direct say. What this implies is that 
members cannot participate in the formal decision over which interests 
should get financial support to be furthered in political representation. 
Professionalisation in terms of group size also refers to the increasing 
number of full-time staff employed to fight for the respective cause as 
opposed to volunteers. Staffs are increasingly trained in professions such as 
law and communication and have no or little grassroots experience. The 
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implications are considered to be weakened links between grassroots 
membership and leadership. More and more groups are detected as 
employing representation professionals and law firms as opposed to their 
own members and staff, though these studies often refer to non-
governmental organisations that are not necessarily active in the general 
interest (Saurugger 2006, 268f). They increasingly use scientists and experts 
for the formation of their claims. Both strategies increase expertise but are 
seen to lower efficient grassroots input. The establishment of offices, or 
special sections in governance headquarters such as Brussels, as well as 
groups having regular contact persons for Commission meetings are a sign 
of professionalisation. According to advocacy group staff, some Commission 
officials interpret having established contacts as a lack of contact with the 
‘real’ citizen or grassroots (Heggli 2010, 247).  
Professionalisation means a consolidation of organisational structures 
and a centralisation of decision-making structures not only for efficiency 
reasons, but also, because hierarchical structures are believed to be the 
only way for a group to be territorially and functionally representative 
(Kohler-Koch 2010a). Geographical and functional representativeness are 
both access requirements of the Commission. However, a centralisation of 
decision-making is thought to lead to key or relevant office staffs taking 
decisions with supporters having no say. A shift is detected from 
membership to management strategies, where activists are replaced by 
communication professionals. Elitist structures emerge where specialised, 
professional lobbyists, scientists and public relations staffs spearhead 
sophisticated management structures. Groups have sophisticated 
fundraising departments or even outsource canvassing and recruitment, 
making them more responsive to donors’ demands at the cost of 
constituencies’ demands. There is an increase of individualistic 
participation (such as signatures), of long-term-passive supporters, and of 
donors as opposed to active and engaged members with participatory 
rights. These tendencies towards a prevalence of groups with 
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professionalised recruitment and maintenance activities, with a low-cost 
form of involvement, are also referred to as ‘protest-business types’ 
(Jordan and Maloney 1997). They are characterized as groups who have 
large supportership with no formal organisational decision-making rights, 
including virtual supportership, and no membership with rights to formal 
participation. Last but not least, professionalisation, as assessed above, and 
the wish to have an impact are pictured as leading to a move from 
contentious to conventional politics, thus co-opting original demands, as 
groups start to moderate their tactical and ideological approaches. In sum, 
the effects of professionalisation are portrayed as a prioritisation of 
expertise and knowledge vs. membership mobilisation, efficiency vs. 
democratic legitimacy and accountability, professionalism vs. volunteerism 
and effectiveness vs. street credibility. 
Part of these access conditions is sufficient funding to get access and 
stay involved (on the conditions of representation of national interest 
groups in the EU see Klüver 2010). Groups who manage large funds are 
considered professional and the particular sources of funding are 
considered to have an impact upon the ‘disconnect’ from their bases and 
original ideology. A high percentage of patronage in the EU and US (money 
from governing bodies) is considered to make members unnecessary; 
instead members in the traditional sense become a luxury (Maloney 2008). 
Moreover, some authors fear a ‘disconnect’ and co-optation of original 
demands, because EU funding serves the Commission’s Directorate-
Generals’ lobbying capacities and hence their own legitimation rather than 
group member participation (Maloney 2008). Civil dialogue is seen to be 
restricted to those issues on which EU institutions consider consultation 
with civil society (organisations) to be important (“partnership by 
invitation”, Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007, 211)24 and hence dubbed as EU 
                                                      
24
 The Commissions principles and standards of consultation do not apply to all consultations, 
reasoned with the principle of proportionality and the need for effectiveness. Proposals are to be 
consulted on if they are considered by the Commission to have a significant impact on the sector, 
relevant parties or policy reform, as well as on Green Papers (European Commission 2002, 15). 
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institutional rhetoric (cf Smismans 2005, 70). Others again mention that the 
need for funding has forced groups into outsourcing their canvassing and 
recruitment in order to find new sources of funding and maintaining their 
membership. This is seen to disconnect in particular national offices from 
members and grassroots, because the latter have no emotional or personal 
ties with the group itself anymore. The result is considered a loss of 
‘meaningful engagement’ (for studies on US environmental groups see 
(Fisher 2006); for a general overview see Maloney 2009). The need for and 
focus on fundraising in itself as well as the wish to have an impact via this 
strategy is believed to lead to a vicious circle of more and more focus and 
search for funds and organisational survival and less furthering of 
substantive views and high risk protest (Everett 1992), directly and actively 
engaging members. Hence the leadership prioritises the search for and 
maintaining of organisational funding over the representation of grassroots 
interests (influence versus membership logic) to the degree that it will 
moderate its ideologies and tactics to obtain funding (Everett 1992).  
To summarise, the professionalisation of organisational structures 
and strategies is assumed to increase the gap between what EU umbrella 
groups put forward as the opinion of civil society members and what the 
grassroots civil societies, or rather their members and supporters, opinion 
actually is (Kohler-Koch 2008; Saurugger 2008). Some of the assumptions 
are that groups apply modern marketing strategies to market their 
positions and gain support, rather than focus on bottom-up opinion 
formation; they employ experts who know about the issues in question but 
not about grassroots opinions; they employ full-time workers with a 
business sense rather than volunteers who are passionate about a cause, 
and organisational structures become streamlined to be more effective 
rather than inclusive (Frantz 2007; 2005). The latter concern includes a 
change of decision-making structures and the rise of groups with decision-
making structures that exclude members from participation in opinion 
formation and reduces their role to financial supporters, so-called cheque-
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book participation, and campaign supporters. The worry in the literature is 
that EU groups are hence no longer representative of their members’ 
interests. As groups, or rather their EU leaderships, become recognised as 
political actors and transnationalise (Frantz 2007), they become more and 
more professional and as a result lose their representativeness (Frantz 
2007; Maloney 2008; Saurugger 2006). This is due to changes in groups’ 
internal organisation (cf Saurugger 2006; Kristan 2007; Maloney 2008; 
Kohler-Koch 2008a; Maloney 2009a) and hence in other words they lose 
the ability to speak for their rank-and-file. Professionalisation as a result of 
recognition is increasingly regarded in the literature as threatening to result 
in the creation of specialised and isolated EU level groups (cf Saurugger 
2008; Maloney 2009). The strategy to engage civil society representatives 
of umbrella associations is considered to lead to a narrow dialogue, 
neglecting grassroots organisations, enhancing co-optation and a change in 
the resource focus of groups towards the EU level as opposed to internal 
opinion formation and decision-making. Thus the integrity of vertical 
communication and participation within these organisations, particularly 
with national and sub-national members, is seen to be threatened. The risk 
portrayed is a separation of EU level concerns from the members and 
recognition in the light of institutional opportunities and resource 
dependencies is thought to affect ability to actually be representative 
(Sudbery 2003, 89f; cf Saurugger 2006). Scholars consequently criticise 
groups’ ability to bring the EU closer to the citizens (Smismans 2002) and 
act as democratic agents for EU decision-making (Saurugger 2006; Maloney 
2008; Saurugger 2008). 
Theoretical	and	empirical	assumptions	of	the	
traditional	view	
This thesis argues that the view in the traditional literature on how 
groups professionalise and why they lose representativeness is too narrow. 
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Recognition, or professionalisation, and representativeness are not 
irreconcilable or incompatible. One of the reasons people construct this 
dichotomy is because it is based on an out-dated, narrow notion of 
representation, conceptionally (cf Mansbridge 2003; Saward 2006; Halpin 
2006; O’Neill 2001) and practically. Therefore the Commission’s strategy 
may not be doomed. 
The theoretical assumptions for the concept of group representation 
are, as argued here, derived from representative democracy theory. 
Advocacy groups active in the general interest are assumed to have the 
same organisational structures and strategies of representation as political 
parties. Moreover, the assumption of a trade-off between recognition and 
representativeness has already been suggested in other interest group 
literature, based on the very same traditional logic of representation. 
Corporatist and party political studies detected developments away from 
the representation of rank-and-file and a mellowing of interests as a result 
of organisational centralisation and professionalisation (Michels 1911; for 
decreasing social anchorage see also Katz 1990; Katz et al. 1992; Mair and 
Biezen 2001; Poguntke 2002). Advocacy groups drawn into formalised 
relationships with the Commission are thought to experience the same kind 
of tensions and developments towards bureaucratisation. 
The following section explains the theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings for the representativeness-professionalisation dichotomy 
argument in the traditional literature. 
The	 theory	 behind	 the	 narrow	 representativeness	
conception	
The concept of representativeness is out-dated, because it relies on a 
traditional understanding of member representation through internal 
democratic participation structures. Most research in political 
representation has been carried out by democracy scholars, or more 
precisely parliamentary democracy scholars, who research political 
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representation. This explains why representation has always been 
connected to democratic legitimacy and specifically free and fair elections 
(Rehfeld 2006, 18). In particular since Olson (1965), the theory concerning 
the legitimacy of political groups has also been derived from 
representational democracy and hence their representativeness is based on 
representative democracy standards (qv Halpin 2006; Kohler-Koch 2009, 
55). In his contested (cf. Marsh 1976) economic rational choice theory, he 
focused on the democratic legitimacy of (economic) lobby groups. Olson 
maintained that not all interests will organise, and  argued that the logic of 
collective action will lead members of (large) groups to join and to act in 
the group's common interest only if motivated by personal (economic, 
social) gains. As he himself declared, his theory is not appropriate for 
explaining general interest groups active on behalf of the common good as 
opposed to primarily their own direct benefit. Moreover, in Olson’s view 
membership matters for representativeness, because representativeness 
depends on the personal gains of members. However, in groups claiming to 
represent a cause such as biodiversity, it is not individual members which 
the group claims to represent. Personal economic and social gains are not 
the core motivating factor, even though common goods are by definition 
ultimately beneficial for the broader society. 
An active membership democratically participating in the decision-
making of a group is seen as the means of achieving representation. The 
constituency authorises the electoral representative who is accountable to 
the constituency. Hence the focus of interest group literature in terms of 
groups’ democratic potential has been on the mobilisation of membership 
participation (Jordan and Maloney 2007; Warleigh 2000; 2001). Therefore 
the impact of recognition or rather professionalisation on the 
representativeness of advocacy groups is generally evaluated based on the 
assessment of internal democratic structures – the ‘membership-logic’. 
Looking at the normative theories applied to understand advocacy 
group representation and their contribution to the EU democracy provides 
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an insight into how normative approaches conceptualise 
representativeness. The strategy to enhance the Commission’s democratic 
credentials via the engagement with advocacy groups is based on the 
broader participatory theories such as (neo-)pluralism (Chambers and 
Carver 2008), deliberative democratic theory (Dryzek 1990; Bohman 1996; 
Habermas 1996; Dryzek 2000; Cohen 1989) (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007, 
214) or associative democracy (Hirst 1994; Roßteutscher 2000; Cohen and 
Rogers 1995; cf Saurugger 2007). (Neo-)pluralism and associative 
democracy rest the democratising effect of groups on their 
representativeness of member views. This is because the enhancement of 
the democratic quality of decision-making through associations is based on 
assumptions that firstly, they provide citizens with the opportunity to 
influence political decision-making by channelling and representing 
citizens’ interests in political deliberations and decision-making (Curtin 
1999; Sudbery 2003, 86). They act as intermediaries or transmission belts 
between the EU citizens and EU decision-makers (Kissling and Steffek 2008, 
208). Interest groups are considered to extend both the range and depth of 
citizen’s capacity to participate in politics beyond the electoral vote. 
Citizens can choose when and where to get active, which in turn enhances 
their satisfaction with participatory opportunities (Maloney 2006, 99). 
Representativeness in the liberal democracy theory or pluralism framework 
is an attribute of groups, a pre-requisite for participation in policy-making. 
Here, representativeness together with responsiveness, are criteria to 
measure democratic representation, in other words how well authorisation 
and accountability mechanisms function in groups (Kohler-Koch 2010, 107). 
Associative democracy scholars specifically argue that it should be interest 
groups rather than individuals participating in governance25, because of 
their ability to raise system efficiency whilst at the same time assuring 
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 It is effectively impossible for every citizen to individually participate in every decision. 
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citizen participation (Hirst 1994; Cohen 1995; (Schmalz-Bruns 1995).26 But 
also deliberative theory emphasizes the additional and moreover more 
direct intermediary function of groups between governments (Kohler-Koch 
and Finke 2007; Steffek et al. 2008) or rather in this case the Commission, 
and the transnational publics (Kissling and Steffek 2008, 208). It recognises 
groups as democratically legitimate actors, because their actions are 
assumed to be representing the diverse interests of the ‘base’, general 
values27 and are based on civil society’s trust (Greenwood 2007; Kohler-
Koch 2007).28 The deliberative approach to enhance democratic legitimacy 
is hence through more and better quality of deliberation. Groups voicing 
societal issues of civil society and raising awareness about EU and 
international level issues are understood to create the infrastructure 
required for deliberation (Warleigh 2001; Finke 2005). They publicly 
communicate and deliberate, voice citizens’ concerns and force issues on or 
up the political agenda (Warren 2001, 70–93); Steffek, Kissling et al. 
2008). 29  Individual group representativeness is hence not relevant in 
deliberative democracy, rather it is the communicative capacity of groups, 
the diversity of views voiced, the quality of the deliberative discourse and 
its publicity or rather the connection of the discourse across EU multiple 
levels (Kohler-Koch 2010, 107). Whilst representativeness in participatory 
theories is conceptualised as the representativeness of member and 
                                                      
26 “
This argument is based on the classical idea developed by Truman (1951) that the representation 
of interests through the group system is certainly neither perfect nor without bias, but that the 
diversity of groups helps to preserve a rather equal representation of all interests” (Saurugger 2008, 
1277). 
27 “Deliberation is central to democracy, because it focuses political debates on the common good: 
in fact, it is the interests, preferences and aims that comprise the common good that ‘survive’ the 
process of deliberation” (Steffek and Nanz 2008, 5). 
28 Kohler-Koch and Finke (2007, 214) specify three ways in which deliberation in the public sphere is 
valuable to a political system: agenda-setting, the generation of reasons by the public sphere which 
can be used by decision-makers to justify their actions based on the general interest, and the 
generation of ‘better-reasoned decisions’, because debates are not restricted by formal rules (such 
as in parliamentary debates). Groups in political deliberations may not only widen the range of 
interests but also of arguments and concerns in a major way (Kissling and Steffek 2008, 208). 
29 Civil associations are moreover believed to have developmental effects, in other words civil 
associations help to educate citizens in political skills and civic virtues (Putnam 2000). Moreover, 
groups help building a transnational identification (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Sudbery 2003). The 
combination of these roles is assumed to create a ‘sense of ownership’, an identification with the EU, 
ultimately ensuring stability (Sudbery 2003, 95). 
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supporter views and is considered a pre-condition for democratic 
participation, in deliberative theory it is the representativeness of the 
population of groups as a whole, also called “system representativeness” 
(Borragán and Smismans 2012), that make interest representation a 
democratic contributor to decision-making.  
Since deliberative theory is popular with EU participatory democracy 
scholars, this might explain why the majority of EU studies on groups' 
democratising potential, professionalisation and representativeness neglect 
the internal group organisation and behavioural dimension, but focus on 
equal and diverse access and influence (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007, 214). 
Nevertheless, although officially promoted in EU documents, the 
participatory practice at EU level is not along deliberative criteria, but 
resembles associative democracy (Saurugger 2006). 
The restriction of most interest group studies to access and 
representation in formal participation mechanisms (see the 'principled 
conception’, Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007, 214) 30  lead scholarship to 
traditionally discuss representativeness in terms of equal access and 
participation, and thus of the interest group population as a whole. The 
question is how representative the landscape of groups with access to and 
influence through consultations and other participatory mechanisms is, 
with regards to the diversity of interests represented and the types of 
interest groups representing (Greenwood 2003; Kohler-Koch and Finke 
2007, 217). Whilst the individual (internal) group perspective analyses the 
ability of groups to act as democratising agents, the population perspective 
analyses the conditions for the realisation of democratic agency. Both the 
population as well as the internal conception assume that groups have to 
                                                      
30
 The ‘functional conception’ they present in the context of the EU on the other hand is much more 
complex and takes into account the contribution of civil society to the democratic quality of the 
entire multi-level EU political system. To explore the contribution of societal group involvement from 
this complex approach, scholars resort to normative theories, such as neo-pluralism, deliberative 
democratic theory (Dryzek 1990; Bohman 1996; Habermas 1996; Dryzek 2000; Kohler-Koch and 
Finke 2007, 214) or associative democracy (Saurugger 2008; Hirst 1994). 
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have internal democracy structures and member participation to be 
representative. The population perspective evaluates representativeness 
on the basis of participatory democracy norms, and the individual 
perspective evaluates group representativeness based on representative 
democracy, or rather political party, norms of representation. 
The	 empirical	 assumptions	 behind	 the	 narrow	
professionalisation	conception	
Today’s professionalisation literature on advocacy groups argues the 
same incompatibility between professionalisation and representativeness 
that corporatist and political party literature did, grounded in the 
traditional conception of representativeness. They detect the same 
tensions, where recognition is assumed to lead to bureaucratisation, co-
optation and remoteness from members. Both strands of literature base 
their understandings of democratic input on group representativeness 
through the logic of membership derived from representative democracy 
theory that is organisational representation through elections and voting. 
Effects of professionalisation, or bureaucratisation, on representativeness 
are hence judged analysing principal-agent relationships and participation. 
Trade unions and political parties were considered to be undemocratic, 
because their bureaucratisation was thought to hamper their linkage 
function. In the same way traditionalists criticise what is happening to 
advocacy groups as they are becoming institutionally recognised.  
The broader interest group literature, including political parties, use 
both of the terms bureaucratisation and professionalisation, which are, 
however, not clearly defined and are often treated as equivalent. 
‘Bureaucratisation’ is characterised by standardised procedures, formal 
division of responsibility, hierarchy, and impersonal social relationships 
(Weber 1922). The term was particularly prominent in the trade union and 
political party scholarship at the beginning and late twentieth century 
(Michels 1911; Offe 1984; Pizzorno 1981; Sabel 1981), concerned with co-
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optation and changes in internal organisational structures that affect 
internal democracy and bottom-up representation as a result of 
recognition. Professionalisation has become the dominant term in more 
recent party and interest group scholarship and is used similarly. It refers to 
changes in organisational and structural changes towards established and 
efficient organisations, such as the increasing use of expertise and efficient 
coordination structures. It describes changes in organisational values and 
expertise, such as the employment of professional staff with private sector 
experience as opposed to volunteers with non-profit backgrounds and the 
moderation of original policy goals.  
Robert Michels developed one of the first major critical theories in 
context of the professionalisation or rather bureaucratisation of groups, 
called the ‘iron law of oligarchy’, which he developed based on a detailed 
empirical study of the German Social Democratic Party. Any group requires 
leadership and coordination, which is necessarily realised by 
bureaucratisation and specialisation. However, any leadership organising 
itself will develop its own interest, thus leading to a rise in power and 
corruption amongst leadership groups.31 The consequence is that any 
organisation, regardless how democratic it may be to begin with, will 
develop into an oligarchy, an internal power elite (Michels 1911). The 
interests of a professionalised party oligarchy will become more and more 
distanced from those of the voters, developing their personal interests in 
maintaining their position of power (Michels 1911).  
By the 1950s and 1960s the view that oligarchy is endemic in any kind 
of organisation was contested.32 Interest group representation as such was 
not much of an issue during times of economic growth and low levels of 
                                                      
31
 Poguntke also detects a rearrangement of inner party power balances to the benefit of the party’s 
public office (Poguntke 2003, 8). 
32
 Michels iron law led to various studies on inter party decision-making processes and although 
Michels is seen as raising valid attention to the dependencies between political functions and 
organisational conditions, his empirical grounds and conclusions are disputed (Poguntke 2003). 
Several authors understand parties as internally fragmented leading to a multiplication of power 
centres, a phenomenon for which empirical evidence has moreover been collected for parties at EU 
level (Katz et al. 1992; Widfeldt 1995; Poguntke, 2000; Scarrow 2000; Mair and Biezen 2001).  
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social tension; but during the economic, social and political shocks of the 
late 1960s attention moved to the role of interest groups in the democratic 
state. Still, in American political science, representation was not the focus 
of interest group studies; rather it was the role of groups as intermediators 
between society and state and their contribution to economic growth and 
stagnation or political stability and instability. Also, the prevailing opinion 
that the formation of interests is determined by socio-economic structures 
(Committee on Comparative Politics, see Berger 1981, 6) or advanced by 
individuals with private aims (Olson 1965) gave no reasons to raise the 
question of representation. Olson instead focussed very much on collective 
action itself and the problem of representativeness was left untouched. He 
claimed that some interests could in fact not be organised. Researching 
trade unions, he put forward the argument that groups of individuals with 
common interests do not necessarily tend to further their common 
interests as generally presupposed by American political scientists at the 
time.33 As soon as groups of a certain size start sharing their costs of efforts 
and grow, this results in a tendency towards exploitation of the great by the 
small. 
Social theory in the 1950s and 1960s did on the other hand 
investigate the relationships of power within groups and more precisely 
whether groups were representing the interests of members or their 
bureaucratic leaders, contesting the applicability of Michels iron law of 
oligarchy (Eldersveld 1958, 185; Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956). Lipset 
provided some empirical basis for the argument that a competition 
between leaders gave members some control over outcome (Lipset, Trow, 
and Coleman 1956). But other than quantitative surveys between 
organised and unorganised interests of the population (Almond 1958, 271), 
the issue of representation was not taken any further (see Berger 1981 for 
a short overview).  
                                                      
33
 Olson’s argument as he states it is however not valid for small groups, who "...[i]n many cases […] 
are more efficient and viable than large ones" (Olson 1965). 
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In the 1970s and 1980s a new strand of literature raised doubts about 
the mostly optimistic view of scholars of interest group representation. 
Organisational forms were now seen as part of the process of the definition 
of interest and no longer just as given by socio-economic structures and 
national specifics. The questions of why particular groups emerge, what 
they do and what impact they have, moved to the centre of attention and 
with that the problematic of representation re-emerged. Institutional 
recognition was considered not only to be shaping forms and strategies, 
but also content and definition of interests. Co-optation - diverting 
preferences and mellowing of conflicting interests through an assimilation 
of interest groups into institutional governance cultures and power 
structures - was back on the agenda. The debate evolved around different 
systems of interest group regulation, mainly corporatism and pluralism, and 
their effect on group representation. The definition of the ‘linkage’ (Lawson 
1980) between political institutions and society (Sartori 1976)34, was found 
amongst other factors to depend on organisational characteristics, such as 
the internal condition of a political party.35 This linkage was defined in 
other words as the political function of parties and the representative and 
intermediary roles that managers of selected, centralised business interest 
groups and trade unions play (Lijphart 1968) between international 
bureaucrats and voters (Streeck and Schmitter 1991). Several party political 
and corporatist studies turned empirical concerns toward changes in 
internal organisational structures and toward a development of 
organisational elites aggravating the linkage function as a result of 
recognition. The political party literature maintains that recognition, in the 
sense that a party becomes a parliamentary party, leads to 
professionalisation which affects internal party structures and lines of 
                                                      
34
 Political parties, or ‘party pluralism’, translate “mass preferences into public policy” (Key 1961, 
433) and channel public preferences (Sartori 1976, 25) by organizing “the chaotic public will” 
(Neumann 1956, 397). 
35
 Good overviews on comparative research on party organisation for example are provided by 
Poguntke and Poole (Poguntke 2003; Poole 1981).  
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accountability creating a top-down party promoting pragmatism over 
ideology (Evans and Sanderson-Nash 2011, 470f). Similarly, Offe argued 
that by providing power and public funds the state could impose a status 
on some groups in corporatist structures; thus a small number of selected 
interest groups would end up with a representation monopoly. This 
institutionalisation of interest groups’ authority would then lead to internal 
transformations of the system of representation where some groups act for 
their members (‘class organisations’) and others for influence (‘policy-
takers’). Neo-corporatist groups were hence criticised for acting in self-
interest and not in the interest of the members or the public as well as for 
privileging strategic interests (Offe 1984). Pizzorno described a cyclical 
emergence of interests that would aggregate, bureaucratise, co-opt and 
eventually dissolve after members and leader interests split. The 
institutionalisation and bureaucratisation led to the loss of check and 
control mechanisms of members over leaders and would only ever be there 
during moments of reformation (Pizzorno 1981; Sabel 1981). Schmitter 
came to the same conclusion that groups or rather their leaderships no 
longer represent their members as a result of institutionalisation, though 
he argued this was because of the stability of groups and not part of a cycle 
(Schmitter 1981).  
One aspect of professionalisation raised in the political party 
literature is the development into ‘electoral-professional parties’ 
(Panebianco 1988) with a decreasing social anchorage (Katz 1990; Katz, 
Mair et al. 1992; Mair and Biezen 2001; Poguntke 2002). Trends towards 
efficient management of the economic and social system were related to a 
development of “catch-all” parties in the US around 1945 to 1960s 
(Margetts 2001, 9), determined to win over as many voters as possible with 
a very general political programme, displacing parties bound to clearly 
defined public interests. This is similar to advocacy group critics detecting 
an increasing coverage of broader issues and a search for organisational 
structures and strategies, such as campaigning, attracting mass support 
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rather than member input (Jordan and Maloney 1997). Parties thus became 
suppliers of hardly varying political programmes (Kirchheimer 1965). The 
internal logic of parties became increasingly influenced by their function as 
electoral campaigners (Farrell and Webb 2000; Bowler and Farrell 1992). 
Being a politician became a career rather than an ideological conviction 
(Beyme 1993), something equally observed in the advocacy group world 
(Frantz 2005). The simultaneous stronger reliance on governmental 
alimentation also shifted the focus of parties on mass communication 
rather than representation of specific interests, because of their using more 
and more capital intensive and technologically demanding electoral 
campaign methods.36 A development towards mass-reaching campaign 
groups has also been connected to the large amount of funding EU 
umbrella advocacy groups receive. 
This strategic dilemma between influence and member inclusion, as 
well as ideological and interest moderation as a result of professionalisation 
is exemplified in the literature by using the German green party “Bündnis 
90/die Grünen” (in short “die Grünen”). Green parties are an interesting 
comparison with environmental activist groups, due to their resemblance in 
original ‘movement-party’ structures, in self-understanding as ‘extra-
parliamentary opposition’ and in ideological focus on ‘new issues’ and 
opposition to ‘distant decision-making institutions’ (Bomberg 1998, 26,28; 
Bomberg 2002, 30,33). Elizabeth Bomberg explains how in order to try to 
take advantage of working through the EU, die Grünen had to take 
measures that violated their own grassroots beliefs. Acting as a movement-
party required “a loose, flexible form of political organisation” (Bomberg 
1998, 28). But at the same time, rules set up by the German greens aiming 
to avert organisational rigidity were hindering their effective exploitation of 
their social capital. The rotation practice for instance stopped experienced 
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 In party politics debates, the financial aspect is also found to have precise repercussions on the 
organisational condition and inner organisational decision-making processes of parties, in particular 
affecting their linkage function (Poguntke 2003, 11).  
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and knowledgeable officers from continuing to serve the green party in 
office. Additional conflicts, already apparent at national green party levels, 
were exacerbated at European level due to the great variety of green 
parties cooperating in the European green party network. The inclusion of 
party ministers and senior party officials in EU committees moreover made 
the EU such an important subject that it could not be left to ad hoc groups 
which then resulted in a further “widening of the gulf between Green party 
members (whose knowledge of or interest in EU matters remains slight) 
and party MPs, MEPs and senior party officials who must increasingly deal 
with these issues” (Bomberg 2002, 38). Bomberg argues that strategic 
debates ended up overshadowing the green parties’ more fundamental 
questions. Europeanisation accelerated “the mellowing of Green ideology 
and ‘professionalisation’ of Green party politics” (Bomberg 2002, 29). The 
green parties’ agenda became increasingly focussed on EU issues in order 
to enhance their electoral support and their emphasis shifted towards 
‘safer’ issues that few would oppose, thus privileging certain ‘pragmatic’ 
green issues over more radical grassroots ones. The leadership became 
more centralised and consolidated; the party itself became a more 
professionalised streamline party in response to the rules of EU policy-
making processes as well as demands for internal reform. The gap between 
leadership and rank and file further widened – shifting the core decision 
making power from the grassroots to the central leadership (Bomberg 
2002, 29-46). The participation in European decision making thus had 
strong organisational, strategic and ideological effects on Green parties. 
These are similar concerns of professionalisation to what traditional 
advocacy group scholars raise today and remind of Michels iron law 
(Michels 1911).  
The wider interest group literature provides some analysis of the 
professionalisation of groups and the impact on group representativeness. 
Trade union and political party studies provide some useful food for 
thought regarding to the dangers of professionalisation for 
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representativeness at the individual group level. However, those authors 
apply a very narrow understanding of representativeness as well as 
professionalisation. Representativeness is defined through the formal 
participation in organisational decision-making and their conception of 
professionalisation neglects any modern technology developments. The 
civil society organisation and advocacy group literature on the other hand 
looks mostly at the population perspective of representativeness and also 
ignores recent technological developments and their implications for 
internal representative structures. This research looks at the individual 
organisational level of EU advocacy groups. It considers internal 
organisational changes due to recognition or rather professionalisation and 
the effects on individual group representativeness. 
Scholars who have studied traditional advocacy groups and those 
concerned with trade union and political parties make similar arguments 
about recognition leading to professionalisation and bureaucratisation 
affecting representativeness. There are three problems here. Firstly, 
political parties and trade unions do not function in the same way as 
groups advocating in the general interest and secondly, the theoretical and 
conceptual approach misses the point of how advocacy group 
representativeness should be defined. The linkage function, based on 
which scholars judge the representativeness of groups, is considered to be 
affected by internal organisational structures. Political party and trade 
union decision-making is formalised by voting systems in which members 
participate. However advocacy group members and supporters often have 
different representation demands and groups hence have developed 
varying decision-making structures. An example is network-structured 
advocacy groups, in particular supporter groups, with demands to 
represent a common cause through alternative ways of forming positions. 
Third, conclusions drawn on what effect professionalisation has on 
advocacy group representativeness are taken using the same traditional 
principal-agent criteria that are applied for trade unions and political 
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parties. This traditional conception of representativeness does not do 
justice to the complex dynamics of group representativeness but is still 
linked to traditional representative democracy. It is not appropriate in the 
cases of cause groups, who resemble an important number of (EU) 
advocacy groups. 
Professionalisation	and	representativeness	in	the	broader	
democratic	theory	discourse	
Though the strategy to bring the people closer to the EU is aimed at 
improving the democratic credentials of the Commission’s decision-making, 
the wider democratic theory discourse has little to offer with regards to this 
study’s research question. Interestingly, the main strands of the normative 
EU democracy scholarship give only peripheral attention to civil society or 
indeed advocacy group professionalisation. Coming from a parliamentary 
democracy perspective, they look at technocratic governance, the 
weaknesses of the European Parliament, and the prevalence of national 
ministries interests in the European Council with a lack of democratic 
backing in the member states. Though there is a lot of literature on 
participatory democracy, the strategy of enhancing democratic credentials 
through advocacy group participation in European political decision-making 
is ignored by the main strands of the wider EU democracy debate. The 
literature looks at the parliamentary road as the only road out of the 
democratic deficiency problem.  
The particularity of the EU in the democracy debate is the 
introduction of another political level, which has confused familiar 
relationships and balances of political legitimacy. 37  The application of 
national democratic legitimacy concepts to transnational levels has turned 
out to be complex and moreover one that is contested. As a result, 
                                                      
37
 A detailed overview on the conceptions of democracy at EU level can be found in Kohler-Koch. and 
Rittberger (2007). An overview on the conceptions towards the role of civil society in EU governance 
is given by Kohler-Koch (2010). 
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discussions tackling the (desired) political identity and (deficit) function of 
the EU as well as related legal regulatory requirements for the evolving 
patterns of cooperation have risen to the forefront of the academic as well 
as political debate.38 Arguments have taken on-board different perspectives 
on the dimensions of modern political democracies: decision-making, 
representation and citizenship.  
The heart of the debate about the legitimacy of the EU evolved 
around the criteria of autonomy versus effectiveness (Scharpf 1996; 
Midgaard 1997; Schmidt 1997)39, and is essentially about the search for the 
right balance between democracy (autonomy) and efficiency. Some 
scholars do not even see a democratic deficiency in the EU or the 
Commission. A normative argument made by the ‘technocrats’ is that there 
is not actually any democracy problem because efficient outcomes 
legitimise EU policies (Majone 1999; Moravcsik 2002). Two of the most 
prominent adherents, Majone and Moravcsik, believe that the EU is in fact 
as democratic and accountable as international governance will probably 
get. Most scholars supporting the latter position take an inter-
governmentalist approach or allocate democratic control over decision 
making for the most part to nation states and their governments. For them 
indirect input legitimation through national states, and more precisely 
national parliaments, together with EU output legitimacy through effective 
policy outcomes is sufficient to legitimize EU politics (Majone 1998; 
Moravcsik 2002). This specific debate around elitism and technocratic 
governance touches on professionalisation, but the discussion is about the 
professionalisation of politics and outsourcing of regulatory services to 
independent agencies, sometimes called ‘quasi-non-governmental-
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 Also referred to as ‘democracy and legitimacy beyond the nation state’ (Dahl 1999; Featherstone 
1994; Follesdal and Hix 2006; Moravcsik 2004; Scharpf 1999; Zweifel 2006).
 
39
 In the democratic legitimacy debate Scharpf assesses the conflict between ‘autonomy’ and 
‘effectiveness’ as dimensions of the normative criterion of “democratic self-determination” (1996, 
136). These he believes can have a negative empirical connection, meaning that in certain cases, one 
needs to be traded-off for the other - but both are necessary to achieve a democratic system. 
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organisations’, rather than the professionalisation of advocacy groups and 
the impact on their role in interest group representation.40  
The other core argumentation on democratic legitimacy in the EU 
arose around the relation of political authority and political loyalty and is 
essentially about defining channels of public support for political decisions 
giving citizens the right to self-regulation and political equality. Many 
scholars believe that there is a deficit of public control with political 
equality, which requires improvements of input legitimacy at EU level 
(Arnull and Wincott 2002; Hix 1999; Zweifel 2006). The underlying 
suggestion in most studies is that citizens will only accept the EU as 
legitimate if its institutions provide participation opportunities for citizens 
to shape EU decision-making just as they expect it on a national level 
(Sudbery 2003, 95).41 On a national level, the citizens of a state provide the 
national government bodies with authority to exercise direct legislative and 
redistributive powers that affect the citizens within the state. But the idea 
that it is not only the citizens of one nation deciding over one nation’s fate 
challenges our traditional view. Instead some ‘far away’ EU regulatory body 
exercises direct legislative and redistributive powers that affect citizens and 
their governments, authorised by citizens of other nations. The result is a 
gap between the demands for a political authority at the EU level on the 
one hand and the (missing) ‘popular loyalty’ that is required to support 
                                                      
40
 The empirical debate revolves around a Brussels elite circle dominated by business experts, who 
are not democratically accountable, but take decisions and decide on regulations without due 
hearings, transparency and publicity (Middlemans 1995, 612 cited in Eriksen and Fossum 2002, 404). 
This technocratic governance is considered to be unable to aggregate particularistic interests (Steffek 
and Nanz 2008, 6). Expert deliberation is recognised to lack a strong link for communication between 
the European constituency on the one hand and the EU institutions on the other (Steffek and Nanz 
2008, 6). 
41
 Hence in theory, IGOs are often looked at as some sort of “international state […with a…] global 
polity and a global population” (Zweifel, 2006, 13) in order to permit the application of the concept 
of democracy to IGOs. As an analytical framework to find out whether IGOs are democratic and 
represent the global citizens, Zweifel discusses seven input ‘dimensions of transnational democracy’. 
These are 1) ‘appointment and removal of power’, 2) participation, 3) transparency, 4) reason-giving, 
5) overrule, 6) monitoring, 7) independence and, together with one output dimension ‘effectiveness 
and performance’ Zweifel (2006). However, most scholars argue that large multi-level and 
multinational IGOs are most unlikely to ever resemble governance structures like a democratic 
nation-state, and in any case it is probably undesirable that they ever would (Stein 2001). An 
exception is the EU, where we find positive as well as negative evaluations of its democratic quality 
and legitimacy. Zweifel for example asserts that the EU “comes close to the world’s most democratic 
federal polities” such as Switzerland and the US (Zweifel 2002, 812ff; Zweifel 2006, 13).  
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such a transnational authority on the other. The theoretical basis for the 
argument above is parliamentary democracy in which national parliaments 
and the European Parliament are the only channels considered for public 
support. The EU democratic deficit arguments hence revolve around 
deficits in the political authority of the European Parliament.42 They do not 
however consider the alternative channel of public support for political 
decisions via advocacy groups. 
These main normative strands thus come to their conclusions by 
applying representative democracy theory. The participatory role of civil 
society or organised civil society is hardly mentioned at all. Some scholars 
assume the absence of a civil society representation dialogue is because 
representative and participatory democracy have traditionally been 
considered a dichotomy (Trenz 2008, 54; Kohler-Koch 2007).  
A further group of normative scholars critiques the distance between 
EU institutions and ordinary EU citizens. Direct access to EU institutions is 
criticised as not fully defined (Schmitter 2000, 3) and hence citizens feel 
they have little influence on and possibilities for involvement in the 
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 Hix for example points out that European executive actors such as the Council and the Commission 
make the bulk of EU decisions whilst the national parliaments’ control is reduced as governments 
can ignore them or can be out-voted in the Council’s Qualified Majority Voting procedure (Hix, 2005, 
177). The intense debate in the 1980s around the weakness of the European Parliament resulted in 
several changes of legal procedures, including a bicameral legislature of the Parliament alongside the 
Council of Ministers established in the Lisbon Treaty which entered into force in 2009. Furthermore, 
there is the second-order election criticism which refers to a “second ranking importance” of the 
European Parliament elections in comparison to first-order elections that are considered important 
by politicians, media and public. The ranking is estimated, amongst other aspects, through voter 
turnouts. Participation in European Parliament elections is low, far lower than compared to national 
general elections, which can be interpreted as indicating the low reputation of the parliament’s 
power, a low awareness of its role amongst civil society, and/or simply the absence of public interest 
in European politics. Participation has in fact been continuously decreasing, despite several reforms 
increasing the power of the Parliament. The declining participation and interest is reflected 
furthermore in the failure to push for the establishment of truly pan-European political parties. Reif 
and Schmitt criticise European Parliament elections as being determined predominantly by domestic 
cleavages instead of by EU-originating alternatives and thus “the directly elected European 
Parliament does not precisely reflect the “real” balance of political forces in the European 
Community” (1980, 3; Bache and George 2006, 20). The formation of national preferences therefore 
does not resemble preferences citizens would put forward at the European level (Hix, 2005, 206). 
Meanwhile, Hix concludes that citizens have no opportunity to choose any rival policies on EU issues 
nor can they “‘throw out’ those who exercise political power at the EU level” (Hix 2005, 206; 
Follesdal and Hix 2006). Hix argues political competition plays an essential role in the formation of 
citizens’ preferences because competitive elections foster a political debate at EU level, which gives 
citizens the opportunity to form their own opinion, based on which they can vote and thus provide 
legitimacy for a government’s policy-making (2005, 179f). 
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‘remote’ EU institutions (Bogdanor and Woodcock 1991, 492). Failing to 
take this public opinion into account is considered to carry the danger of 
“popular alienation and hostility” (ibid) towards the EU.43 The resulting 
challenge is seen in “[bridging] the gap between elite proposals and 
popular perceptions” (Bogdanor and Woodcock, 1991, 492).44 It is amongst 
these scholars where participatory democracy finds mention (Warren 2001; 
Collingwood 2006; Maloney 2006; Greenwood 2007; Kohler-Koch 2010). 
The theoretical background for organised civil society participation is 
interest group pluralism, which provides enhanced participation 
opportunities by recognising diverse interests in the form of interest groups 
whose opinions are taken into account in the decision-making processes 
alongside the traditional mechanism of parliamentary or assembly votes 
(Czempiel and Rosenau 1992; Schulze 1994).45 The argument is that a 
stimulation of political and civic engagement can balance out assumed 
deficiencies in representative modern democracies (Maloney 2006, 99) and 
will enhance the democratic quality of policy making. The Commission’s 
mandate requires it to consult the diverse voices of the European citizens 
and hence forms the basis of its legitimacy.46 This is where the strategy of 
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 Lack of influence and lack of involvement of many citizens is apparent i.e. through the declining EP 
election participation (see below). Decreasing participation in EP elections moreover makes precise 
commitments for the EU difficult. 
44
 Amongst the problem-solving suggestions is supplementing representative democracy with direct 
democracy measures which according to Scharpf generate more legitimacy (1996, 137). One 
suggestion is “the direct election of an executive” (Bogdanor and Woodcock 1991, 489) or rather “a 
(partial) presidential/interlocking system” (Hix 1998, 19) where the Commission president is 
indirectly elected by national parliaments (Hix 2002). This way a “genuine system of competitive 
party democracy” (Hix, 2005, 176; q.v. Hix 1998, 19) may develop that may eventually form a 
European identity. However Hix also mentions behavioural changes required to make this system 
work (Hix 2005, 176f). A further suggestion brought forward to “bridge the gap” is the use of 
referendums for certain EU issues (Bogdanor and Woodcock 1991, 489). 
45
 This strategy is moreover closely connected to political integration and the creation of a single 
political space, making the international level the realm of political participation as opposed to the 
national level (Kohler-Koch 2008a, 21). 
46
 The European Commission in its White Paper on Governance expresses its wish for itself and the 
EU as a whole to be a legitimate, democratic player that is respected and understood by the citizen. 
To achieve this, it strongly emphasises the need to improve effectiveness of all governance processes 
with, within and amongst EU institutions on multiple levels. The Commission explains that even 
though the EU is neither like a national government nor can it deliver policy making in the same way 
as national governments (European Commission 2001, 32), people still expect the EU to do politics 
similarly to their national political institutions. Quoting the Commission, the EU has to meet citizens’ 
expectations, though in different ways: It has to build partnerships with a wide variety of actors 
(2001, 32). 
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the European Commission to enhance its democratic credentials via the 
engagement with advocacy groups has its roots. In this context, the 
Commission wants to strengthen the role of groups as facilitators of a 
broad policy dialogue giving a voice to civil society’s views 47  as an 
alternative form of participation next to representation (e.g. Greenwood 
2007, 177; Maloney 2008, 70; Czempiel 1993, Kissling and Steffek 2008, 
209f). The legitimacy of this form of representation “is closely linked to the 
fundamental right of citizens to form associations in order to pursue a 
common purpose” (European Commission 2002, 5). 
Nevertheless, the strand of the normative literature promoting 
enhanced participatory channels does not touch interest group 
professionalisation and at the same time, the literature that engages in 
professionalisation of groups is relatively disconnected with the EU 
democratic legitimacy debate. As the normative democratic deficit model 
does not engage with the questions on how group professionalisation 
affects their representativeness and what group representativeness means, 
it is not directly relevant to this thesis. 
The larger EU democratic deficit and legitimacy literature investigates 
systemic structures, such as the inclusion of citizens either directly through 
the parliament or indirectly through nation states. Recent legitimacy 
literature suggests a third channel of citizen engagement via the 
Commission. However suggestions in this strand of the literature are of 
systemic nature, disregard the micro-level of such engagement dynamics 
and are not based on empirical observations. This is crucial, because they 
cannot be compared with parliamentarian structures. The dynamic of the 
inclusion of the citizens – or rather civil society - via the Commission works 
differently to the representative structures discussed in the grand 
democratic deficit literature since we are confronted with an 
                                                      
47
 Civil society [organisations] play “an important role in giving voice to the concerns of the citizens 
and delivering services that meet people’s needs” (European Commission 2001). 
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administration. Concerning the “bridging the gap strategy”, the Commission 
actually engages with EU level confederations of solidarity groups and their 
interests, rather than with the individual citizen and their vote. Civil society 
and interest group literature on the other hand has indeed touched on 
groups acting as mediators between the Commission and the citizen, as 
well as on the democratic credentials this strategy might improve. But again 
it largely neglects the effects of recognition on the internal dynamics of 
groups. Few authors have investigated internal dynamics of confederated 
groups and a recently discussed problematic is the professionalisation of 
groups as a result of recognition which is assumed to be hampering their 
ability to act as mediators. However detailed studies are missing. Studies 
either raise problems based on normative assumptions that lack empirical 
underpinning, or empirical studies are based on normative assumptions 
derived from theories that are grounded in representative democratic 
theory. This study fills this gap by undertaking a systematic empirical 
analysis of the internal dynamics of groups, in order to investigate whether 
the engagement between the Commission and advocacy groups is a zero-
sum relationship in terms of its democratic credentials. It thereby connects 
the grand but macro-level EU democratic deficit literature with the 
empirical observations of the civil society literature. The study suggests that 
though problems do at times arise through recognition, it is an empirical 
question whether the relation is zero-sum or not, rather than a feature that 
can be defined by definitional fiat.  
In the broader context of groups’ potential to enhance democratic EU 
decision-making, it is important to point to the fact that, though a large 
body of literature takes into account pluralist understandings of how groups 
can enhance the democratic quality of decision making, professionalisation 
criticism of advocacy or lobbying groups seems to be disconnected from 
the wider pluralist debate. The underlying perception of participation and 
group democratising qualities in most studies is restricted to access and 
representation in formal participation mechanisms (Kohler-Koch and Finke 
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2007, 214). ‘Functional participation’ (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007, 207), 
taking into account the contribution of civil society to the democratic 
quality of the entire multi-level EU-system (outside the institutional 
system), is largely neglected by group professionalisation critics.  
Conclusion	
As the argument above makes clear, the Commission’s strategy to 
enhance the quality of its decision-making is not doomed. The assumption 
in the traditional interest group literature that groups professionalise as a 
result of formal recognition and thus lose their representativeness (Kohler-
Koch 2010, 111; Kohler-Koch 2008; Sudbery 2003; Warleigh 2001) is based 
on a too narrow conception of representativeness and an out-dated 
empirical conception of professionalisation. The conclusion reached by the 
traditional literature is limited only to a range of cases. It does not apply to 
all types. Organisational structures and strategies of representation differ 
between advocacy groups, not only as opposed to trade unions and 
political parties, but also amongst advocacy groups themselves. These 
differences require a reconsideration of membership-logic as a basis for 
representativeness. Moreover, updating the concept of professionalisation 
beyond bureaucratisation, to include the increasing application of new 
media technology, calls for a fresh look at the effects of professionalisation 
on organisational structures and strategies of group representation.   
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3	 The	diversity	of	group	
representativeness	and	
professionalisation	
There are theoretical, conceptual and empirical problems with the 
traditional approach to the assumed dichotomy of professionalisation and 
representativeness. The aim of this thesis is to open up the 
representativeness-professionalisation dichotomy and in this context the 
narrow view on advocacy groups and their representation potential. The 
existing literature on interest groups applies traditional conceptions of 
representativeness that are accommodating neither the diversity of 
organisational structures and strategies of advocacy groups, nor recent 
technological advancements impacting organisational structures and 
strategies. Instead professionalisation is confined to organisational 
bureaucratisation such as expert staff and streamlined structures as well as 
co-optation. This thesis connects wider perceptions of representativeness 
in interest group studies with findings in communication and media studies 
on organisational implications of technological advancements such as the 
internet and social media. Professionalisation in new media technology can 
have precise implications for structures of communication and 
participation. It points out the discrepancy and lack of communication 
between the different scholarly approaches. Broadening both conceptions 
may lead to different conclusions on the implications of professionalisation 
for group representativeness. The findings for bureaucratising political 
parties and trade unions may not hold true for professional advocacy 
groups. This chapter elaborates the theoretical and empirical basis for such 
a revision. 
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Traditional literature on group representativeness has not considered 
organisational differences between advocacy groups and other interest 
groups beyond remarks about the difficulty of organising diffuse interests 
and hence their disadvantaged starting position in gaining access and 
having an impact at EU level.48 But the relevance of analysing and taking 
into account organisational differences is much more important than that. 
It determines, as will be discussed in this chapter, what type of 
representative claim a groups puts forward and how it does so, as well as 
what type of members/supporters a group has. That in turn impacts how a 
group’s representativeness can be judged – and how the impact of 
professionalisation on a group may be judged. 
This thesis argues for a much more nuanced response to the 
question, whether groups can be representative. The first section of this 
chapter shows the limitations of the traditional conception of 
representation as a result of its origins in representative democracy, or 
democratic representation in political parties. It suggests alternative 
approaches to understanding group representativeness, taking into account 
the diversity of organisational structures and strategies and suggesting a 
two-dimensional character of representativeness. The second section 
highlights the roots and shortcomings of the narrow traditional conception 
of professionalisation, or rather bureaucratisation. Bureaucratisation 
carries different implications for the diverse organisational structures and 
strategies of representation. Moreover, the thesis analyses the implications 
of new media technology for representativeness. The chapter concludes 
that progressive conceptions of professionalisation and representativeness 
lead to different conclusions for the impact of professionalisation on group 
representativeness. Further empirical studies revising the 
professionalisation-representativeness dichotomy assumed in the 
traditional interest group literature are needed. The Commission’s strategy 
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 There are studies describing also the diversity within advocacy groups active in the general 
interest, including the diversity amongst cause groups such as environmental groups (Greenwood 
2003, 175-229), but these have not been applied to the representativeness assumption. 
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to enhance its democratic credentials by engaging with advocacy groups 
might not be doomed. 
Diverse	organisational	structures	and	two-
dimensional	representativeness		
The traditional conception of group representativeness is based on 
member participation in internal decision-making. Positions are formed 
based on member input and representation is thus taking place to further 
members’ interests (cf ‘promissory’ and ‘anticipatory’ representation by 
Mansbridge 2003). Recent studies on political parties and advocacy groups 
have, however, found that representation is more diverse and depends on 
the organisational structures and strategies of groups, including their type 
of constituency and beneficiaries (Halpin 2006; Mansbridge 2003; O’Neill 
2001). The following section connects recent insights in the political party 
and interest group literature and attempts to redefine the concept of 
advocacy group representation. The thesis moreover suggests that 
representativeness is two-dimensional, requiring not only an acceptable 
structure of position formation, but also the acceptance of the 
‘representative claim’ (Saward 2006) by group members and supporters. 
Acceptable	 formation	 of	 positions:	 The	 acceptability	
dimension	of	representativeness	
Since the traditional theoretical framework is linked to representative 
democracy or rather democratic representation, traditional interest group 
scholars approach the judgement of how professionalisation affects group 
representativeness by analysing impacts on member participation and 
mobilisation. This conception is linked to the principal-agent form of 
representation we find in elected representation that constitutes 
representative democratic theory. In other words, representativeness is 
judged by groups’ internal democratic structures. Groups are considered 
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representative if members have a say in organisational decision-making and 
decide on the positions and activities of a group.  
Evaluating the representativeness of advocacy groups using the 
membership-logic as yardstick is problematic. Before one can measure 
representativeness, it is crucial to open up the dynamics of representation 
and ascertain who or what groups actually represent and how they do it. 
Do members elect their leadership to represent their interests one-on-one, 
or does the leadership represent interests that members support? Is 
representativeness necessarily based on membership participation, or can 
members and supporters be represented through alternative modes? In 
the case of public interest groups, who benefits from the interests 
represented, the members and supporters specifically, the wider society, or 
the future society and those with no voice? The argument here is that the 
diverse dynamics of representativeness require a more nuanced 
assessment of what makes a group representative and ultimately what 
criteria need to be applied to evaluate their democratising potential. It 
points to the need to open up and adapt the logic of representation to the 
dynamics and dimensions of advocacy groups in a multilevel network 
environment. The general issues of representativeness are moreover 
complicated by the development of multi-level governance. This complexity 
is a particular feature of policy-making in the EU. Analysing the effects of 
professionalisation on representativeness, it engages with the concept of 
representation in context of advocacy groups, a field largely neglected 
(however see recent work by Halpin 2006; O’Neill 2001), as well as with 
literature on the representation of interest groups and political parties 
more broadly (Burke 1782; Mansbridge 2003; Saward 2006).  
Representation in advocacy groups is different to representation in 
the electoral system. However judgements of representativeness and the 
impact of professionalisation on the latter have so far mainly been based 
on theories of representativeness originating in traditional representative 
democracy theories. These theories are not comprehensive enough and 
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indeed inappropriate for explaining the dynamics and characteristics of 
group representation. The traditional conception of representation is 
derived from representative democracy theories, where representativeness 
is solely gained through voting/formal participation structures. Recent 
(Halpin 2006; O’Neill 2001; Mansbridge 2003; Saward 2006) and other 
literature (Burke 1782) suggests there are different mechanisms of 
representation. Firstly, membership-logic does not do justice to cause 
groups whose representativeness works according to logic of ‘solidarity’ (cf 
O'Neill 2001; Halpin 2006). Also, representativeness does not necessarily 
require the construction of a ‘representative claim’ by the members. Group 
leadership can equally make a legitimate claim which people then choose 
to support as representing their interests (Saward 2006).   
Further, given the fuzzy definition of the character of groups, 
resembled in various labels such as non-governmental organisations, civil 
society organisations or social movements, as well as the vast normative 
democratising expectations raised by sociologists, democracy scholars and 
international relations scholars (for a short overview see Halpin 2010, 1-
24), it appears rather impossible to respond with a flat yes or no to the 
question of groups’ representativeness and democratic potentials (Halpin 
2010, 23f). Groups are indeed very different in the roles they assume, the 
organisational structures and strategies they take on board and the 
(mutual) relationship they develop between leadership and affiliates (cf 
Greenwood 2003, 175-229). One empirical shortcoming is that traditional 
group scholars derive their conclusion that professionalisation and 
representativeness are incompatible mostly through studies with very 
broad or loose definitions of advocacy groups (Warleigh 2001; see Kohler-
Koch and Quittkat 2009 on the broad use of the concept of civil society 
organisations). Only very few studies look solely at groups that have a clear 
general interest purpose as opposed to furthering members business or 
professional interests, even if not-for-profit. Not many theoretical and 
empirical studies differentiate organisational structures and strategies also 
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amongst advocacy groups active in the general interest (cf Halpin 2006, 
O’Neill 2001). Whether or not a group stands for genuine general interests 
makes a difference not only with regards to democratic credentials and 
genuine voice of and for the citizens, but with regards to expectations 
towards representative structures. It also matter whether a group is 
representing a narrow cause such as conventional social movements (e.g. 
abolition of hunting) or are active in the more general interest of the 
environmental cause for example (e.g. Greenpeace). The response to 
democratising expectations requires a much more systematic approach in 
order to understand which types of groups have got what degree of 
representativeness – and how this is affected by professionalisation. 
This thesis defines a group as representative, if the purpose of its 
representative claim is the same as of its members and supporters and if 
the representative claim is accepted as representative by its members and 
supporters. How these same properties come about varies according to 
organisational structures and strategies of representation. Consensus or 
votes are required, if the claim or leadership is to be representing 
members, such as occurs in the case of trade unions. But the same 
properties of interest do not have to come about through member 
participation. They can be brought about through a supporter choosing to 
join a group to support a broad political aim of the group, or a supporter 
might sign a campaign or get active on a single issue campaign in support of 
a specific policy goal. Individuals joining groups based on shared political 
values feel that their interests are voiced by these (cause) groups, hence 
they feel represented and this dynamic needs to be included in the 
judgement of representativeness. From a traditional democratic theory 
perspective, representation through means other than member 
participation does not mean ‘representation’ and hence from this 
perspective there is no need to re-label. It is an asset to have more 
interests represented, but a group with no traditional internal democracy 
will not be considered representative. The point this thesis makes however 
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is that a lot of dynamics do mean representation, if not in the traditional 
context. 
Few attempts have been made to define a more comprehensive 
concept of group representation that will take into account different 
structures of representation, including member or supporter structures. 
Curiously, the concept of representation has recently gained renewed 
attention by political party scholars, questioning the narrow and limited 
understanding of representation in the literature so far (Mansbridge 2003; 
Saward 2006a). Similarly, a small number of scholars have started to 
critically look at the particularities of advocacy group representation, in 
particular of cause groups (Halpin 2006; O’Neill 2001).  
Member versus cause groups 
The assumption in the literature is that groups form their positions 
based on democratic member votes or participation in organisational 
governance. Their positions are induced by the preferences of the 
members’ interests and the grassroots supporters. In other words, 
positions are formed to represent members’ preferences. An example 
would be trade unions, which form positions based on the needs of 
employees of a specific business sector. Group leaderships form positions in 
the interest of individual members’ personal work place needs and the 
representation is taking place on behalf of these individual employees. 
Representatives are ‘acting for’ (Pitkin 1969) members and members cause 
changes in the groups’ representative behaviour (Mansbridge 2003, 521). 
The organisational strategy is to represent their direct ‘human’ members, 
since the interests represented are those of the constituency, thus of the 
members. The human characteristic further includes that the constituency 
(members) could potentially speak for themselves (Halpin 2006, 926).  
Adapting Mansbridge’ conception to the case of EU groups, these 
might thus put forward a “relatively unmediated version of the constituents 
will” (promissory representation, Mansbridge 2003, 516). The EU group is 
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then accountable to its member groups (and they in turn to their members) 
in the traditional principal-agent sense. EU groups have to keep their 
promises in order to be representative of their constituency. Or EU groups 
might put forward a position they predict members will agree to in 
hindsight (anticipatory representation, Mansbridge 2003, 517). This creates 
a reciprocal power relation and enables continuing mutual influence, 
because it leaves room for members to change their preferences and for EU 
groups to influence members’ preferences (2003, 517f). The difference to 
promissory representation is that EU groups put forward positions because 
they think it makes sense taking into account member characteristics 
(prudential), not because the EU group “ought to” based on promises made 
(moral) (2003, 519). The basis for judgement of EU group 
representativeness in anticipatory representation is the quality of 
communication between members and the EU group in order to anticipate 
preferences and influence them (2003, 519). EU groups need to create 
conditions of choice leading members to make choices in their interest. 
Influence exerted by the EU group has to be educative in the interest of the 
original environmental mission (cf 2003, 517, 519). The quality of education 
can be judged by deliberative criteria, assessing whether members are 
more or less aware of their underlying interests and policy implications and 
whether they are able to transform their preferences in a way they will 
later consider as ‘good’ (2003, 519). ‘Good’ in the context of environmental 
groups includes members becoming more concerned with the health of the 
environment and the common interest. 
In short, the literature expects EU environmental groups to form their 
positions based on member participation in organisational governance, 
facilitating representation on behalf of the members. This implies that 
member groups participate in EU position formation and that they 
internally provide for participatory structures down to the grassroots. 
Judging representativeness is based on either the numbers of members and 
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supporters (promissory) or the deliberative qualities of the communication 
between EU groups, member groups and grassroots. 
There is an inherent problem in conceptualising all groups with the 
‘representation through membership-logic’. The definition of a member in 
the traditional context is a person or organisation formally affiliated to a 
group, generally through the payment of a membership fee (depending on 
the organisational structure), with the right to participate in opinion 
formation and organisational decision-making. The traditional concept thus 
defines a group as representative if its positions are formed and decided 
upon by formal member participation inclusive of all organisational levels 
down to the individual. However, most groups have no potential to be 
representative by membership-logic (Halpin 2006, 922); because their work 
is not in direct benefit of their members but of a cause, and often groups 
do not actually claim to represent members. Cause, supporter or solidarity 
groups are groups who stand up for issues such as nature or human rights 
as opposed to for the benefit of their supporters. Hence the existing 
normative definition declares the large number of advocacy groups that 
speak for a cause in the general interest (i.e. non-human constituencies or 
future generations) or in the interest of those without a voice (i.e. the sick 
or poor) as non-representative and consequently as having no 
democratising potential.  
These interests, however, are part of our society and hence have a 
legitimate reason for representation in the political process. They form part 
of the pluralist interests required for healthy democratic policy-making. 
Regulating interest groups based on their ability to include membership in 
formal participation structures (Greenwood and Halpin 2007, 200) is 
problematic, because it disadvantages groups whose legitimacy is based on 
their “ability to place a cause in the political arena” as opposed to those 
groups whose legitimacy is based upon their “ability to represent a given 
membership constituency” (Greenwood and Halpin 2005). It is indeed 
exclusive and violating people’s democratic rights to raise their concerns by 
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joining cause groups, if the voices they give to a group are rendered 
unrepresentative. For some of the interests, the only chance to be 
represented is through groups rather than the alternative channel of 
political parties. The electoral cycle is ill-suited to deal with minority and 
specialty issues, less emphasised by mainstream governing parties, or 
pressing issues such as climate change, which require immediate actions 
benefitting generations beyond the (re) election date.  
The more recent advocacy group literature has made some attempts 
to move away from the traditional understanding of representativeness49 
and argues for a differentiation in expectations towards groups (O'Neill 
2001; Halpin 2006; Halpin 2010). Scholars argue that expecting groups to 
be internally democratic does not take into account the diversity of groups 
and the consequential differences in the authorisation and accountability 
relations between group leaders and their affiliates. Conclusions however 
differ, with some arguing that certain groups such as cause groups cannot 
be representative though they are legitimate (Halpin 2006, 922) and others 
arguing that they can, but it is not formal member participation that makes 
them representative (O'Neill 2001). Some groups cannot be representative 
in the traditional sense and hence cannot be expected to be internally 
democratic. Rather than expecting the same democratic structures of 
representation from all groups, democratising expectations should depend 
on the type of group constituencies and beneficiaries (Halpin 2006). In 
other words, evaluation standards and criteria depend on what or who is 
being represented. In member groups that represent humans, these human 
members authorize the leadership and hold it to account, as expected by 
traditional group scholars (O'Neill 2001; Halpin 2006). The source of 
legitimacy is membership representation via internal democratic structures, 
                                                      
49
 Kohler-Koch for example defines representativeness in a more comprehensive way: “Civil society 
organisations [CSOs] at the EU level give expression to citizens’ preferences by responding to ‘signals’ 
(such as public opinion polls, media coverage of public debates) and/or to demands directly 
addressed to them either by ordinary citizens or by their members (by mandating representatives 
through elections) or supporters. CSOs, on their part, will channel the (aggregated) preferences into 
the decision-making process by interacting with the Commission” (2008, 12f). 
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because the affiliates are also the beneficiaries (Halpin 2006, 925). 
However in cause groups or so-called ‘solidarity groups’ (Halpin 2006) 
representing causes rather than the direct interests of human members, 
such as the environment, animals or future generations, these cannot 
authorize the leadership or hold it to account (O'Neill 2001:494). “[T]wo 
central features of legitimisation – authorisation and presence – are 
absent” (O'Neill 2001, 494). Supporters of cause groups are not the direct 
beneficiaries of a group. Supporters of animal rights or fight against poverty 
groups do not benefit from the cause directly. Supporters of environmental 
cause groups are indirect beneficiaries of a group in the sense that an 
environmental group represents the interests of the environment on behalf 
of its supporters. Although a healthy environment is beneficial for all, 
because clean water and air are collective goods, the primary 
representation is in the interest of a healthy planet. This affects the 
requirements for legitimacy and internal democracy. Since the affiliates are 
not the ones the groups advocate for, they do not need to be consulted in 
determining positions. The legitimacy of cause groups hence does not 
result from representing members but from epistemic sources. The 
emphasis is very much on aspects such as knowledge, expertise, solidarity 
(experiences) or empathy with the beneficiaries (O'Neill 2001; Halpin 2006, 
925ff), as well as judgement (O'Neill 2001). Thus in cause groups that 
represent political values, the focus is on the internal determination of 
preferences rather than their formation in response to the constituency. 
This determination may rely on expertise as in the case of environmental 
groups. However, any representative claim has to be made on the basis of 
group values and principles and must be based on acceptance. For other 
groups, such as human rights groups, this requires further qualitative 
research. 
Recent electoral representation literature similarly criticises the 
limited understanding of representation. Party political authors have 
reassessed the specific relationship between authorisation and 
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accountability, searching for new tools to analyse representation 
(Mansbridge 2003; Saward 2006; Saward 2009; Severs 2010). Mansbridge 
argues that existing normative criteria for the judgement of accountability 
are all designed for one specific type of representation, ‘promissory 
representation’, which is about a representative keeping or failing to keep 
promises made to a constituency (cf Mansbridge 2003, 525), but there are 
other types of representation, recently analysed by empirical scholars, 
which existing normative criteria cannot judge (Mansbridge 2003, 515). 
Though Mansbridge argues in the context of electoral representation, 
lessons can be learnt with regards to the diversity of representation 
dynamics and related normative criteria for advocacy groups. Mansbridge 
shows that representation is not as simple and straightforward, but may 
vary in each context.  
Projected to the legitimacy and accountability dynamics of advocacy 
group representation, Mansbridge’s categories of representation suggest 
that there is not only membership-logic in the sense of promises being 
fulfilled. For example, the leadership might support policy positions that it 
predicts its members and supporters will agree with in hindsight 
(anticipatory representation). In this case, the emphasis is on the normative 
need for good quality of deliberation between the leadership and the 
constituents during the time of policy making (cf Mansbridge 2003, 525). In 
case of advocacy groups, transparency, deliberation, but also the support of 
positions and campaigns shown by members and supporters are indicators. 
Or, the group leadership might base its policy position on its own 
knowledge and expertise in the field and on the leaderships’ or rather the 
groups’ principles and common sense (gyroscopic representation). The 
emphasis here is on the normative need for good quality deliberation at 
the time of the authorisation of the leadership (cf Mansbridge 2003, 525). 
In the group world this requires transparency of groups, leader profiles and 
group principles, which provide the qualitative base for people to decide 
whether they support a group and its leadership. A groups’ leadership 
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might also represent the interests beyond its own member- and supporter-
ship (surrogate representation). This seems particularly apt in relation to 
human rights and environmental groups, who lobby for the benefit of the 
wider society and environment, rather than simply their immediate 
members and supporters (Strolovitch 2007, 55). Representativeness in this 
case cannot possibly only be measured via the participation of members. 
Surrogate representation is a crucial democratic function of groups, 
because they stand for interests of those that ‘have no voice’, i.e. on behalf 
of those who lack the necessary knowledge and expertise (Maloney 2009, 
284). Mansbridge’s normative criterion here is a proportional 
representation of conflicting interests as well as “the significant 
representation of important perspectives” (Mansbridge 2003, 525). 50 
Groups are seen to play a vital role in voicing uneasy and by electoral 
representation neglected minority interests. To resume: in the promissory 
and anticipatory forms of representation the representatives’ preferences 
are induced by the constituency. In gyroscopic representation, the 
representatives’ preferences are internally determined. 
As Saward convincingly argues, it is not only the represented, which 
choose their representatives, but representatives somewhat choose, or 
rather ‘claim’, what and whom to represent (Saward 2006). A group 
speaking in the name of the environment will thus base its legitimacy on 
scientific studies as well as own experience or knowledge in its network. Its 
supporters may support this cause via campaigns, lobbying or 
subscriptions; they agree to help the group in its claim and actions to speak 
for the environment. Indeed, the case of the environment might be an 
example where it is important that the specifics of the interest are 
                                                      
50
 Mansbridge notes, financial contributions can cause ‘systemic inequities in representation’ 
(Mansbridge 2003, 525). In group literature, the issue of financial support has been controversial. 
Some argue groups are over-representing the interests of the rich as well as other dominant parts of 
society, which works against democratic inclusion (Strolovitch 2007). At the same time, there is a 
redistributive element to this. Resource-rich citizens ensure interests are represented that less 
affluent people have strong opinions about, but who cannot afford membership costs (Maloney 
2009, 284). 
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determined through scientific or group research rather than purely through 
member opinions. A group that advocates the protection of the rainforest, 
for example, does this based on scientific data and possibly empathy with 
natives, animals and the planet. Greenpeace actions with regards to the 
rainforest may be based on their own flights and observations above the 
Amazon to check where illegal deforestation is taking place to grow soya, 
and on research into which companies buy this soya which then leads to 
campaigns against those companies. Members are not included in the 
collection of facts nor in setting up the campaigns based on these facts, but 
they support them nevertheless, knowing that they would not have the 
information in the first place to initiate a campaign. Addressing the 
democratic deficit through enhancing group representativeness in the 
sense of membership-logic would exclude such groups, and may thus in 
fact work against the purpose of political inclusion (Halpin 2006, 937). 
Thus, even if contestable, O’Neill concludes a ‘representation based on 
claims’ to speak for non-human constituencies or future generations is “the 
best we can hope for” (O'Neill 2001, 497). 
The question relevant for understanding group's representativeness is 
thus not only about representing as such, but crucially also about 'what 
motivates people to join'. With promissory groups it is the participation in 
organisational governance and the positions put forward which members 
demand. In gyroscopic and surrogate groups supporters are motivated by 
political values they support. The problem with the traditional concept is 
that it fails to approach groups with regards to their different political 
values and member and supporter interests. Different members and 
supporters request different types of participation structures and degrees 
of participation, depending on the values and interests they pursue. For 
example, individuals may join a trade union or the association for university 
scholars in order to promote their interests and influence the trade 
unions/associations position. On the other hand, people that join 
environmental groups like Greenpeace have the environment as an 
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important value/political aim and to materialise that value they join an 
organisation that also highly values the environment. Hence some kind of 
representativeness is still (normatively) needed despite environmental 
groups representing a cause, but it requires different structures of 
representation and responsiveness than a member group does, because 
the traditional authorisation-accountability structure is absent. In other 
words, this thesis understands ‘cause’ organisations more in terms of a 
political value people pursue. 
There are differing opinions as to whether groups should require 
people to be actively participating in internal decision-making or not. Some 
scholars see participation as vital for groups to act as ‘schools of 
democracy’ (Putnam 2000), whilst others feel that if people do not wish to 
be active then they should not be forced to (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
2002). After all, the majority of people choose to limit their participation to 
a minimum, i.e. to monthly subscriptions or to signing petitions every once 
in a while, and do not wish to get engaged in group activities. They choose 
not to be actively involved in groups that have traditional accountability 
mechanisms in place, or at least not to make active use of their right to 
authorize and hold leaders to account. They rather rely on leaders to fulfil 
the objective the group is committed to (qv Jordan and Maloney 1997). 
Groups with alternative modes of representation hence voice interests of a 
majority of people and “we should be more concerned if groups were not 
offering such opportunities” (Maloney 2009, 284). Moreover, absence of 
formal member participation in governance does not mean that a group 
and its leadership do not care for their supporter views. Groups where 
supporters have no say in formal decision-making indeed have an incentive 
to be responsive to supporters’ views on policies in order to avoid 
supporter exit (Maloney 2009, 283f). After all, supporters are a vital finance 
and legitimacy source, translating into political weight. 
The Commission’s strategy has to be in harmony with organisational 
characteristics and the characteristics of civil society, as well as with the EU 
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decision-making structure. To enhance the democratic quality of its 
decision-making, it is a necessity that the Commission include these voices 
of civil society in the way they are voiced. Moreover, whilst it is crucial for 
democratic quality that active engagement is stimulated at all levels, the 
work done by elites at EU level may still form some sense of transnational 
identification, because there is trust and ‘passive engagement’. Quoting 
Maloney, cause or solidarity groups “activate support by individuals for 
collective ends” (2009, 284). 
To put it bluntly: rendering the voice of a group like Greenpeace in EU 
decision-making as non-representative, because it has no internal 
democratic structure, would neglect the interest of all its supporters that 
have identified themselves with for example Greenpeace’s principles and 
position. People do have a wide choice of advocacy groups with very 
different types and degrees of participation and engagement opportunities. 
A group representation system inclusive not only of member group 
interests, but also of what is called supporter, solidarity or cause group 
interests, includes all advocacy group interests and hence is more 
democratic overall.  
In practice, it is not always obvious which type of representation a 
group pursues: “In practice, representative behavior will often mix several 
of these forms. One cannot always tell by looking at a specific behavior 
what dynamics lie behind it” (Mansbridge 2003, 515). 
Accepting	positions	 formed:	The	acceptance	dimension	of	
representativeness	
Judging group representativeness has to consider social legitimacy 
criteria. The acceptance of groups’ representativeness in the eyes of the 
constituency, in other words the social validity of a representative claim, is 
based on expertise and organisational credibility and ultimately on trust of 
members and supporters in the group. The support of a group via other 
means than voting/formal participation might have to be accepted as a 
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form of representation, since anything else would mean the denial of 
people’s choices to voice their interest by choosing particular groups or 
campaigns (cf Jordan and Maloney 2007, 33f; Maloney 2009) and would 
hence be undemocratic. When investigating representativeness, 
differentiated studies in terms of the demands of groups’ member and 
supporter base should be a decisive factor for the judgement of 
representation structures. Traditional scholars look at democratic 
representation structures, or representing. Hardly any differences in the 
study on professionalisation and representativeness are made between 
groups’ member and supporter demands, their political values and 
interests and their acceptance of what is represented. The differences have 
implications for what organisational structures of representation and 
communication are required and how they should be judged. 
This thesis claims that part of the answer to the question whether 
groups can connect the Commission‘s decision-making with the base, lies in 
an aspect of representativeness so far overlooked by interest group and 
participatory democracy scholars, namely the acceptance dimension. 
Whilst traditional representativeness takes into account normative 
legitimacy criteria (acceptability dimension), the acceptance dimension is 
linked to the social legitimacy point of view (based on the definition of 
government legitimacy drawing on Kielmansegg 1971, 368 in Dingwerth 
2007, 14). The answer to the question whether or not professionalisation 
undermines group ability to bridge the gap between people and politics, 
requires the empirical assessment of the ‘social validity’ of a group and its 
positions: member groups and supporters accepting EU level groups’ 
decisions as rightful and as representative of their views. The acceptance 
dimension then is the acceptance of groups’ representativeness in the eyes 
of the constituency, in other words the social validity of a group’s 
representative claim.  
The acceptance of a group’s representative claim or position varies 
according to the organisational structures of representation. In promissory 
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(and anticipatory) representation, where the position is formed based on 
member participation, the acceptance is expressed at the same time and 
through the same mechanisms of participation. Thus as a group votes on a 
position the very vote of the members is also their expression of 
acceptance. In gyroscopic and surrogate groups this is not the case and the 
two-dimensional character of representativeness becomes apparent. The 
position is formed by the group or its leadership on the basis of scientific 
knowledge, expertise, principles and/or empathy. The acceptance by the 
supporters of the group is not expressed at the time of position formation. 
Acceptance in these groups is expressed differently by different members 
and supporters and at various points in times. 
Member groups of gyroscopic/surrogate EU groups express their 
acceptance of the groups’ activities and positions by being members. They 
become members because they follow the same principles and mission in 
support of a cause and generally base their views on the same or similar 
scientific studies. Member groups also express acceptance by promoting 
and running campaigns in support of the EU position. Individual supporters 
(members and supporters of EU member groups in turn) on the other hand 
express their acceptance through a variety of means which the EU group 
and its member groups make available. Traditional forms of support are 
first of all being a supporter itself, by monthly subscription, donations or 
volunteering, signing paper petitions, writing letters to politicians and 
engaging in direct action in policy campaigns. Forms of support are further 
facilitated through new media technology, such as signing online petitions, 
blogging, and emailing politicians, Facebook, Twitter or Tumblr (see 
professionalisation section in this chapter). 
Thus in a gyroscopic/surrogate group the leadership puts forward a 
representative claim, such as protecting biodiversity, and people can 
choose to support this claim as representing their personal values and 
views. Greenpeace for example puts forward certain transnational political 
values on environmental issues which supporters identify with. Acceptance 
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requires a certain level of trust by members and supporters that the 
leadership represents their interests. A particular issue arising in the debate 
on surrogate representation is where groups represent people of other 
communities than themselves, such as the North representing the South. In 
groups representing voices of the vulnerable, i.e. farmers in the global 
South or illegal immigrants, there cannot be any explicit trust through 
subscribing to a group by the effected. The trust is required of those who 
subscribe to the cause, hence supporters, not from the beneficiaries. This is 
precisely because these groups do not represent the voices of these people 
directly, but interests considered – claimed - beneficial to them by the 
group and by those supporting these values. Hence trust has to exist 
between the latter towards the common value/cause. More complicated 
are cases where for example women’s groups in the North explicitly claim 
to represent women in the South, hence speaking for other constituents 
without their participation.  
There is a need for transparency of the principles and objectives of a 
group as a precondition for support and trust. Trust is not gained through 
participation in formal decision-making, but because the mission of a group 
represents members’ and supporters’ values. Members and supporters 
need not even be informed about every activity of a group to believe in it 
representing their interests, as long as they continue to trust in the 
leadership to represent its values. The specific demands of information and 
communication depend on member group and supporter expectations. 
These are in turn related to the principles of information and 
communication a group communicates when members and supporters join 
or support a specific policy campaign. 
It is argued here that the acceptance dimension, or trust, is based on 
expertise and organisational credibility. Organisational credibility is 
reflected in the group’s media image and its popularity in society, as well as 
in the direct support it receives for example through subscriptions, 
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donations and campaign support. 51  The fact that supporters and/or 
members have the option to opt-out but choose to remain ‘in’ indicates a 
belief by members and supporters in the competence of their leadership to 
act in their interest.52 Trust is moreover apparent when member groups 
support other (EU) groups in their network/hierarchy to put forward a 
position without having actively participated in the formulation of this 
position. Trust is derived from a group’s expertise, organisational credibility, 
responsiveness, transparency and accountability, experience and solidarity. 
Groups generate trust if priorities and objectives are clear in manifestos 
and followed in practice.  
Expertise can be expressed through the employment of highly 
qualified staff visible in the educational and professional background of 
staff, the number of full-time staff and in the general and campaign-specific 
amount and quality of own or commissioned scientific surveys that inform 
positions. Additionally, expertise is reflected in the variety and skill of 
marketing strategies to achieve political impact, which is reflected in the 
visibility of media and lobbying activities in print, electronic and social 
media as well as in the communication with affiliates, the public, 
government and industry. Expertise is consequently also reflected in the 
availability of resources. 
Transparency and accountability (for gyroscopic/surrogate 
representation this is the adherence to the group's principles) are very 
important pillars of trust and are facilitated via open and easy access to 
information, financial and activity reporting, and the general codes of 
conduct of a group. The experience of a group in the specific fields where it 
raises representative claims moreover stimulates trust. Experience is 
                                                      
51
 Social scientist Christiane Frantz in her work on groups as media actors for example argues that to 
understand the limits of group professionalisation in terms of a balance between media democracy 
and credibility of groups as political actors in the eyes of supporters, the response is to be found in 
the recall of campaigns and the amount of donations as well as certain organisational developments 
(2007, 194). 
52
 Membership retaining numbers, or rather ‘revolving door membership’, may be an issue to be 
considered here.
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reflected in a group’s age, its level and scope of activity, geographically and 
issue-wise. Local experience of an environmental group might be crucial to 
gain its supporters trust for one representative claim and for the other it 
might be EU level experience, thus it is depending on groups principles and 
strategies. A group showing solidarity/empathy also has the potential to 
gain trust. Solidarity is meant here in the ideological, principled, moral and 
ethical sense. For example a group showing and acting upon solidarity with 
the victims of drinking water pollution or oil spills might gain trust because 
of the altruistic cause it promotes. Judging whether a group is 
representative depends on a group’s organisational structure and strategy, 
its aims, representative claim and importantly member and supporter 
expectations.   
To evaluate the quality of representativeness, representation 
literature tends to resort to responsiveness as an indicator (Rehfeld 2006; 
Severs 2010). But responsiveness matters differently for groups that form 
their positions based on member interest and participation and for those 
that form their positions based on expertise or empathy. Responsiveness is 
traditionally judged by looking at how responsive the representer, or the 
leadership of a group, is to its members, because that traditional 
conception of representativeness is tested as accountability and 
authorisation between affiliates and group leaders (Halpin 2010, 23). This is 
however only valid for promissory/anticipatory groups. The responsiveness 
of gyroscopic representation is the overall policy portfolio and its 
coherence with the groups’ principles. The representative-audience 
relationship is different in gyroscopic and surrogate groups. In order to 
understand how responsiveness may be judged, it is important to question 
the aim of representation, is it the good of society, the good of the 
environment or what members want? In other words, the evaluation of 
representation using responsiveness has to be done depending on the 
acceptability dimension (based on how positions are formed). 
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There are different demands of responsiveness by member groups 
and supporters. The act of accepting a representative (claim) as legitimate 
by supporters can require varied levels and types of responsiveness. For 
example a person might be satisfied with reading what Greenpeace is doing 
about whaling in Japan and support a campaign financially or by signature, 
but may not be interested in any further information regarding the 
campaign. Another person might wish to be kept in the loop about the 
overall activities of its group. Yet another one might want to take part in the 
selection of issues the group prioritises. Supporters are not all the same 
and they require different levels and sorts of attention. At the individual 
group level it becomes obvious that the representative task is not 
straightforward, and one can suspect that the larger and more diverse the 
supportership, the more challenging it is to respond to increasingly diverse 
demands. The RSPB with its over one million supporters, for example, 
needs to keep representing the interests of its traditional supportership of 
bird-watchers, but also cater for the interests of the broader environmental 
conservation enthusiasts as well as raise awareness towards local, national, 
EU and international environmental policy issues. There are a number of 
channels for responsiveness a group may make use of, such as emails, 
online conferences, social media, print, face-to-face meetings, opinion polls 
or surveys. Groups often do their own or commission government- and 
market-independent research. Whether or not their usage can help with a 
group’s representativeness depends on how well it is tailored to the specific 
characteristics and demands of members and supporters.  
The above also explains why it is difficult to design clear yardsticks for 
the empirical evaluation of how representative groups are. Organisational 
credibility and trust are factors that may be judged, but cannot easily be 
measured or quantified. Organisational credibility, which is reflected in a 
group’s media image and its popularity in society, can be evaluated by 
looking at news reports, reporting and feedback on events, campaigns and 
policy positions. Generally the degree of activity of a group and the number 
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and quality of opportunities it provides for exchange with members, 
supporters and society will also have an impact on its image, but this again 
depends on supporter expectations. The popularity of labels or their 
‘brand’ also reflects their popularity in society. The obvious indicators 
which are easier to track down are the number of members and 
supporters. These can be, and this is by no means extensive, fee-paying 
members or supporters, activists, volunteers and donors, subscribers to 
newsletters, signatories of specific campaigns, and participants at events, 
Facebook page/group/event likes, Twitter followers and bloggers. Even 
though it might be slightly more straight forward to ‘count’ popularity this 
way, it is still impossible to determine a threshold above which 
representativeness is achieved or below which there is none. For example 
one cannot say that 20,000 supporters make a group representative but 
19,000 do not. In fact most, including large established groups, have 
difficulties knowing how many members, supporters and volunteers they 
actually have.  
The acceptance dimension moreover has implications for the interest 
group system as such. It indicates that group representation, regardless of 
the participation of members, may be valid and legitimate because it is 
accepted as such. Kohler-Koch concludes for the EU interest group system 
as a whole that the representative claim of EU level groups is valid because 
“citizens have accommodated to the system and because the respective 
stakeholder audience accepts the outcome of conflict settlements as being 
legitimate” (2010, 112).This research does not argue for a dismissal of the 
traditional concept of representativeness based on democratic 
participation nor does it argue that the acceptance dimension on its own is 
sufficient. What it does do is suggest it is problematic to solely apply the 
traditional concept to the varying types of groups with their different 
organisational structures and strategies, including types of members and 
supporters, interests and aims. Groups have diverse representative claims, 
with regards to what or whom they represent and how they represent. 
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Hence the concept of representativeness has to be adapted to these 
differing empirical conditions.  
Professionalisation	is	more	than	
bureaucratisation	
In addition to the theoretical limitations of the assumed 
professionalisation-representativeness dichotomy, the traditional argument 
applies a limited empirical conception of professionalisation. 
Professionalisation is not only bureaucratisation as depicted in corporatist 
studies (see chapter one), but also includes professionalisation in 
communication and new media technology applications. The theory of 
representation of groups dealing with the professionalisation criticism is 
thus basing its argument on an outdated conception of professionalisation. 
The more comprehensive conception of professionalisation means that the 
affects professionalisation is assumed to have on group representativeness 
need to be reconsidered.  
The literature considers internal democratic structures where the 
leadership is elected and members partake in formal decision-making a 
condition for groups (and their leadership) to be representative (see 
section on acceptability in this chapter). Traditional group scholars hence 
analyse the impact of professionalisation on this narrow type of 
representation. The problem traditional group scholars detect in 
professionalisation is its hindrance of this traditional type of democratic 
representation (Jordan and Maloney 2007; Kohler-Koch 2009, 54f; 2010, 
110ff; Warleigh 2000; 2001). They conclude that one is incompatible with 
another. Second, they mostly see professionalisation in the form of 
bureaucratisation and institutionalisation (Kohler-Koch 2010, 110ff 
Warleigh 2000; 2001). However, professionalisation is more encompassing 
than bureaucratisation and crucially includes the application of new media 
technologies. There is scarce mentioning in the interest group literature of 
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professionalisation effects in terms of new media technology on the 
representativeness of advocacy groups active in the general interest. Trenz, 
for example, who defines representation as a claim for publicness or 
gaining public visibility, has detected a change in the “representative mode 
of political communication” as a result of the Internet (Trenz 2009, 15). 
Hence, the conceptual problems are that traditional group scholars look at 
the effects of an out-of-date understanding of professionalisation on a 
narrow conception of representativeness. 
There is also a general need for groups to professionalise, which is 
vital for many groups to get support and for their survival and influence in 
the future. This is due to social, political and technological changes in the 
EU. On the one hand, the nature of many issues, such as climate change, 
that transcend national borders, makes it necessary to deal with them at 
higher (EU) level. On the other hand, the communication and engagement 
behaviours of people are changing due to new media technology (Salter 
2003). This in turn requires the adaptation of organisational structures and 
strategies to these new attitudes of communication, participation and 
representation. These adaptations are necessary for groups in order to be 
representative of the voices of the people in the way they wish to voice 
them (e.g. through Facebook likes, online petitions or emails rather than 
paper petitions or engagement in person). Even though many corporatist 
scholars emphasised the developments caused by social, economic and 
technological change from below, including the decline of class and 
religious cleavages and the changes in communication, the existing group 
professionalisation literature so far hardly includes professionalisation 
changes in communication as a result of new media technologies. 
A better understanding of professionalisation in particular in relation 
to new media technologies does not mean recognition or 
professionalisation has no negative impact on representative structures of 
groups. But the differentiation of types of professionalisation in connection 
with the re-definition of representativeness sheds a different light on what 
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impact recognition has for different group representation structures and 
strategies. Professionalisation does not necessarily lead to a loss of 
representativeness. 
Professionalisation	 has	 varying	 implications	 for	 different	
types	of	groups	
The impact of recognition and the resulting bureaucratisation takes 
different shapes and has different consequences depending on what type 
of representation a group pursues and what organisational strategies and 
structures a group has. Clearly, all groups have to be effective to be 
considered legitimate in the eyes of political decision-makers. In order to 
become more effective, groups adapt their organisational structures and 
decision-making. However, this adaptation varies, depending on existing 
organisational structures and strategies. Federal groups might streamline 
their cooperation with national and sub-national member groups whilst 
increasing expertise. Small cause groups find expert niches. Large member 
groups might set up focus group structures to avoid bureaucracy and be 
more effective for example in responding to consultations. Large cause 
groups such as the RSPB try to balance supporter expectations, whilst 
broadening their portfolio, in order to retain existing as well as attract new 
members and consequently increase political weight.  
But above all, professionalisation has different impacts on groups, 
depending on their organisational representation structures and strategies, 
or their basis of position formation. The traditional promissory groups for 
example form their positions based on membership participation. If their 
organisational structures of representation streamline and reduce 
participatory opportunities, affecting the say members have over positions 
formed, then their representativeness is jeopardised. However, for 
gyroscopic and surrogate groups on the other hand, who form their 
positions based on scientific knowledge, group principles and empathy, 
bureaucratisation impacting member participation in position formation 
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does not matter for the representativeness of the position. This is because 
their position formation does not require member participation. These 
groups have supporters expressing their support in ways other than 
participating in internal decision-making. Still, whilst bureaucratisation is 
largely irrelevant for gyroscopic and surrogate groups, professionalisation in 
terms of expertise and new media application can be beneficial for both 
dimensions of representativeness.  
There are a number of ways outside formal participation structures 
for a group to represent and be responsive to the interests of member 
groups and supporters as well as the public. These include direct action, 
volunteering, signing petitions, donating or simply joining a group and 
paying membership fees. Alternative channels of communication provide 
advocacy groups with representativeness despite, and indeed at times 
because of, professionalisation of the leadership. The study of advocacy 
group recognition also has to recognise the practical changes taking place 
in terms of communication tools and representation mechanisms. The 
development and application of new, in particular online, technologies, 
such as social media and its impact on the change of organisational 
structures of decision-making and representation must be taken into 
account. On-going technological developments have meant important 
changes to the ways individuals, organisations and government institutions 
communicate with each other and they have completely changed the 
dynamics and dimensions of communication and representation of 
interests (cf Chadwick 2006, 83-143). The technological changes in society 
and the resulting behavioural changes require the concept of 
professionalisation to consider these technologies and their potential for 
group representativeness. New media technology not only changes 
informal organisational structures and strategies of representation, but at a 
more general level it changes the way society behaves. It changes the way 
people, or rather members and supporters, interact with groups, voice 
their interests and how they want to make their voice heard. It changes the 
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concepts of representation and participation. In turn and though slowly 
and lagging behind, groups react to these changes in society and behaviour. 
Groups are emerging that are entirely online and have no formal presence, 
and established groups turn to new ways of online interest representation. 
There is hence a need to understand organisational changes through 
professionalisation and the effects or rather counter-effects on co-optation 
dynamics. Though certain restrictions hold true, such the limitations of the 
use of new technology to certain parts of the population and hence of 
group members and supporters, professionalisation in the form of 
incorporation and application of social media tools may have the potential 
to enhance representativeness in most cases to at least some degree. It 
increases outreach, facilitates engagement and participation rather than 
passive one-way information, and it erases geographical restrictions by 
facilitating interaction across various horizontal and vertical geographical 
and organisational levels. It is more instant in terms of information and 
reaction, reduces the need for resources, which is a problem for many 
smaller groups in particular. It provides more case or issue-specific 
opportunities of engagement and provides individuals with the opportunity 
to choose not only where and whether, but also how and when to get 
engaged or express support. Overall it is likely to give members, supporters 
and the general public a greater sense of ownership over the debates 
groups engage in. 
New	 media	 professionalisation:	 Counteracting	
bureaucratisation	
This thesis re-visits the professionalisation criticism taking into 
account not only an updated version of representativeness as defined 
above, but also an updated version of professionalisation in order to assess 
the current potential of representativeness of groups. Advocacy group 
scholars researching the impacts of professionalisation on group 
representativeness can benefit from a dialogue with media 
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professionalisation studies. Politics and media communication scholars 
investigate professionalisation as in the increased application of new media 
technology such as the internet and social media. They analyse a 
sophisticated sourcing and sharing of information for organisations and the 
application of internet technology as tools of participation for individuals, 
also referred to as online activism as opposed to offline activism. The 
majority of scholars focus on individuals, or individuals as members of 
political groups, which is mostly defined to political parties. Internet and 
media studies are less theory-based and focus more on quantitative 
empirical studies analysing the usage and activism of professional tools. 
They look at mobilisation of political engagement and voting behaviour, 
analysing differences between age and other pre-conditions such as 
political interest (Gibson et al 2004; Pickerill 2003). Interest group scholars 
and internet and media scholars hardly talk to each other, although they 
could benefit from exchanging knowledge on professionalisation. 
Researching group representation should make the connection with 
research in new information technologies and web 2.0, two areas of 
research so far largely unconnected and under-researched. The dominant 
normative ground for media studies, nevertheless, is similar to traditional 
studies the need for active members, tends to look at political parties and 
focusses on mobilisation rather than representativeness in its diverse forms 
(Gibson, Nixon, and Ward 2003; Lusoli and Ward 2004). Still, the advocacy 
group professionalisation literature can benefit from insights on 
technological potential for communication and participation as well as its 
usage in society, by groups and their supporters (cf Castells 2001).  
Professionalisation in new media technology has the potential to 
counter bureaucratisation tendencies and add alternative channels of 
organising representation (Pickerill 2003, 58). Professionalisation in the 
literature on internet and communication also refers to changes of 
organisational structures and strategies brought about by new media 
technology in particular around the internet (Castells 2001; Pickerill 2003). 
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The internet has facilitated a fast and cheap distribution of information and 
coordination of logistics with broad reach. It is characterised by a network 
dynamic that resembles that of groups and movements. It allows groups to 
put greater pressure on decision-makers from more sides more quickly, 
enables agile and rapid strategies of countering opponents and critics and 
facilitates allying (or rather persuades would-be allies). Technological 
professionalisation has also been seen to lead to institutional innovations, 
for example issue networks and world/European forums around particular 
(sets of) issues. The internet created new forms of protest, such as 
umbrella coalescing and spider-web organising, which permits action along 
the spokes of the web, without leadership from the centre or top. The 
passive nature of the lay public and indeed many members and supporters 
has furthermore led groups to adapt their organisational strategies to 
member demands and characteristics, for which the internet has provided 
great facilities, inciting professionalisation in terms of the use of new media 
technology. Several authors note how making use of the internet (Van Rooy 
2004) has made groups more dynamic, since they can form different 
networks at different times, they have easier access to media, and possess 
cheaper and faster geographic mobility and cultural interaction. This 
enhanced understanding of professionalisation need not ignore certain 
dilemmas of bureaucratisation and institutionalisation. Moreover, 
organisational culture, individual people’s skills and the issue advocated 
impact and may limit the potential of online technologies to balance out 
bureaucratisation (Gibson et al 2003). However, it puts the effects of 
professionalisation in modern perspective. Face-to-face meetings remain 
important, in particular for promissory groups, but new media can offer 
supplementary channels of communication (i.e. email, Google docs, Twitter 
groups) and participation (i.e. online conferences, Skype), making groups 
less dependent on physical meetings and resources.    
Formal participation structures in traditional promissory groups of 
course have the important function of limiting dangers of isolation from 
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constituents and co-optation, in particular for EU level groups. Informal 
online tools, however, have the potential to enhance political inclusion by 
connecting individuals, including leaderships and supporters, and 
communities horizontally and vertically across territorial and organisational 
levels, as well as across issues and societies (qv Pickerill 2003, 27). In 
established environmental and justice groups, new media technology has 
been found to be assisting and improving the performance of existing 
group functions to achieve aims more efficiently (Gibson et al 2004, 198; 
Pickerill 2003, 28). In fact it strengthens groups’ resistance to 
bureaucratisation pressures, because groups can be efficient without 
hierarchical structures, without many resources and without the need for 
geographical presence (Pickerill 2003, 28, 58). New media technologies are 
particularly fruitful for groups that face the challenge of remoteness 
between leadership and members (Pickerill 2003, 27). They help smaller 
groups to overcome restrictions of resource scarcity, because they do not 
require physical presence for communication. Less formal, non-hierarchical 
groups are also found to be able to make most use of new media 
technology because of their flexible structures, open to free experimental 
and innovative use of these technologies (qv Gibson et al 2003, 198). New 
media technology in particular improves awareness and political weight of 
single or focused issue and shared goals groups and campaigns (qv Gibson 
et al 2003, 198). New media technology thus enhances the communication 
infrastructure (cf Castells 2001, 164) and informal as well as formal 
participation mechanisms. Responsiveness, political inclusiveness, the 
identification with political communities and informed opinion formation 
are not only important conditions of representativeness, but also bring the 
citizen closer to EU politics. 
Counteracting bureaucratisation, professionalisation in new media 
technologies also offers alternative modes of engagement. Most critics see 
bureaucratisation as problematic full stop; but some do make a difference 
between a necessary degree of professionalisation and elitism (Adam 2008) 
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and too much professionalisation (Van Rooy 2004). For example one 
argument is that professionals are necessary to facilitate the voicing, 
mediation and translation of the interests of the masses (Adam 2008; 
Parkinson 2006; Saurugger 2007). In this context it is important to note that 
traditional group scholars point out that it is not only the groups who are 
not offering participation opportunities, but that citizens or rather 
supporters do not actually wish to get actively involved. What they fail to 
take into account is that professionalisation in terms of the use of internet 
technology has paved a way for members, supporters and citizens to show 
their support the way they prefer, whether it is financially as regular 
subscribers or donors, actively through direct action, campaigns or 
signatures, or in solidarity through virtual membership. Without the need 
to increase staff or financial resources, groups are able to offer alternative 
modes of engagement which are more adaptive to citizens’ demands. The 
point is not only that some professionalisation is clearly necessary for the 
creation and voicing of demands, but professionalisation can indeed be 
counteracting bureaucratisation tendencies. Professionalisation thus has 
been instigated or rather spurred on by two additional factors to those 
mentioned earlier, one being the internet and the other being the passivity 
of citizens and members. 
New	 media	 technology:	 enhancing	 dimensions	 of	
representativeness		
New media technology can help promissory groups re-connect with 
their base. Gyroscopic groups benefit because it provides structures for 
input of local expertise into the formation of positions. Expert opinions and 
grassroots experience can be exchanged and inform positions and support. 
Groups can make use of transparency and information tools, as well as be 
responsive to their affiliates through informal ways of expressing and 
debating affiliates’ and leadership’s interests. New media technology offers 
an abundance of potential channels that can provide the leadership of a 
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group as well as affiliates and broader public mutually with a sense of the 
general as well as specific interests, opinions and expectations of both. 
Leaderships can provide arguments; raise awareness, as well as challenge 
members’ and supporters’ opinions - and vice-versa. Amongst these media 
technologies are websites, email lists, online conferences and social media 
such as Vimeo, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, fora and blogs. Moreover 
groups make use of online surveys and policy or focus groups to receive 
member and supporter views which influence policy directions (qv 
Maloney 2009, 283f).  
Expertise and more fluid mechanisms of communication and 
participation also have the potential to enhance the professional image of a 
group. The acceptance of gyroscopic and surrogate representation relies on 
its professional qualities generating trust in their expertise and ability to 
fight for the cause and the values supporters have subscribed to. A more 
professional image has the potential to increase the acceptance dimension 
also with regards to the broader civil society, particularly relevant for 
surrogate groups. 
Worth noting in the context of professionalisation and expertise is 
that representation is not mere agency (Edmund Burke interpreted by 
Eulau et al. 1959, 743). An environmental group leader who does exactly 
what I, as an environmental science and politics amateur, would do in her 
place, does not do a good job in representing me (cf Pitkin 1967, 144f; 
Rogowski 1981, 396). People want professionalism and expertise in 
representation. Representation is not merely a fulfilment of promises, but 
it is crucial that advocacy groups engage in creating and, if necessary, 
altering promises. In the case of EU issues which are said to be remote from 
the citizen and often very technical and difficult to understand for the 
amateur, it is necessary to have a group provide information, explanation 
and constituency-tailored framing of issues. Groups help their constituents 
and beyond by providing different ways of framing the argument.  
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Groups not only challenge government positions, but also challenge 
and engage with citizens opinions, whether there is direct interaction or 
not. As an example, in the case of a no-fly zone over Libya, Avaaz listened 
to the vast majority of its supporters when supporting a no-fly zone. But 
when a small number of supporters raised significant, reasoned concerns 
with this position, Avaaz put these in context and opened a discussion to 
re-consider its position on Facebook. Avaaz thus played a crucial role in 
facilitating and steering a debate and introduced important perspectives of 
a minority that challenged the opinion of a majority. Another example is 
the decision of the Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE) concerning 
the building of wind turbines. The group challenged its members, who were 
generally against the alteration of the landscape, by reasoning the necessity 
for the creation of more renewable energy sources. The group leadership’s 
encompassing knowledge put member opinions in the perspective of the 
wider societal benefits of their policy position. The leadership decided for 
the benefit of the wider society, rather than the beauty of the landscape to 
supporters (CPRE official 2011). Both of these examples try to show that a 
more dynamic and professional representation can enhance the democratic 
quality of decision-making, because it can create better informed opinions 
that are ultimately beneficial to a larger part of society. It also shows that 
representation does not only mean the aggregation of interests, as is often 
conceptualised by scholars of groups (qv Kohler-Koch 2008, 12f). In contrast 
to what is assumed in the literature, the hypothesis here is that as groups 
become more professionalised, this has the potential to positively affect 
their credibility in the eyes of supporters as legitimate representatives of 
their interest. 
The professionalisation of groups in terms of their usage of 
communication tools, such as new ways of online participation, facilitate 
engagement in a way that does not necessarily require formal membership 
and may even act beyond groups’ own member/supporter base. Groups 
indeed do not only promote the interest of their members/supporters, but 
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beyond (Frantz 2005, 183). Citizens can use the internet to participate 
outside formal organisational structures but nevertheless impact on formal 
agendas of organisations (Ward and Gibson 2009, 38). Taking social 
networks as an example, citizens can form and join groups on specific 
issues, thereby displaying their support for an issue that may be put 
forward by a group they are not formally affiliated to. Groups can be 
responsive to affiliates and the broader public’s preferences by responding 
to indications of interests and opinions in the media, such as public opinion 
polls or media coverage of public debates (qv Kohler-Koch 2008, 12).  
Conclusions	
This thesis puts forward progressive conceptions of 
representativeness and professionalisation. It does not deny the continuous 
danger of co-optation and bureaucratisation also to modern forms of 
advocacy organisations. Nor does it glorify the potential and actual use of 
new media technologies in advocacy groups as mechanisms to achieve 
representativeness. It further does not attempt to make any normative 
claims about groups’ democratic agency as such. Rather, it is a positive 
theory challenging the assumption that groups becoming more and more 
professional are losing representativeness, which in turn is considered to 
affect their democratic agency.  
Organisational structures and strategies of groups are more diverse 
than the traditional conception of representativeness allows for. Judging 
groups’ representativeness based on member participation is inappropriate 
in a number of cases. It does not account for the diverse roles and 
strategies groups implement with regards to representing an issue. Groups 
form their positions not only based on membership input 
(promissory/anticipatory), but also based on expertise, experience, 
principles (gyroscopic) and empathy (surrogate). Professionalisation has 
different impacts on the representativeness of diverse groups. Moreover, 
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the definition of professionalisation in the traditional group literature is 
largely defined to bureaucratisation and mostly overlooks the role new 
technology can play for enhancing representativeness. The redefinition of 
both conceptions, representativeness and professionalisation, requires a 
revision of their assumed relation and the implications for the 
Commission’s strategy to enhance its democratic credentials. The 
democratic deficit debate, focussing on institutional properties, has to truly 
take into account the properties of advocacy groups to understand the 
dynamics of their democratic agency. 
Membership-logic cannot explain why members and supporters 
support or trust their leadership to be representative of their values and 
interests when they have not been formally involved in the formation of 
positions. Instead, organisational credibility and a groups’ expertise explain 
why cause groups are perceived as representative by supporters and 
beyond. The membership-logic is also ignorant of the – democratic - 
choices individuals make with regards to how they would like their interests 
to be represented. Crucial to the above argument is the observation that 
bringing citizens closer to the EU does not translate into more participation, 
as opposed to what is widely accepted in participatory literature. Quoting 
Van Wessel, “we should not mistake a will to be taken into account more, 
for a will to participate more” (2010, 455).  
However, the acceptance dimension and informal communication can 
only be assessed case-by-case. Which advocacy groups are representative 
and have democratising potential is an empirical question, not one that can 
be concluded by definitional fiat. Moreover, the representativeness of 
claims made in consultations should be considered based on the issue in 
context. Qualitative empirical research is required to detect whether 
professionalisation takes place at the cost of representativeness, or 
whether groups are actually both professional and representative. 
Professionalisation has the potential to enhance representativeness and 
hence does not hamper groups’ democratising potential per se. 
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This research does not make any normative claims with regards to 
groups’ democratising qualities, their accountability or the democratic 
legitimacy of the Commission, though of course the behavioural dimension 
of groups has normative implications. If professionalisation is compatible 
with representativeness, then the normative strategy of bridging the gap 
through engaging advocacy groups is feasible to pursue.   
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4	 Methodology:	Professional	and	
representative	groups?		
The thesis examines the impact of recognition on the internal 
dynamics of environmental advocacy groups in two EU policy cases. It 
considers whether professionalisation takes place at the cost of 
representativeness, whether professionalisation in fact accompanies 
representativeness or indeed whether professionalisation enhances 
representativeness. Commission officials, as well as EU, national and sub-
national environmental groups were interviewed to understand how the 
input into specific EU consultations is constructed. The interviews 
investigated how positions were formed within groups and their member 
networks and what the groups’ self-perceived role and professional image 
is (acceptability dimension). Additionally, the groups’ use of new media 
technology such as emails, mailing lists, websites, blogs, Facebook, Google, 
Vimeo, YouTube, and Twitter, was analysed to appreciate what these 
technologies were applied for and how, in order to understand their 
potential to enhance representativeness. Additionally, new media 
technology application in the particular issue areas gives an insight into 
how member groups, but also supporters, choose to engage and be 
represented in EU groups (acceptance dimension). 
If groups can professionalise and be representative, the implication is 
that there is potential for the Commission to enhance its democratic 
credentials by engaging with advocacy groups – despite, or perhaps 
because, of professionalisation. Though the argument for a renewed 
concept of representation holds true for national groups as well, it is in 
particular the EU level, with its multilevel network structure of 
representation and search for a cure to its democratic deficit (Saurugger 
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2008a, 151), which calls for a renewed analysis of the dynamics and a 
reconsideration of the dimensions of group representation.  
The following chapter first introduces the chosen interview and case 
study methodology and then elaborates in more detail how, why and which 
groups and policy cases were selected. The conduct of expert interviews as 
well as the use and collection of data are then described further and the 
groups and policy areas introduced. Lastly, limitations to the thesis’ 
research question and methodological framework are explicated. 
Case	study	approach	
The methodology chosen is case studies in combination with 
qualitative semi-structured interviews. This methodology was chosen 
because it enables a precise tracking of the degree of professionalisation 
we find in a group as well as showing how groups ensure 
representativeness, which importantly includes informal ways of decision-
making, opinion formation and support that cannot be derived from formal 
documents. Moreover, it enables a look into how day-to-day practical 
reality modifies or qualifies what the formal guidelines prescribe. The 
thesis investigates group practices, behaviours, role perceptions and trust. 
This requires the exploration not only of information available, but also of 
information that can only be generated during the course of personal 
interviews. This kind of analysis best provides the data on 
professionalisation and representativeness for this thesis, because it 
investigates the why and when: why are groups representative and under 
what professionalisation circumstances? Moreover, qualitative analysis 
facilitates the purposeful selection of cases (groups) and allows testing 
existing as well as challenging hypotheses. Does recognition or rather 
professionalisation really mean a decrease in representativeness?  
This research question sets the frame for the case study approach. 
The claim in the literature is raised in relation to the Commission’s strategy 
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to enhance its democratic quality of decision-making by engaging with 
advocacy groups, amongst others. This requires a case study that looks at 
EU level groups engaged with the Commission. Further, the hypothesis in 
the traditional literature is that this engagement leads to a 
professionalisation of groups, which hampers their representativeness. The 
challenging hypothesis of this thesis is that this engagement might lead to a 
different kind of professionalisation than so far assumed and 
representativeness might indeed not necessarily be affected negatively. The 
focus is not so much on whether or not groups professionalise, or indeed 
why, since this is widely studied already, both in general, as well as as a 
result of recognition (Hull 1993; Saurugger 2006; Adam 2007). However the 
thesis looks at the type of professionalisation and the effect it has on 
organisational representativeness that has so far been misinterpreted, 
mainly as a result of out-dated conceptions of professionalisation and 
representativeness. Hence the case studies aim to show what 
professionalism of groups engaging with the Commission looks like and 
how this affects organisational representativeness. The impact of 
engagement can best be traced by selecting specific EU policies, to which 
the organisational formation of a decision and internal interaction 
(acceptability) and the expression of support (acceptance) can be explored. 
The task is then to test whether these groups engaging with the 
Commission are professional as well as representative. The issue under 
investigation is not only to test the correlation between professionalisation 
and representativeness. Rather, this thesis questions the conceptions of 
group professionalisation and representativeness. It tests but also adds to 
different dimensions of the conceptions of professionalisation and 
representativeness and the relation between the two.  
Some methodological criticism is raised against the selection of 
restricted case studies in terms of neutrality and for being less 
representative than quantitative analysis. However, these risks can be 
limited or even eliminated through transparent and clear approaches to 
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analysis for example by clearly outlining what and how data is used to 
explain individual conceptions and hypotheses. Interviews were used to 
provide evidence on how organisations interact and form positions in 
practice based on background information available in the form of 
documentation, such as statutes on internal communication and 
participation as guidelines. Several questions collect numerical data such as 
the size of a group, but a large number of questions collect attributes, 
which involve subjective interpretations - it is important that the research 
method minimizes ad-hoc subjective interpretations and enhances the 
likelihood of replication. Interviews were recorded to enable reliable 
documentation and notes were taken, in order to be able to revisit exactly 
what was said during analysis. They were then analysed and open 
questions coded according to indicators of professionalisation and 
representativeness. To limit the scope for subjective interpretation of more 
open questions, established practices to code data were applied to be able 
to discern and keep record of conceptions, definitions and themes in a 
consistent way. In terms of the evaluation of data retrieved from 
interviews, if possible, questions were posed in a way that clearly facilitates 
direct interpretation and comparison. Each interview took between 45 and 
90 minutes. Since this project is not about identity but about internal 
organisation, rhetoric/language used in the interviews did not matter in 
this context.  
The sample selection considers and is aimed at the generalisation of 
results. However, the representativeness of a qualitative sample, as in the 
generalisability for the large population, is no expedient criterion 
(Helfferich 2009, 172). Qualitative research wants to find if and how the 
'general' can be found in a special case. Generalisations from qualitative 
research want to reconstruct typical patterns, not detect re-distributional 
conclusions. Instead of the representativeness criterion, in objective 
hermeneutic there is a need for the precise definition of a sample and an 
inner representation of the sample (Helfferich 2009, 173f). Since this thesis 
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wants to reconstruct typical patterns of representativeness and 
professionalisation in EU advocacy groups, in particular cause groups, the 
selection of the sample was restricted to environmental groups who are 
active at EU level, are professional and amongst which we find many cause 
groups because of the topic. The inner representation of the sample of 
these environmental advocacy groups needs to be varied in order to avoid 
premature generalisations (Helfferich 2009, 174). The sample case studies 
include cause groups with differing organisational structures and strategies, 
such as EU (global) advocacy groups or EU umbrella networks53, with 
different degrees of professionalisation and varied channels of 
representativeness. Though the selection of interview partners was 
predetermined and straight-forward, as interviewees needed to be 
gatekeepers with policy-specific information on position formation, the 
variety of groups and people interviewed was increased by asking interview 
partners about more potential gatekeepers (snowball system) (Helfferich 
2009, 175f). 
 
 
                                                      
53
 EU or global advocacy groups, such as Greenpeace and WWF, have a global strategy and brand 
with members groups at national and sometimes regional levels formally integrated in one 
organisation. All groups adhere to the global guidelines. EU network umbrella groups are coalitions 
of independent groups active at EU, regional or national level. 
1
0
0
 
 
 
	
Table 1: Dimensions of group representativeness 
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Expert	interviews	
The type of interview method used to analyse the case studies is 
systematising expert interviews. This means that experts in their fields 
were chosen as interviewee partners to retrieve specific knowledge of 
action and experience. In this form of interviewing “it is not the experts 
themselves who are the object of investigation; their function is rather that 
of informants who provide information about the real objects being 
investigated” (Bogner and Menz 2009, 47). A balance was sought between 
including closed questions designed to retrieve biographical data of staff as 
well as easily comparable data on perceptions of roles and concepts, 
organisational structures and strategies and values. Open questions gave 
space to narratives. That way two of the main criticisms towards expert 
interviews were tackled: lack of standardisation and quantification of data 
and too narrow, guided structure limiting interviewees own views and 
additions to the conversation (Bogner and Menz 2009, 44). A systematic 
approach to the analysis of the open narrative ensured comparability also 
of the non-quantifiable data and the embeddedness of interview, 
methodology and theory. The first part of the questionnaire was designed 
to retrieve more general information on staff and the group, and the main 
part focussed on organisational structures and strategies as well as 
acceptance in context of the specific policy. This encouraged narratives on 
case study related aspects such as position formation on a specific issue, 
which generated information for the general criteria of the formation of 
positions (Meuser and Nagel 2009, 33). Narratives also allowed for insights 
to the personal interpretation of rules and discrepancies between 
leadership and members/supporters and were able to provide meaningful 
examples of professionalisation and alternative representativeness 
structures in practice (Meuser and Nagel 2009, 34).  
The analysis of the interviews went through a number of stages of 
qualitative analysis exploring expert knowledge (for a detailed explanation 
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of this methodology see Meuser and Nagel 2009). Interviews were taped 
and relevant passages transcribed. These passages were then paraphrased 
into thematic units, providing information for the representativeness and 
professionalisation indicators. Examples are new media technologies 
applied or formal decision-making structures. After paraphrasing, the units 
were put into thematic order and in a next step these thematic units were 
compared between the different interviews. A sociological comparison of 
the empirical findings categorised commonly shared knowledge from the 
interviewees that can claim general validity or validity in the given context. 
For example, the comparison of social media usage within groups made 
clear that amongst EU environmental groups, there has recently been a 
realisation of the importance of using these as interactive tools with 
members- and supporters. It can be generalised from the sociological 
comparison that environmental groups are in the process of applying more 
and more social media for interaction internally with member groups and 
externally with supporters and the public. Finally these empirically 
generalised findings were framed to form typologies and theoretical 
conceptions. In the example this means that groups do not only 
professionalise along traditional criteria, but most importantly also with 
regards to new media technology, which in turn has implications for their 
representativeness. Different groups make different use of new media 
technologies and this, depending on different organisational structures and 
strategies, can have a positive impact on their representativeness. 
Data	collection	
Using criteria established in chapter one and two, the questionnaire 
was designed to retrieve data on the concepts of professionalisation and 
representativeness in order to facilitate their assessment for each of the 
groups interviewed. In conjunction with information retrieved from other 
primary sources such as group and public websites, Agence Europe, 
statutes and minutes, interviews provided the primary data of this thesis 
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constituting the core means by which a detailed understanding of the 
scope and type of professionalisation and the practices as well as the 
definition of representativeness could be obtained. In particular, personal 
interviews are a unique source of reference providing information on 
perceptions of roles of leaders/members/supporters, beliefs and trust 
which otherwise would not be obtainable. Moreover interview data was 
used to test claims about group operation, estrangement of the leadership 
from members and elite domination. Again, the focus was not on the 
changes of professionalisation, though that was captured to a degree, but 
on the state of professionalisation within a group in order to test the 
hypothesis that groups professionalise their new media communication. 
Likewise, the emphasis was not on changes in representativeness, but in 
capturing the actual practice and character of group representativeness in 
light of the more comprehensive conception of representativeness, taking 
into account the organisational and strategic diversity of groups. 
Data on professionalisation was collected on the traditional 
conception of bureaucratisation, such as the degree of specialisation and 
expertise of the EU group leadership and the centralisation of organisation, 
and on a more comprehensive conception including new media technology 
usage. Data was retrieved from group websites, including social media 
sites, and interviews with Commission officials, the groups in question as 
well as their member groups. Data was collected on the age of the 
organisation, number of staff, their area of responsibility (how specialised 
are staff portfolio, e.g. are there specific communication officers or policy 
officers?), their employment status (full-, part-time or volunteer) and 
sources of funding (membership, donations, government, foundations, 
private). In terms of expertise, data was generated on their professional 
qualifications and career backgrounds, such as if staff have work experience 
or are qualified in public or private management, consultancies, marketing, 
law firms or EU institutions and on which level (EU institutions, EU group or 
grassroots experience). The retrieval of data on expertise further included 
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the generation and use of scientific studies and experience on the ground 
by groups. Information on organisational decision-making structures and 
position formation were found on websites, in annual reviews and statutes 
as well as inquired about in interviews. In order to assess the hypothesis on 
professionalisation of internal communication and the formation of 
positions, data was collected on the width (access) and depth (variety) of 
the usage of internet communication technology and its usefulness for 
information, participation and communication, as experienced by EU 
groups and their members/supporters. Processes of professionalisation 
were taken into account at all levels of organisation (leadership and 
member organisations) to be able to understand the internal variances of 
professionalisation and consider the relevance of professionalisation for 
representativeness at all organisational levels. Results on 
professionalisation and representativeness between different groups were 
compared in order to understand if claims that certain organisational 
features make a difference in terms of the representativeness of groups can 
be confirmed.  
The main professionalisation criticism in the traditional literature is 
that groups, as a result of recognition, will focus on influence logic over 
membership logic – in other words the literature claims that there are 
resource dependencies as well as institutional access conditions that will 
lead groups to focus on efficiency rather than internal communication. The 
hypothesis of this thesis is that professionalisation in new media 
technology in fact enables groups to counteract bureaucratisation and be 
more member focused, because it makes member/supporter engagement 
less resource and location dependent. Groups professionalise their internal 
communication by applying new media technology, thereby reducing 
resources such as time, money and staff. Respondents were asked to 
indicate what resources lobbying and networking requires and how they 
divide time and resources spent on lobbying/networking versus 
communicating with members/supporters. These questions also facilitate a 
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comparison of the distribution of time and resources spent in member 
versus supporter groups.  
Crucially, one hypothesis of this thesis is that there are different types 
of representativeness made up of two-dimensions, the acceptability and 
acceptance dimensions. Therefore EU groups and member/supporter 
groups were asked how they define representativeness; whether they 
consider themselves as being representative and they were confronted 
with different conceptions of representativeness. It indicates the 
importance groups attach to being representative of a cause or 
members/supporters within their own group and in general. It specifically 
investigates whether positions are formed based on member input and 
demands, or on scientific data, experience, principles or empathy 
(acceptability). A number of questions were designed to inquire whether 
groups that are professional cause (advocacy) groups, are considered 
representative in the eyes of their members groups – hence whether they 
are accepted as representative. Member groups were questioned on 
whether they felt represented by EU groups (acceptance). Do members 
groups accept the EU groups they are a member of as representative of 
their values and positions? 
The answers to these questions facilitate the comparison of different 
degrees of professionalisation on the one hand and the perceptions of 
representativeness on the other. To this end EU groups were additionally 
presented with a list of environmental groups and requested to identify 
whether they consider them professional and representative. This 
moreover facilitated a comparison of conceptions of representativeness 
amongst organisational levels. Beyond this the answers gave an indication 
on perceptions of representativeness in the group sector more generally.   
The collection of data on representativeness criteria was approached 
in two ways: On the one hand active involvement through various 
mechanisms of participation were analysed on group websites, such as new 
media communication, interactive tools and email lists. On the other hand 
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the application of these tools in practice as well as further internal 
participation mechanisms were investigated in the personal interviews. 
Questions about application of internet technology and social media, as 
well as other more traditional forms of communication, give insights about 
the degree of transparency and deliberation, as well as responsiveness, 
inclusiveness and embeddedness of internal communication and position 
formation. Questions on internet technology and other forms of 
communication and decision-making also try to go beyond the traditional 
conception of representation through members and include data on the 
support and participation of supporters as well as other interested parties. 
In this context, efforts made by groups to demonstrate responsiveness 
were observed. Responsiveness helps understand whether groups advocate 
the interests of their cause/members, creates trust and is an indicator for 
representativeness, depending on the groups’ structures and strategies, 
including member and supporter demands. The necessary degree of 
responsiveness to create trust and representativeness depends on the 
political aim, values and representation demands of leaders and 
members/supporters of a group – hence the type of representativeness a 
group is practising (see chapter two).  
Questions about role perceptions of staff and members and 
supporters were posed to both EU and their member groups, in order to 
shed light on claims in the literature that there is a moderation in ideology 
and groups become self-interested (in other words groups or rather their 
leadership increasingly perceive themselves as working for their portfolio 
as opposed to for members/supporters or indeed their cause). This can 
help understand whether there is a different view on how radical or 
moderate positions put forward should be but crucially also who decides 
on that. For example, a moderation of claims in order to find common 
ground with a network of EU groups and with the Commission might well 
be favoured by members/supporters. A WWF EU group member, due to the 
manifesto and political aim of the group, might have very different views on 
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the matter of cooperation and compromise then a Friends of the Earth 
Europe or World Economy, Ecology and Development (WEED) member. 
Additionally, the organisational role and political aim expressed on websites 
and printed material is compared to interview data in order to detect 
discrepancies that could indicate leadership deviation in practice from 
group manifestos. 
Advocacy	group	and	policy	cases	
The interaction between groups and the Commission as well as within 
and amongst the network of group members, supporters and coalitions is 
investigated in the cases of five EU environmental groups using the 
examples of recent decision-making in water policy and greenhouse gas 
emission reductions policy.  
The intellectual rationale for selecting environmental groups reflects 
the aim of the thesis to highlight gaps in the existing literature. The thesis 
challenges the dominant argument that groups necessarily lose their 
representativeness as they professionalise. Rather than undertaking a 
comparative or in-depth study of the representativeness and strategies of 
the groups under investigation, it points to examples where the existing 
theory is flawed and is unable satisfactorily to explain representativeness 
and professionalisation. The thesis points to the need to develop new 
concepts of representativeness and professionalisation and provides a 
starting point for further research. Moreover, environmental groups were 
chosen, as they exemplify one of the most outstanding counterexamples to 
traditional internally democratic membership groups.  
All groups are cause groups but with diverse organisational structures 
and strategies. The two policy areas the groups engage in are 
environmental policies affected by climate change, a global phenomenon 
requiring EU-wide and global strategies, as well as local action. Because 
climate change affects everyone on every level across national borders, it is 
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of interest to any group active in the climate change related topics of water 
scarcity and emission reductions, regardless what organisational or 
geographical level. Moreover, the international dimension of environmental 
policy makes the supranational structure of the EU as well as advocacy 
groups active at supranational level increasingly important. About 80 per 
cent of environmental policy in the EU is decided at EU level.54 It therefore 
exemplifies a perfect case to investigate how EU level groups form 
positions, given that sub-EU organisational levels should have a vested 
interest in the shaping of EU-policies. Additionally, it is perfect for 
showcasing the professionalisation in online technologies creating 
necessary transnational linkages on a global issue. 
The issue of climate change is complex and of relevance from a 
number of different perspectives. Water scarcity and drought are highly 
sensitive issues which are of great importance to member states as well as 
a wide range of public and private stakeholders, due to its potentially 
severe economic and social impact. Water scarcity affects agriculture, 
industry, energy, transport and tourism as well as local communities and 
private households and eventually entire eco-systems and is a security and 
health hazard. Water is arguably the most important resource for a human 
being. Because of the special physical and social characteristics of the 
environment in general, and water quantity in particular, and the broad 
number of interested and affected parties, the participatory approach is 
suggested to be especially effective in order to accommodate these 
characteristics and interests. Water management demands broad 
consultation, because it requires very scientific and technical knowledge, 
for example for assessment processes and evaluating solutions. There tend 
to be wrong or unrealistic conceptions for example about water usage, its 
availability and consumption in the public, or simply a lack of awareness 
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 WWF-EPO website (accessed 20/08/2012: http://www.wwf.eu/about_us/eu_environment/). 
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and information.55  Interest groups are valuable in providing technical 
information, information on local state-of-the-art and needs as well as 
creating awareness and framing issues. Water is a subject requiring EU and 
indeed international legislation because water scarcity and droughts 
happen across boundaries and their causes and preventive measures 
require common transnational effort to achieve effective results. Because 
of this, modern water management in the EU is also designed and 
implemented along hydraulic units rather than national territories. The 
green paper on emission reductions is equally of relevance to industry, 
business, agriculture and energy sectors and local communities. Since it 
affects the energy mix and the structure of energy consumption, it 
eventually has an impact on any household or private and public 
organisation and moreover impacts foreign and security policy. The 
emissions reduction policy is a European strategy in communication with 
UN climate talks and connected to the global aims of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The EU is thus a 
policy actor participating in global negotiations as well as legislating within 
EU boundaries. Emissions may be pumped into the air of one country, but 
the resulting effects of climate change are global. Equally, the efforts of one 
country will only really have a weight in collaboration with others. This 
emphasises the need for transnational consultation, as well as networking 
amongst environmental groups on the issue. The emissions reductions 
policy requires not only broad consultation of the various sectors impacted. 
It also calls for economic, scientific and technical analysis and local 
experience input reporting on solutions and their potential. 
Environmental politics or rather ‘green’ politics moreover is of 
particular interest in the frame of the wider democratic deficit debate 
surrounding the EU and the European Commission. Green politics has 
become increasingly prominent with EU institutions as a means of 
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 The Eurobarometer on water gives data on the awareness of water-related problems (TNS Opinion 
and Social 2012). 
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providing legitimacy through green reputation in the eyes of European 
citizens and internationally and is moreover providing an image of 
identification for citizens. This explains the particular interest in an 
engagement with advocacy groups, notably environmental groups. The 
increasing importance of green politics is also reflected in the number of 
environmental EU groups and other stakeholders, including European 
Parliamentarians who joined the ‘spring alliance’, which describes itself as 
“a participatory movement to ensure that the European Union puts people 
and planet first”.56 In 2010, the growing awareness of the urgency of 
climate change led the Commission to set up the Directorate-General 
Climate Action. The latter “[…] now proposes policy and represents the EU 
in the international negotiations, while DG Environment concentrates on 
ensuring that relevant environmental aspects like soil, forests and 
biodiversity are factored into climate policy”.57 Interesting for the study of 
cause groups is the fact that the EU Directorate General for Environment 
was set-up in 1973 with a surrogate and gyroscopic goal: “to protect, 
preserve and improve the environment for present and future 
generations”.58    
This thesis applied the decisional method used in case studies on 
strategies in order to identify information on key organisations, leadership, 
officials and their interaction: participants in climate, water and forestry 
policy-making related stakeholder dialogues and consultations were 
retrieved from official EU documents, the EU Bulletin and EU institutions 
websites such as DG Environment; moreover from sources such as Agence 
Europe and related academic literature. Additionally, information on 
stakeholders was found on the EU lobby register and group websites as well 
as through mapping existing environmental networks of groups such as the 
Green 10 at EU, national and sub-national level and through secondary 
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 The European Spring Alliance (accessed 01/07/2012: http://springalliance.eu/).  
57
 Website of DG Environment (accessed 07/09/2012: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/environment/index_en.htm). 
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 Website of DG Environment (accessed 07/09/2012: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/environment/index_en.htm).  
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literature. Interviews have been carried out with EU and national decision-
makers and with group leadership at EU level and member organisations at 
national and sub-national level in the UK and Germany. To identify which 
groups are relevant to the case studies, in other words which groups have 
an interest in the policies, a keyword search was carried out on the lobby 
register, member groups of the EU groups were investigated with regards to 
the interests they represent and minutes and documents on EU stakeholder 
meetings were scanned. A mixture of decisional, positional, reputational, 
and relational methods used in case studies of network structures were 
applied to identify member and supporter organisations with an interest in 
the specific case thesis policies (Knoke 1993, 30): Sources of information 
were member and supporter lists, position papers and minutes as well as 
interviews discovering further member organisations with an interest 
and/or that were involved. After creating a list of the EU groups involved at 
EU level, interviews gave an insight into which participating groups at the 
internal organisational levels had an interest in the policies and how they 
were represented in the position brought forward to the Commission. This 
includes what groups’ base their position on (acceptability) and how 
support was expressed by member groups, but also their members and 
supporters in turn (acceptance). 45 interviews were carried out in total, 
which though this is a qualitative study, provides a lot of comparative data 
and complex insight. The focus was however on the five EU environmental 
groups of the case studies and their member groups interviewed. The focus 
on these five groups in particular was strategic, to include groups of 
different organisational structures and strategies. The selection was further 
dictated by the availabilities of EU and member groups’ to be interviewed 
during the period of fieldwork.  
Two aspects were investigated to test the impact recognition, or 
rather professionalisation, may have on group’s ability to be representative 
of their members: the criteria and scope of professionalisation and the 
formal, informal, active and passive mechanisms of representation within 
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groups. These gave insights about what groups based the formation of their 
positions on and what channels of acceptance groups made available – 
hence how their representativeness could be judged. What types and 
degree of representativeness and professionalisation can be found in 
groups was established in chapter one and two. How groups’ 
representativeness is assessed was established also in that chapter. The 
case studies test under which conditions (scope and type) of 
professionalisation (variance), groups have which type and degree of 
representativeness. 
To test representativeness (see table 1), the indicators for the two 
representativeness dimensions were developed from recent studies on 
political party representation (Mansbridge 2003) as well as advocacy group 
representation (Halpin 2006; O’Neill 2001) (see chapter two). 
Traditional professionalisation criteria established in chapter two are 
based on professionalisation and bureaucratisation criticism in the 
traditional group literature (Kohler-Koch 2010; Michels 1911; Offe 1984; 
Sudbery 2003; Warleigh 2001), organisational theory (Egeberg 2001) as 
well as on professionalisation in new media technology discussed in 
communication and media studies (Castells 2001; Pickerill 2003). 
For the water policy case an interview was conducted in DG 
Environment with the former team leader on water scarcity and draughts, 
now active on water adaptation and climate change. Secretary Generals of 
two EU groups involved in water scarcity and droughts stakeholder 
meetings were interviewed: BirdLife Europe and the WWF European Policy 
Office (WWF-EPO). Their national group members in Germany 
Naturschutzverband Deutschland (NABU) and WWF Germany and in the 
UK, The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) and WWF UK, were 
interviewed. Additionally, member groups of the European Environment 
Bureau, also active on the water issue, were interviewed to get additional 
data on the groups in question and perceptions of representativeness and 
professionalisation in the environmental group sector. Member groups 
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were interviewed in the UK and in Germany, for practical reasons (language 
and expenses), but also to enrich the diversity of groups interviewed. The 
two countries have inherently different government structures and 
cultures, often reflected in the structures of advocacy groups. For Germany 
they were: Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz e.V., Bund für 
Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND – Friends of the Earth 
Germany), Deutsche Umwelthilfe e.V., Deutscher Naturschutzring (DNR), 
Grüne Liga. For the UK they were: Campaign to protect rural England 
(CPRE), FoE England, Wales and Northern Ireland (FoE-EWNI), Scottish 
Environment Link (LINK), Wildlife and Countryside Link. In addition, the UK 
non-profit consultancy Waterwise was interviewed to receive further 
information about the policy and the group sector. 
For the emissions reductions policy three EU decision-makers were 
interviewed who acted/are acting as core figures in the policy field. Two in 
DG Clima (a head of unit in the Directorate for European and international 
carbon markets and a policy officer for the economic assessment of climate 
policies) as well as the deputy head of cabinet in the cabinet of the 
environment Commissioner Potoĉnik. Interviews were conducted with the 
Secretary Generals of three EU groups involved in meeting on the policy: 
Greenpeace EU, the Climate Action Network Europe (CAN-E) and Friends of 
the Earth Europe (FoEE). National member groups interviewed in Germany 
were Greenpeace Germany, Forum für Umwelt und Entwicklung (FUE) and 
Deutscher Naturschutz Ring (DNR), Germanwatch, WEED, Bund für Umwelt 
und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND) and in the UK groups interviewed 
were Greenpeace, Sandbag, the Campaign for the Protection of Rural 
England (CPRE) and Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland (FoE-EWNI).  
To receive further information on groups, regulations and the 
perception of professionalisation and representativeness by Commission 
officials, the policy officer responsible for NGO liaison and the funding 
scheme Life+, as well as five further officials in DG Clima, Environment and 
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Agriculture were interviewed. For a further independent group/consultancy 
perspective on the two core conceptions of the thesis, a European 
consultancy for non-governmental organisations was interviewed.  
The aim of the empirical investigation was not to carry out an in-
depth analysis of precisely how representative and professional 
environmental groups are. Rather, the aim was to explore the 
representativeness and professionalisation of a number of groups in order 
to illuminate the gaps in the literature. This meant investigating how well 
the literature explained representativeness by comparing organisational 
structures and practices against theoretical assumptions. The emphasis is 
therefore often on what groups base their positions on and whom they 
intend to represent, which entailed analysing the documents and websites 
on formal decision-making structures and missions (i.e. statutes, annual 
reports and mission statements). Interviews were then used to inquire 
further about informal channels of decision-making and communication 
(i.e. emails, mailing-lists and intranet). Importantly, a large number of 
background interviews with a variety of environmental groups, an advocacy 
group consultancy and Commission officials were able to get a sense of the 
acceptance dimension of representativeness. By giving examples of 
representativeness and professionalisation that go beyond the traditional 
assumptions of member representation and bureaucratisation, the thesis 
points to the need for further research in the field.   
What	the	thesis	does	not	to	
This research does not argue for a dismissal of the traditional concept 
of representativeness based on democratic participation, nor does it argue 
that the acceptance dimension on its own is sufficient. What it does do is 
suggest it is problematic to solely apply the traditional concept to the 
varying types of groups with their different organisational structures and 
strategies, including types of members and supporters, interests and aims. 
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Groups have diverse representative claims, with regards to what or whom 
they represent and how they represent. Hence the concept of 
representativeness has to be adapted to these differing empirical 
conditions. 
This thesis puts forward progressive conceptions of 
representativeness and professionalisation. It does not deny the continuous 
danger of co-optation and bureaucratisation also to modern forms of 
advocacy organisations. Nor does it glorify the potential and actual use of 
new media technologies in advocacy groups as mechanisms to achieve 
representativeness. Further it does not attempt to make any normative 
claims about groups’ democratic agency as such, though of course the 
behavioural dimension of groups has normative implications. Rather, it is a 
positive theory challenging the assumption that groups becoming more and 
more professional are losing representativeness, which in turn is 
considered to affect their democratic agency.  
This thesis also does not analyse the representativeness in terms of 
the wider group population. This thesis responds to claims in the literature 
that professionalisation takes place at the cost of representativeness, 
because there is an estrangement between the leadership and its 
members. To assess this claim the multilevel representativeness of the 
internal organisation of groups is analysed. It provides the structural and 
strategic analysis of (vertical) representativeness within groups. The thesis 
does not try to explain whether these groups engage the individual citizen 
or if the (recognised) group population as a whole is representative for the 
population (horizontal/system perspective). Nevertheless, the analysis of 
group internal organisation and representativeness undertaken in this 
thesis is of crucial importance to the overall representativeness of the 
group population.  
Likewise, individual members and supporters of groups have not 
been included in this research. This is because the context of the research 
question, whether or not groups can be representative despite - or because 
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of – professionalisation, is set in the EU context. The criticism is precisely 
that EU groups professionalise and do no longer represent their member 
groups. Though criticism in the literature that advocacy groups are 
generally becoming a certain type of professionalised supporter, solidarity 
or campaign organisation and no longer represent individuals is taken into 
account, it does not concern this research question immediately. Instead, 
this thesis wants to test whether the recognition at the additional political 
level, and hence a professionalisation of EU level groups, goes hand in hand 
with moving away from national and sub-national member/supporter 
group interests. EU groups do not have individual members and supporters 
and hence the thesis investigates member and supporter groups at national 
and sub-national levels rather than individual members. It would however 
be interesting and revealing to investigate further whether national/sub-
national groups are representative of individual members/supporters. This 
would require a larger individual member/supporter survey and would 
have to overcome the difficulty of the need to cooperate with groups to 
provide access to members/supporters, let alone accessing confidential 
member and supporter data. 
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5	 Introduction	 to	 the	 case	 studies:					
EU	policies	and	environmental	groups	
Chapter one explained how one important strand of the interest 
group literature considers the Commission’s strategy to enhance its 
democratic credentials through the engagement with advocacy groups to 
be doomed. According to the argument, groups disconnect from their 
members and supporters as they engage in institutionalised dialogue and 
as a result lose their representativeness (Kohler-Koch 2008; 2010, 111; 
Warleigh 2001). Chapter two challenged this assumption, suggesting that 
advocacy groups perform different types of representation and have more 
complex channels of expressing support. Moreover, their 
professionalisation also includes an increased application of new media 
technologies for representation structures and strategies. The assumption 
that groups necessarily lose their representativeness as a result of 
professionalisation has to be revisited taking into account the diverse 
organisational structures and strategies and considering the two 
dimensions of representativeness established in chapter two and three. 
The thesis attempts to illustrate the gaps in the literature through the 
analysis of interviews, documents and websites in the examples of five EU 
environmental groups and some of their member groups in two policy 
cases. The following chapter provides background information on these 
groups and cases to give an overview of who the groups are and in what 
type of policy environment they are active in. Based on this information the 
specific case studies will analyse the representativeness of the groups using 
the typologies and assumptions established in chapter two and three.  
The case studies do not attempt to investigate how groups campaign, 
but rather what groups’ base their representative claims on and how their 
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representativeness is constituted, as well as what role new media 
professionalisation plays in the course of it. The case studies attempt to test 
whether group professionalisation necessarily comes at the cost of 
representativeness.  
The	climate	change	policies	
The two policy areas the groups engage in are environmental policies 
affected by climate change, a global phenomenon requiring EU-wide, 
indeed global, strategies and local action. Because climate change affects 
everyone on every level across national borders, it is of interest to any 
group active on the topic of water scarcity and emission reductions, which 
are related to climate change regardless of what organisational or 
geographical level. Moreover, the international dimension of environmental 
policy makes the supranational structure of the EU, as well as advocacy 
groups, active at supranational level increasingly important. About 80 per 
cent of environmental policy in the EU is decided at EU level.59 It therefore 
exemplifies a perfect case to investigate how EU level groups form positions 
and how these are accepted, given that sub-EU organisational levels should 
have a vested interest in the shaping of EU-policies. Additionally, it is 
perfect for showcasing the professionalisation in online technologies 
creating necessary transnational linkages on a global issue. 
The	EU	Water	Scarcity	and	Droughts	policy	
Over the last decade the politics of water have changed. Historically, 
water management has been managed locally,60 however modern water 
management is no longer defined to national borders but to entire 
hydrological units that can either be within one country or across national 
                                                      
59
 WWF-EPO website (accessed 20/08/2012: http://www.wwf.eu/about_us/eu_environment/). 
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 The area of water policy has been marked by distinct national differences in the theory of water 
pollution, policy tools and effective compliance with EU water law. Countries have experienced great 
difficulties in the integration of EU law into national regulations. Environmentalists are strong players 
at EU level in comparison to UK environmentalists (Richardson 1996). 
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boundaries, including territory outside the EU. This river basin approach 
also marks a trend towards more adaptive, sustainable water management 
that aims to take into account environmental, economic, technological 
institutional and cultural characteristics of an entire hydrological 
ecosystem. Water is no longer treated as a commodity, but as a natural 
resource. This change in perception provides a stronger ground and 
opportunity for environmental groups to push for social and ecological 
awareness in water policies, but also requires cross-national coordination 
of policies and implementation by the groups. 
The Water Framework Directive from 2000 and the related River 
Basin Management Plans are the main regulations marking this change. 
However, a number of EU member states raised concerns that the directive 
does not propose adequate strategies to address water scarcity and 
droughts and requested the initiation of EU action on water scarcity and 
droughts.61 The fact that not only Southern, but also Northern member 
states experience droughts and water scarcity situations raised the pressure 
for specific regulations and encouraged additional actions by the 
Commission such as the drought management plan, a working group on 
water scarcity and droughts, mainly for national governments, and the 
commissioning of studies on water saving potential by the EU.62 In 2006 and 
early 2007 DG Environment carried out an in-depth assessment of water 
scarcity and droughts in the EU. Following the assessment, the Commission 
presented a set of available policy options to achieve water efficiency and 
water savings in its Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council (European Commission 2007). In the frame of its preparation, it 
summoned and chaired a stakeholder forum on water scarcity and 
droughts to discuss the status-quo of water scarcity and droughts as well as 
possible solutions and contributions from stakeholders, to which also 
advocacy groups were invited. Two stakeholder meetings were held in 
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 Thus request was raised at the Environment Council of 9 March 2006. 
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For example in the summer of 2003 most countries in central-western Europe were affected by 
drought and in 2005 Portugal and Spain were severely struck by drought.
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Brussels about the development of the water scarcity and droughts policy 
and one meeting in 2010 to discuss progress against that policy. Three 
follow-up reports in 2008, 2009 and 2010 document the implementation 
process of the water scarcity and droughts policy. ‘NGOs’ and ‘civil society’ 
are mentioned as important players in the implementation of water policies 
and in particular in raising awareness and creating a water saving culture in 
the EU. The Commission subsequently (January 2011) and as part of the 
preparations for the 2012 Water Scarcity and Droughts Policy Review 
wished to establish a more formal and permanent group to meet more 
regularly on water scarcity (WWF-EPO and BirdLife officials 2010/11). 
DG Environment, in particular the water unit, consulted stakeholders 
to get input on the status quo, solutions and orientations. Amongst the 
stakeholders present were three environmental groups, the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF), BirdLife and the European Environmental Bureau (EEB).63 All 
three environmental groups are members of the Green 10, the EU 
environmental umbrella network recognized by the Commission as the 
sectoral group representative. Information on who selects and election 
criteria is not apparent in official documentation, however according to an 
insider it is the Commission’s Director Generals, Directors or Head of Units 
responsible for the particular policy who invite stakeholders to attend 
meetings.64  Environmental advocacy groups report that amongst each 
other there is no formal decision on who can or cannot attend, but that 
attendance of stakeholder meetings depends on groups’ willingness and 
ability to attend and provide resources. However, there are formal 
conditions for any advocacy group to be able to attend stakeholder 
meetings, requiring expertise and representativeness. For example to be 
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 Further stakeholders present at the first stakeholder forum on water scarcity and droughts were 
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admitted to contribute to the common implementation strategy, described 
by one of the groups as “kind of an idea of a modified comitology process 
that is in charge of the Water Framework Directive” (interviews 2010/11), 
groups have to have a proven track record of experience in the issue area to 
prove they could add value to EU policies and discussions. The second 
condition is that the group has to represent several organisations within 
the EU member states. 
The	 Communication	 on	 Greenhouse	 Gas	 Emission	
Reductions	beyond	20	per	cent	
In 2005 the EU adopted the goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
in order to limit global warming to below two degrees above pre-industrial 
level. In March 2007 the EU’s leaders endorsed a climate and energy policy 
package that aimed to combat climate change whilst strengthening the EU’s 
energy security as well as competitiveness. This integrated approach 
commits Europe to transforming itself into a ‘highly energy-efficient, low 
carbon economy’. The Commission's communication views the EU as a 
crucial player to spark movements towards global emission reductions and 
as a leader in the global combat against climate change (European 
Commission 2010, 3), setting “an example to the rest of the world” (DG 
Clima 2010, 1). 
The first step of this approach was the agreement of the 20-20-20 
targets, including a reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions of at least 20 
per cent below 1990 levels. Amongst the strategies for emissions 
reductions are: the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the increase 
of the collective renewables share to 20 per cent of the EU energy mix and 
the use of carbon capture and storage (CCS). The ultimate aim is cuts of 80-
95 per cent by 2050 by all developed countries. At the global level, the UN 
Conference on Climate Change in Copenhagen in December 2009 was 
unsuccessful in securing binding commitments to reach the 2 degrees 
target. Since then, Germany, France and the UK have stepped forward 
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pushing for a 30 per cent reduction, “on condition that other major 
emitting countries in the developed and developing worlds commit to do 
their fair share under a global climate agreement. United Nations 
negotiations on such an agreement are ongoing.” In that context, in May 
2010, the European Commission published the communication ‘Analysis of 
options to move beyond 20 per cent greenhouse gas emission reductions 
and assessing the risk of carbon leakage’, which, rather than deciding on 
which reduction level to go for, revisits the analysis of the implications of 
the 20 per cent and 30 per cent targets and assesses the risk of carbon 
leakage. The background for revisiting the analysis is that the financial and 
economic crisis, since the endorsement of the climate and energy policy 
package in 2007, changed the grounds and figures of the original analysis. 
The slower growth of the economy meant fewer emissions, thus an easier 
and less costly achievement of the 20 per cent than anticipated in 2008, 
but at the same time it took away the necessary drive towards the 
development of green technologies. This in turn risks making the long-term 
achievement of 80-95 per cent by 2050 more difficult and more costly. 
Therefore, the Commission carried out an analysis of both the 20 per cent 
and 30 per cent greenhouse gas emission reduction options to compare the 
technological, financial, economic and political implications of both 
scenarios. Whilst pointing out the costs of sticking to the 20 per cent target, 
the report also observes that the international context is not ready for a 
move to 30 per cent and that the EU’s economic situation places a 
constraint on what is economically and financially achievable (European 
Commission 2010). The Communication was followed by a detailed 
technical analysis published in February 2012 (European Commission 2012, 
5). Both, the communication and the analysis contained in its Staff Working 
Documents have been forwarded to the Council, European Parliament, 
Committee of the Regions and Economic and Social Committee to inform 
their discussions on a potential move to a 30 per cent greenhouse gas 
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emission reduction target. Meanwhile, the Commission has announced 
plans for further analysis in the light of the international negotiations.65 The 
emission reduction objectives further had to be submitted to the UNFCCC 
Secretariat by the EU and other parties by May 2012 in order to prepare for 
a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. To that purpose 
the Commission published another Staff Working Document (European 
Commission 2012, 18) providing technical input for discussions with 
Member States.66 
The communication on emission reductions is equally of relevance to 
industry, business and local communities and since it affects the energy mix 
and the structure of energy consumption, it eventually has an impact on 
every household or private and public organisation and moreover impacts 
foreign and security policy. A stakeholder consultation on the climate and 
energy package took place more broadly and stakeholder meetings around 
the implementation of the climate and energy package are held. There was 
no stakeholder meeting on the 30 per cent reduction issue specifically, 
although a stakeholder form was available for groups to be filled out 
(environmental groups 2010/11). 
The creation of the Commission's Directorate General for Climate and 
the release of the communication by the new Climate Commissioner, 
Connie Hedegaard, on the benefits, both environmental and economic, of 
the EU moving to a 30 per cent emission reduction target encouraged 
environmental groups. The communication was received as a positive 
change by many EU environmental and climate change groups, providing a 
good analysis and basis for debate. Further, a number of big corporations 
are now in favour of a 30 per cent reduction target, strengthening the 
environmental groups’ stance (Sandbag official 2011). After Copenhagen, 
the climate change think tank, Sandbag, led a coalition of 21 environmental 
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and climate change groups, including WWF and UNICEF, to support a 30 per 
cent target or more. At the same time, the European Alliance for 
Competitive Industry put out a letter stating that they could not go to 30 
per cent, because it would be too punishing to industry. The Corporate 
Leaders Group on Climate Change published an important response saying 
a 30 per cent target was indeed possible. The Sandbag coalition sent a 
letter to the European Council president Van Rompuy and the European 
Commission president, Barroso, and furthermore signed an online petition 
together, in order to get various advocacy groups to push for 30 per cent or 
more. Also at the same time, the UK, Germany and France stepped forward 
in support of a 30 per cent target. This sequence of incidents together gave 
environmental and climate change advocacy groups momentum in their 
push for more ambitious emission reduction targets (Sandbag official 
2011). 
The reasons for environmental and climate groups advocating 
emission reductions beyond 20 per cent generally follow a similar line of 
argument, with varying emphasis on justice, environmental or economic 
aspects. The general reasons are exemplified by a Sandbag official (2011):  
“Firstly, if we don't increase our ambition, we are not really 
staying true to the recommendations of the IPCC for the kind of 
commitment that is expected of a developed nation. Secondly, 
Europe is one of the largest emitters historically. If we pride 
ourselves on being leaders on climate change we need to practise 
what we preach. Thus environmental responsibility and Europe's 
credibility are at stake. To be a leader in new low carbon economy 
you need to start driving action now […] low carbon jobs, green 
jobs. I don't believe there will be a carbon economy, if we do not 
have higher ambitions.” 
Forming positions in the interest of the environment based on 
scientific studies (gyroscopic), requires groups either to be professional and 
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have the expertise to carry out reliable and sound studies themselves, or to 
rely on scientific studies published by others generally accepted as sound. 
In the case of the emission reductions communication, the scientific ground 
around which groups formed their positions is accepted under international 
law. This makes their positions a strong and legitimate case on behalf of the 
environment and the general public, including future generations 
(surrogate). It thus strengthens their acceptability dimension and 
‘representative claim’. The gyroscopic argument is that the scientific 
consensus over the International Panel for Climate Change report, or what 
groups understand the scientific consensus to be, dictates what are the 
threats, the scale of action needed and the pace. Member groups take 
these same studies as basis for their positions and support of the EU 
position (environmental group officials 2010/11). In the case of emission 
reductions groups rely on the UN climate convention ratified by almost all 
nations of the world, with its central article two stating that dangerous 
climate change has to be avoided. The EU target of a 20 per cent reduction 
is in violation of article two. Additionally, EU groups and their member 
groups interviewed argued that the EU has to take a lead with a high target, 
as set out in its own policy communication, in order to stimulate other 
countries to follow. Moreover, an economic interest in raising the target has 
to be stimulated, because as the Commissions own studies show, it is in the 
interest of the EU economy to increase investment in innovative renewable 
technologies. The latter arguments are founded on the Commission’s and 
the EU groups’ own scientific and economic studies as well as their 
principles to take on responsibility of action. 
As with any general interest advocacy group based in Brussels, all 
groups are registered as non-profit organisations under Belgian law, which 
requires a certain governance framework consisting of a general assembly 
and a board. 
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The	environmental	advocacy	groups	
The interaction between groups and the Commission as well as within 
and amongst the network of group members, supporters and coalitions is 
investigated in the cases of five EU environmental groups using the 
examples of recent decision-making in water policy and more specifically 
water scarcity and drought policies and greenhouse gas emission reduction 
policy. All groups are environmental cause groups but with diverse 
organisational structures and strategies. 
WWF-European	Policy	Office	
The WWF-European Policy Office (WWF-EPO) is the European 
representation of WWF International, opened in Brussels in 1989. WWF, 
headquartered in Switzerland, was founded in 1961 by a group of ‘scientists 
and advertising and public relations experts’ committed to establishing an 
international organisation to raise funds for conservation. The founders’ 
intention from the start was not to represent the people or members, but 
to “harness public opinion and educate the world about the necessity for 
conservation”.67 For that purpose they invented the panda brand logo: 
“aware of the need for a strong, recognizable symbol that would overcome 
all language barriers, the group agreed that the big, furry animal with her 
appealing, black-patched eyes, would make an excellent logo”. 68  The 
conservation strategy agreed was to work, wherever possible, with existing 
non-governmental organisations, and base arguments “on the best 
scientific knowledge available”. 69 
WWF is open to forming coalitions with business and working with 
government in order to further conservation goals, although the type of 
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partnership is different. Business and industry are considered a second-
level community after the first community of environmental groups in 
Brussels, other Brussels-based advocacy groups and groups based in the 
member states (WWF-EPO official 2010): 
”Sometimes with the NGOs there is more weight in numbers. 
But also we can share the burden of the tasks. Not having that 
many resources we can be more effective in the way we employ 
them. I think its different with businesses and industry, there the 
partnerships are more tactical and they have to do with increasing 
influence and authority in the lobbying process. If NGOs and 
industry can be saying the same thing that is politically much more 
powerful.” 
From the beginning onwards, the international fund-raising was 
organised through setting up offices in different countries. It was the 
founders who launched the national member groups, which send up to 
two-thirds of their funds raised to WWF international, and keep the 
remainder to spend on conservation projects of their own choice.70 
WWF International now has 24 national WWF member groups and 
five associated groups operating under a different name. Member groups 
are responsible to their own Boards and accountable to their donors. WWF 
International itself is accountable to national member groups, donors, and 
the Swiss authorities. WWF International's Board and committees are 
mostly made up of members from the Boards and Chief Executive Officers 
of the member groups. WWF moreover has programmes and 
representatives in many countries.71 
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The science-based approach to conservation has been WWF’s 
strategy ever since; however WWF has undergone some changes regarding 
the complexity and focus of its conservation targets since its foundation. 
Today, rather than conserving single species with a local focus, the 
conservation strategy has global aims, which are: slowing climate change, 
reducing toxics in the environment, protecting oceans and fresh waters, 
stopping deforestation, and saving species. These aims require complex 
scientific analysis and an integrated national, regional and global 
approach.72 The change of focus also manifested itself in the name change 
in 1986 from ‘World Wildlife Fund’ to ‘World Wide Fund For Nature’.73 The 
strategies to raise funds and awareness and to achieve conservation have 
been the same all along: campaigning through various media, including the 
press, lobbying and working with governments, as well as working in the 
field. 
In Europe, WWF is present in 20 countries and has over 3.5 million 
supporters. Worldwide, it is active active in over 100 countries employing 
about 5000 staff with over 5 million supporters, making Europe the area 
with the highest density of WWF supporters.74 The WWF-EPO with its 41 
staff notably is a relatively unique structure within WWF, because it does 
not have its own individual members, but it is a representative office of the 
WWF group network, and who in turn have members and supporters 
(WWF-EPO official 2010). 
The members together with WWF International initiated the 
establishment of WWF-EPO. They decided that Brussels was of extreme 
importance for decision-making both for the EU but also as a global player. 
It was seen as important to have a European policy programme, since 80 
per cent of the environmental legislation that governs the EU member 
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states originates in Brussels. WWF decided to establish a European policy 
programme with a strategy board which sets the direction, has advisory 
responsibilities for the running of the office and oversees strategy and 
implementation plans, and resolves some of the controversial issues. Its 
decision-making structure hardly changed since its creation and the 
ultimate goal, “people living in harmony with nature”, has stayed the same 
(WWF-EPO officials 2010). 
Water scarcity and droughts was identified as an extremely important 
issue by WWF and as one of the serious problems experienced in a number 
of the WWF’s priority river basins. In fact WWF’s first land purchase 
established the Coto Doñana National Park, an important wetland area in 
the Guadalquivir Delta marshes. WWF is currently fighting proposals to 
drain the marshes and syphon off water to irrigate agricultural land and to 
expand tourist facilities.75 
The decision to get active on the issue at EU level came with the 
opportunity to address this problem and face one of WWF-EPO’s objectives 
through the EU process on the Water Scarcity and Droughts 
communication. WWF-EPO has been very active around the Water Scarcity 
and Droughts issue and was one of the NGO stakeholders involved in the 
development of the policy. It participated in the stakeholder forums and 
consultations organised, as well as in the work under the common 
implementation strategy of the working group on water scarcity and 
droughts. It further held bilateral meetings with the Parliament, when the 
Parliament was adopting its report as well as with the Commission, when 
some of the work was on-going on the preparation of the policy. WWF-EPO 
also wrote to and held bilateral meetings with the Council, though normally 
the Council is approached through national member groups. WWF-EPO 
also tracks the implementation of the Water Framework Directive. The 
Commission does not have administration staff of its own based in the 
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member states, but at the same time as the guardian of the treaty it needs 
to check policy implementation. Thus since the European Parliament and 
the Commission do not really have much say in implementation and do not 
have first-hand information from the ground, WWF-EPO sees its 
opportunity in providing that information, which may differ from the 
information member states provide, and bringing problems to light. The 
Water Scarcity and Droughts policy is still evolving and during 2011 WWF-
EPO was preparing for the major 2012 policy review.  
BirdLife	Europe	
The BirdLife European and Central Asian Partnership (BirdLife Europe) 
was established in Brussels in 1993 as the European division of BirdLife 
International working on European issues. It is an umbrella network of 45 
national environmental conservation groups with one national member 
group, so-called ‘partner’, in every EU member state. BirdLife Europe is one 
of six Regional-division Secretariats that compose BirdLife International. 
According to its own record, BirdLife Europe engages more than 4,100 staff, 
two million individual members and supporters and tens of thousands of 
skilled volunteers. Together with its 45 national member groups it owns or 
manages more than 5,800 sites encompassing 320,000 hectares.76  BirdLife 
Europe was set up “because of the ever increasing impact that decisions 
taken at EU level have on nature and the environment”.77 Brussels staff 
works on the improvement of EU policy legislation according to BirdLife 
Internationals environment and biodiversity standards and supports the 
development of the European and Central Asian Partners.  
BirdLife Europe’s strategy to conservation is regional, with member 
groups implementing the Europe Programme coordinated by BirdLife 
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Europe staff, working closely with BirdLife Global Secretariat staff 
headquartered in the United Kingdom. 78  BirdLife considers birds as 
indicators for the health of biodiversity. The BirdLife Europe Programme 
delivers guidelines to conserve birds and biodiversity across Europe, based 
on expert knowledge about the status and threats to the species.  
BirdLife prepares species action plans together with conservationists, 
scientists, nature managers and relevant stakeholders which the European 
Commission adopts. They set agreed conservation objectives and a 
framework of actions that helps to focus the conservation efforts and 
limited resources on the solution of the most important problems. Species 
action plans provide a framework for action for international treaties, 
national governments and governmental agencies, NGOs and scientists. 
They provide an official basis for actions since they are endorsed through 
intergovernmental agreements.79 
BirdLife got involved in the Water Scarcity and Droughts policy, 
because its UK member group, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
(RSPB), felt it was an important issue and BirdLife Europe office itself does 
not have a policy team working on it. The RSPB thus requested to represent 
BirdLife’s policy position at the Commission’s stakeholder meetings and 
consultations, acting in the name of BirdLife. Apart from the advantage of 
working as part of a greater coalition, national groups are required to act 
through European umbrella groups, because the Commission does not 
engage with national groups in stakeholder meetings. The RSPB is very 
active on Water Scarcity and Droughts issues and water more generally.  
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Friends	of	the	Earth	Europe	
Founded in 1986, Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE) is the European 
representation of Friends of the Earth International (FoEI), “the world’s 
[and Europe's] largest grassroots environmental network”. 80  FoEE was 
established in the context of European campaigns on acid rain and the 
protection of tropical rainforests, under the guidance of Friends of the 
Earth International (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 9). FoEI was founded 1971 
in Sweden by its French, Swedish, British and US members. Since, it has 
expanded its membership to 76 national member groups, who generally 
existed prior to becoming part of FoEI, with 5,000 local activist groups on 
every continent and over 2 million members and supporters around the 
world.81 Groups are diverse and independent, but all carry the FoE name 
and are “united by their commitment to combine grassroots activism with 
international advocacy [and c]ampaigning on the basis of shared ecological 
and social values” (FoEI 30th anniversary, 2001). 
The international scope of its strategy resembled in the name 
‘Friends of the Earth’ was essential to its founders, as was a “decentralised 
and democratic structure that allows all member groups to participate in 
decision-making”82 and gives the member groups room to “move ahead 
their own way”.83 FoEI, just as FoEE, forms its positions based on science 
and ecological and social values with an international objective, but the 
structure for decision-making and experience input from the field is 
enabled through a participatory voting system. The formation of its 
international positions moreover relies on input from communities, and 
alliances with indigenous peoples, farmers' movements, trade unions, 
human rights groups and others.84 
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FoEI’s strategy has always been to motivate people to protect the 
environment, but the issues and tools have expanded since its foundation. 
Starting out as an anti-nuclear power movement, it today spans a number 
of issues, such as climate change, policies that promote unsustainable 
consumption and production and place biodiversity protection above free 
trade priorities – although all are true to the original aim to create 
environmentally sustainable and socially just societies. This expansion is 
partly due to “the emergence of ever more global and social problems”.85 
Moreover, its marketing strategies now include using big names, such as 
Radiohead for the European Big Ask campaign, as well as a recently 
established ‘Council of Patrons’, made up of prominent thinkers, activists 
and celebrities in support of FoEI’s campaigns. 
FoEE has 30 national member groups who represent more than 2,500 
local activist groups with at least 700 staff and countless volunteers. 
Between 2009 and 2011 more than 1,000,000 people took action in 
Europe, both online and on the streets (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 12). 
FoEE's strategy is to build up strong local, national and EU capacity for 
action towards environmental justice. As the EU grew in legislative activity 
and in its role in global environmental, trade and agricultural decision-
making, so did the number of FoEE office staff. Since its establishment with 
a couple of staff, Friends of the Earth Europe has grown into a large office 
with 30 staff engaged in campaigning, communications, fundraising, 
network coordination, capacity building and supporting youth activism, 
“capable of mobilising tens of thousands of people across Europe […and] 
holding both European institutions and multinational companies 
accountable for their actions” (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 8 and FoEE 
website/about).In its own words, it campaigns “for sustainable solutions to 
benefit the planet, people and our future, influencing European and EU 
policy and raising public awareness on environmental issues” (FoEE Annual 
Review 2011, 2). FoEE's aim, since its establishment, is to put “the 
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environment on top of the European agenda” (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 
9). According to its statement in its annual review, FoEE wants “to challenge 
the current model of economic and corporate globalisation, campaign for 
environmental and social justice and promote solutions that will help to 
create environmentally sustainable and socially just societies” (2011, 13).It 
aims to be “the people’s voice at the heart of the European Union” (FoEE 
Annual Review 2011, 2). 
FoEE got involved in the Commission's policy on greenhouse gas 
emission reductions, since climate justice and energy is one of FoEE's six 
core programmes, including the EU's climate responsibility, UN climate 
talks strategy, energy savings and community-based renewables.86 FoEE 
suggests that a 40 per cent reduction is needed by 2020 if a two-degree 
temperature increase is not to be exceeded. This position goes beyond the 
EU's official position of 20 per cent as well as beyond the demand of some 
of the member states to reach 30 per cent emission reductions. FoEE is 
moreover sceptical towards the European Emissions Trading Scheme, part 
of the strategy to reduce emissions.87 
Greenpeace	EU	
Greenpeace European Unit is the European office of Greenpeace 
International, “an independent global campaigning organisation that acts to 
change attitudes and behaviour, to protect and conserve the environment 
and to promote peace. It comprises 28 independent national/regional 
offices in over 40 countries across Europe, the Americas, Africa, Asia and 
the Pacific, as well as a co-ordinating body, Greenpeace International”.88 
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“Greenpeace speaks for 2.8 million supporters worldwide, and encourages 
many millions more than that to take action every day.”89 
Greenpeace started off with a group of “Quakers, pacifists, ecologists, 
journalists and hippies”90 on a boat trip to the island of Amchitka in the 
Aleutians. Their objective was to stop a second nuclear weapons test. The 
trip was sponsored by 16,000 people who attended their fundraising 
concert. Established in 1971, Greenpeace’s strategy of independence, non-
violence and creative confrontation is still the same today. Greenpeace’ 
mission has been environmental, political and global from the start and its 
positions have been guided by environmental science and ethics ever since. 
Raising funds through people that support its mission and engaging 
activists to protect the environment remains its core organisational 
strategy.  
Based in Amsterdam, Greenpeace International’s 175 staffs 
coordinate global Greenpeace policy and strategy. Greenpeace 
International helps to set up national/regional offices and also set up the 
EU office. It draws up combined financial forecasts and strategies for the 
worldwide organisation, provides fundraising support to national/regional 
offices, provides cost-efficient global internet technology services and 
Internet tools, and protects the Greenpeace trademark. The 
national/regional offices are independent in how they carry out the global 
campaign strategies set by Greenpeace International within their local 
context, and in seeking financial support from donors to fund their national 
operation.91 
Greenpeace is an international environmental advocacy group, which 
aims to represent the health of the planet, a global mission. Greenpeace 
groups around the world see their task in a global context, and hence 
Greenpeace EU likewise focuses on global work, looking at the EU as a 
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global player. Greenpeace EU exists firstly, because about 80 per cent of 
legislation in the EU is decided at EU level.92 Secondly, as a global player, EU 
politics require a global perspective. The EU is the biggest exporter, the 
second largest importer and controls 20 per cent of global trade. It is a 
block of countries that exports a lot of its policy mechanisms and standards 
abroad, for example standards of emission trading schemes used in other 
countries. Therefore Greenpeace aims to have certain environmental 
standards in the EU that can have a positive impact globally. Thirdly, the EU 
is a very active player in all kinds of international political fora. If 
Greenpeace can get the EU to speak with one voice for a position 
Greenpeace supports as positive for its mission, in other words for the 
benefit of the planet, then this united voice of the EU can make a global 
difference politically (Greenpeace EU official 2010). 
Greenpeace EU aims to monitor and analyse EU institution’s work, 
expose EU policies and laws it considers deficient, and challenge EU 
decision-makers to implement ‘progressive solutions’. Its 15 staffs are 
employed mainly as policy officers, as well as some directing, managing and 
communication staff.93 
Greenpeace EU has been very active on the issue of greenhouse gas 
emission reductions and the respective EU policy. The reason Greenpeace 
EU became active on the policy is because cutting carbon is one of its main 
campaigns. Greenpeace Europe has been campaigning for the limitation of 
global warming to below two degrees above a pre-industrial level for many 
years. Moreover, from a global perspective, it is crucial that the EU takes 
the lead and thus takes on a higher share of global emission reductions. In 
order to increase pressure on the US to reduce emissions, the EU has to 
strengthen its cooperation with other actors outside the EU, including 
developing countries and emerging industrial countries. The third 
important reason for Greenpeace EU was a huge drop in carbon price over 
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the last years taking away an important incentive for green technology and 
green and resource efficient development in the EU. At “stake is our 
dependency on fossil fuels, our chance to create new green jobs in Europe 
and of course our climate, the stability of the global climate system” 
(Greenpeace EU official 2010). Climate change affects everybody and is the 
biggest environmental problem of our time. Climate change could have a 
major economic impact in terms of migration, resource scarcity, water 
levels as well as agricultural production. The impacts are huge and affect 
every single European citizen. According to the Stern report 20 per cent of 
the global GDP would be affected. Energy is the biggest contributor to 
climate change and almost every single European citizen is using energy 
which requires a shift to green technology. For the European citizen, how 
the electricity is generated makes no difference as such, but of course it 
does make a difference for the climate and eventually comes back to the 
European citizen. This causality chain has to be framed and explained to the 
people, which Greenpeace sees as one of its roles (Greenpeace EU official 
2010). 
Greenpeace EU has two general emission reduction policy goals, of 
which one is to build a global coalition of progressive countries that can 
drive people towards an international climate deal. Another goal is to foster 
the development of green energy efficient technology in the EU. Though 
Greenpeace EU has not been involved in any formal processes, it has 
regular meetings with all Commission official levels, whether Heads of 
Units or Directorate Generals working in DG Climate and DG Energy, or the 
respective Commissioners and cabinets. In its campaign Greenpeace’s 
scientific and solutions-oriented strategy becomes clear:94 
“Greenpeace is calling on the EU to increase its domestic 
climate target to 30 per cent as a first step. There are strong 
environmental and economic arguments for doing so. A study by 
                                                      
94
 Greenpeace EU website (accessed 20/07/2012: http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-
unit/en/campaigns/Climate/Cutting-carbon1/). 
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Oxford and Sorbonne Universities, among others, found that a 30 
per cent target could create a net six million new European jobs by 
2020. Shifting away from fossil fuels will help shield Europe’s 
economies from ever-unstable fuel prices. These are among the 
reasons why Unilever, Philips, Google and Axa are among nearly 
100 major companies now calling on EU governments to support a 
30 per cent climate target.“  
One of the policy demands, made together with WWF, is the request 
for an adjustment of the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), since, in its 
current state, it is threatening to worsen rather than improve the 
situation.95 
Climate	Action	Network	Europe	
The Climate Action Network Europe (CAN-E) was established in 1989 
as an umbrella network of environmental advocacy groups active on 
climate and energy issues. The aim was to bring the existing groups 
together to coordinate positions and lobby activities both in Europe but 
also at the international climate change negotiations. Today CAN-E is 
“recognised as Europe's leading network working on climate and energy 
issues”,96 with 152 member groups in 25 European countries. 
CAN-E is the Western European regional office of the global Climate 
Action Network (CAN), established in 1989 which has over 700 member 
groups in more than 90 countries, working to promote government, private 
sector and individual action to limit human-induced climate change to 
ecologically sustainable levels.97 The global network “is based on trust, 
openness and democracy”.98 CAN’s global environmental vision is:99 
                                                      
95
 Greenpeace EU website (accessed 20/07/2012: http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-
unit/en/campaigns/Climate/Cutting-carbon1/). 
96
 CAN-E website (accessed 20/07/2012: http://www.climatenetwork.org/profile/member/climate-
action-network-europe).  
97
 CAN Facebook (accessed 18/09/2012: http://www.facebook.com/CANInternational/info).
 
98 
CAN-E website (accessed 18/09/2012: http://www.caneurope.org/about-us).
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“a world striving actively towards and achieving the 
protection of the global climate in a manner that promotes equity 
and social justice between peoples, sustainable development of all 
communities, and protection of the global environment. […] CAN's 
mission is to support and empower civil society organisations to 
influence the design and development of an effective global 
strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and ensure its 
implementation at international, national and local levels […].” 
The coordinating role by CAN-E entails mostly supporting its member 
groups offering logistical and informational support about policy and 
climate change. There is also an outreach element in its role in the sense 
that it talks to other stakeholders, such as students and researchers. But 
most importantly, as one CAN-E official expresses, the objective is to 
“represent our members to influence policy” (2010). 
CAN-E has been very active around the emission reduction policy, 
which is one of its prime goals and main advocacy issues. CAN-E was 
central in coordinating EU level climate advocacy by hosting working 
groups, strategy sessions, press briefings and conference calls (CAN-E 
Report 2010, 12). CAN-E got involved in the policy, because emission 
reductions are a core element in the fight to avoid the dangers of climate 
change. According to CAN-E, 30 per cent reductions are not consistent with 
the two degree policy either. Its aim is convincing EU leaders to move to a 
40 per cent target in the near future. However, since member states and 
the Commission are only considering a 30 per cent reduction that is a 
“difficult enough goal” (CAN-E official 2010). One interviewee made the 
point that success could be considered in terms of keeping the issue on the 
agenda and making sure that in the media not only the business side is 
presented but also the broader NGO side (CAN-E official 2010). 
                                                                                                                                       
99 
CAN-E website (accessed 18/09/2012: http://www.caneurope.org/about-us).
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Staff interviewed considered that a number of issues are at stake. 
There are the consequences of not acting according to climate science on 
the one hand, and political consequences on the other. The international 
diplomatic agenda will be affected, if the EU does not raise its goals, and 
the opportunity for Europe to take the lead in emission reductions is at risk. 
Another line of argument is that the green economy and green jobs are not 
sufficiently incentivised without an increase in emission reduction goals. 
Governments and businesses are considered most affected by the policy 
(CAN-E official 2010). 
CAN-E participated in the stakeholder consultation and also in most 
of the stakeholder meetings regarding the implementation of the climate 
and energy package and filled out the stakeholder form on the 30 per cent. 
This was in response to a formal invitation from the Commission. 
Sometimes invitations get sent directly to a person, sometimes generic to 
the office. In 2010, CAN-E was focussing on trying to convince EU leaders 
that it is indeed in their best interests, as well as the environment’s, to 
make the move to minus 30 per cent before Cancun, on the way toward a 
minus 40 per cent emissions reduction target in the near future (CAN-E 
Report 2010, 5). In doing its climate advocacy on the emission reductions 
policy, CAN-E works closely with the Green 10, of which it is a member, and 
also works with the EEB, its 'sister organisation' in its own words (CAN-E 
Report 2010, 17). 
This introduction to the five EU environmental advocacy groups 
engaged in the two policies provides background information to set the 
scene for the empirical analysis of the groups’ professionalisation and 
representativeness in the following empirical case studies. 
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6	 Water:	WWF	and	BirdLife	
The assumption that groups necessarily lose their representativeness 
as a result of professionalisation has to be revisited taking into account 
varying organisational structures and strategies and considering the two 
dimensions of representativeness established in chapter two and three. 
The case study analysis is therefore divided into three parts: 
introduction to the groups and case, organisational structures and 
strategies of representation, and professionalisation. Firstly, the 
Commission’s water scarcity and droughts policy is introduced and EU 
groups engaged with the policy are presented (WWF and BirdLife). 
Secondly, the promissory (and anticipatory) representation structure, as 
assumed in the existing literature, is reviewed and compared with the 
predominantly gyroscopic and surrogate position formation found in the 
empirical examples. Moreover, the consequences of distinct organisational 
structures and strategies of representation for the acceptance dimension of 
representativeness found in the case study groups are explained. Thirdly, 
the assumptions of the impact of professionalisation, or bureaucratisation, 
on group representativeness in the existing literature are reviewed and re-
visited taking into account gyroscopic and surrogate representation 
structures. The conception of professionalisation is then extended to 
include new media technology and its implications for the two dimensions 
of representativeness. Empirical findings support the thesis that group 
representativeness is two-dimensional and more complex than hitherto 
assumed in the professionalisation and representativeness dichotomy 
literature. Moreover groups increasingly professionalise their new media 
application constituting alternative channels of support and feedback; and 
hence providing further potential to positively impact representativeness. 
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Organisational	Structure	and	Strategy	
The thesis suggests that in order to understand the 
representativeness of a group, it is necessary to look at its organisational 
structure and strategy. The following section first reviews the 
representation structures and strategies the literature assumes groups 
have, presuming that representatives’ preferences are induced by the 
constituency. The cases of WWF-EPO and BirdLife Europe then reveal that 
these environmental groups have different organisational structures and 
strategies of representation. They form their positions based on science, 
rather than on members’ votes or preferences, and member groups and 
supporters often express their acceptance of the position represented via 
means other than democratic votes or participation in governance 
structures. Taking into account the two dimensions of representativeness, 
combined with the distinct organisational structures and strategies, it 
becomes apparent that the evaluation of representativeness depends on 
and varies according to the structures and strategies of interest 
representation. 
Forming	positions	
The literature on the professionalisation of EU advocacy groups 
assumes that professionalisation negatively affects group 
representativeness (on a threshold of media performance 
professionalisation see Frantz 2007; Frantz and Martens 2006; Saurugger 
2005). One of the arguments in the literature, set out in chapter one, is that 
there is a lack of member and supporter participation (see Saurugger 2008 
for an overview, Sudbery 2003, 87; Warleigh 2001, 2004). Moreover, 
institutionalisation of advocacy groups is said to lead to the centralisation 
and bureaucratisation of organisational structures and the creation of elite 
leadership remote from members and supporters, or grassroots interests 
(Kohler-Koch 2010, 111, Kohler-Koch 2008; Warleigh 2001). Positions put 
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forward by EU groups in Brussels no longer represent the interests of their 
member- and supportership, because members and supporters have no or 
little say in the formation of EU positions (Sudbery 2003, 87; Warleigh 
2001). 
The assumption in the literature is thus that groups form their 
positions based on democratic member votes or participation in 
organisational governance. Their positions are induced by the preferences 
of the members’ interests and the grassroots supporters. In other words, 
positions are formed to represent members’ preferences. Representatives 
are ‘acting for’ (Pitkin 1969) members and members cause changes in the 
groups’ representative behaviour (Mansbridge 2003, 521). The 
organisational strategy is to represent ‘humans’, since the interests 
represented are those of the constituency, thus of the members. The 
human characteristic further includes that the constituency (members) 
could potentially speak for themselves (Halpin 2006, 926).  
The EU groups might thus put forward a “relatively unmediated 
version of the constituents will” (promissory representation, Mansbridge 
2003, 516). The EU group is accountable to its member groups (and they in 
turn to their members) in the traditional principal-agent sense. EU groups 
have to keep their promises in order to be representative of their 
constituency. Or EU groups might put forward a position they predict 
members will agree to in hindsight (anticipatory representation, 
Mansbridge 2003, 517). This creates a reciprocal power relation and 
enables continuing mutual influence, because it leaves room for members 
to change their preferences and for EU groups to influence members’ 
preferences (2003, 517f).  
In short, to be representative, the literature expects members of EU 
environmental groups to have a say in the governance of the group. This 
implies that member groups participate in EU position formation and that 
they internally provide for participatory structures down to the grassroots 
in a way that assures their opinion is reflected in EU positions. Structures of 
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representation would give member groups and their members in turn 
power over the EU groups’ representative activities. Judging 
representativeness is based on either the numbers of members/supporters 
(promissory) or the deliberative qualities of the communication between 
EU groups, member groups and grassroots (anticipatory).  
However, positions may also be formed based on values, principles 
expertise or empathy. In the traditional promissory and in the anticipatory 
forms of representation the representatives’ preferences are induced by 
the constituency whilst in gyroscopic representation, the representatives’ 
preferences are internally determined. Neither gyroscopic nor surrogate 
representations require participatory position formation as promissory 
representation claims do. 
The case studies show that groups represent environmental interests 
not primarily through participatory decision-making structures as assumed 
in the traditional literature. Groups form their positions based on 
gyroscopic factors such as scientific knowledge, experience and common 
sense among the leadership. Decision-making structures tend to be in place 
to make sure national and sub-national experience and expertise is 
considered in the position formation and to decide on the ‘how’ rather 
than the ‘what’. Moreover, their position formation reflects the interests of 
future generations and the environment, such as nature, the climate and 
biodiversity, and is thus a surrogate representation.  
The important difference between promissory or anticipatory and 
gyroscopic or surrogate representation is not about whether or not 
member groups get involved in the formation of a policy position. It is 
about whether the policy position itself is based on a bottom-up issue that 
individual and group members have raised, or whether the need for action 
is based on scientific, experience and common sense factors. In other 
words, the promissory representation requires a democratic structure that 
resembles the specific needs and interests of the members themselves, 
whilst the gyroscopic representation primarily resembles the interest of a 
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cause based on scientific analysis, experience in the field and common 
sense, though this is of course happening in the interest of member groups 
and individual supporters or else they would not be supporting such a 
cause (acceptance dimension). Consensus or agreement structures are in 
place to receive agreement for proposed policies based on gyroscopic 
reasoning, rather than to enable democratic participation in which the 
interests of the base are represented at the top.  
Representation	 in	 EU	 environmental	 groups:	 The	
acceptability	dimension	
The cases of WWF-EPO and BirdLife Europe below illustrate that 
groups do not perform promissory representation as the basis of their 
positions. They instead apply a mixture of representation structures, with 
gyroscopic and surrogate representation structures as dominating features 
in the two environmental groups. 
WWF- European Policy Office 
WWF-EPOs reason for being is “to stop the degradation of the 
planet’s natural environment and to build a future in which humans live in 
harmony with nature” (WWF-EPO Annual Review 2011, 28). It makes no 
actual claim to represent its member groups and supporters in the 
traditional promissory sense or rather in terms of democratic 
representation. Instead, when speaking on behalf of its large member and 
supporter base, WWF-EPO prefers to claim it “seek[s] to represent the 
views of” 20 million people rather than “representing 20 million members 
of Europe” (WWF-EPO official 2010). The representative claim is one about 
the cause and mission the group stands for: “we are a representation office 
of the WWF network vis-à-vis the European institutions on the issues that 
are of concern to the organisation and the mission of the organisation” 
(WWF-EPO official 2010). 
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The WWF is a science-based and solutions-oriented organisation. It 
represents the cause of the environment and tries to influence policy and 
raise awareness, by basing its policy recommendations on expert 
knowledge as well as its own networks experience in the field – a 
gyroscopic position formation. Policy details are very much based on WWF-
EPO’s analysis. The WWF flagship analysis is “the living planet report”, 
which sums up a number of years research, showing the state of 
biodiversity and the state of people’s consumption overshoot. The analysis 
is a guideline as to which particular policy priorities to follow and where to 
allocate resources, in order to achieve these particular objectives. It 
highlights the particular areas which are either extremely urgent or where 
there is a huge opportunity for the WWF to make a difference. This analysis 
is carried out either by independent scientists who are doing their own 
research, or in cooperation with WWF partners, such as the Sociological 
Society and Global Footprint Network in the case of the living planet 
report.  
The particular role of EPO is to support the WWF European and 
global network in better understanding, interacting and changing EU policy 
legislation. The group considers its role as “supporting the network of 
national members through relevant timely information and knowledge of 
processes […] and accessing funds is crucially important these days. We are 
the gatekeeper for the national networks to EU funding” (WWF-EPO 
officials 2010). WWF-EPO gives advice to the network of European WWF 
groups and guidance with regard to European policies. It moreover feeds 
experience and show cases from the ground into policy recommendations. 
This includes WWF-EPO taking results from the offices, the ‘local products 
and solutions’, trying to package and describe them, including socio-
economic data and then making a case for these vis-à-vis decision-makers 
to promote and magnify some of the solutions to other areas. WWF’s 
specific role is showcasing possible solutions that can be developed on a 
larger scale in order to help reconcile the market and state. WWF-EPO aims 
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to clearly refine its arguments and take into account actual and potential 
objections from other sectors and the Commission (WWF-EPO officials 
2010). 
WWF-EPO’s gyroscopic representation is reflected in the structure of 
management and cooperation with its member network. The decision to 
give priority to and get active on the Water Scarcity and Droughts policy 
was taken in the strategy and in the implementation plan process, prepared 
by WWF-EPO in consultation with member groups and presented to the 
strategy board for approval. The WWF-EPO strategy board sets the 
direction, has advisory responsibilities for the running of the office, 
oversees strategy and implementation plans, and resolves some of the 
controversial issues (WWF-EPO officials 2010). The strategy board meets 2-
3 times per year, headed by a rotating chair, and is made up by 
conservation directors from seven of the 22 European WWF offices100, plus 
WWF International. They are “the shareholders on behalf of WWF that 
make sure that [WWF-EPO] is delivering on the objectives that WWF has 
set for itself” (WWF-EPO official 2010). However, the strategy board does 
not have formal decision-making power. It is WWF International together 
with four individual members, who take formal decisions as the annual 
General Assembly, and who are accountable for the proper and transparent 
administration and functioning of the office. The General Assembly also 
elects the members of a Management Board and its officials101, and in 
practice has the same membership as the General Assembly with one 
member less. The Management Board approves the budget and annual 
accounts, the work programme and activity report and appoints the 
Secretary General (WWF-EPO officials 2010 and website). During the 
development of the strategy plan WWF-EPO further sought advice of 
                                                      
100 In 2012 these were WWF Sweden, France, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, United 
Kingdom and the Danube-Carpathian office in Austria (accessed 18/5/2012: 
http://www.wwf.eu/about_us/governance/). 
101
 The WWF-EPO Management Board officials are president, vice-president(s) and treasurer. 
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people in the Commission, the cabinet, business industry and of other 
Brussels advocacy groups. 
The internal planning meetings go through a prioritisation exercise, 
several big opportunities are identified, but limited resources require the 
selection of the most pressing issues. WWF-EPO in communication with its 
internal network, that is the directors of national offices and the policy 
network, scores which particular issues to concentrate on more, and which 
ones to drop. Priorities are given based on various criteria and selected 
issues are shaped into a work plan for that particular year, identifying clear 
deliverables that have to be achieved by the end of the year; for example 
the mining waste directive was dropped off the list, but water scarcity and 
droughts was seen as an extremely important priority for a number of the 
WWF offices WWF-EPO is working with, thus it was decided to allocate 
resources to it.  
WWF-EPO got active on the Water Scarcity and Droughts policy, 
because of the effects water scarcity and droughts have on the ecosystem 
and eventually people’s livelihoods. These effects WWF determined 
through scientific research and first-hand experience in its own projects 
and programmes. The key goal of the Water Scarcity and Droughts policy 
for WWF-EPO is to promote the demand management rather than 
constantly increasing the supply, as well as to establish environmental 
flows, one of the key determinants of ecology. WWF-EPO wanted to assure 
that the water scarcity and droughts regimes achieved a proper 
implementation of the Water Framework Directive through promoting 
water efficiency by using water pricing as a tool. In the EU a significant 
amount of territory is affected by water scarcity. Water scarcity is 
something that can be managed and is not a natural phenomenon. It 
means available water is completely overused, rivers dry up and do not 
meet the sea anymore, groundwater levels fall, sea penetrates and pollutes 
the groundwater further and wetlands dry up. As a WWF-EPO official 
explains, there are clear impacts water scarcity has, and these impacts are 
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clearly linked to people's livelihoods, to impacts on biodiversity, loss of 
ecosystems and ecosystem functions’ functions. At stake are peoples’ lives: 
nobody can survive without water and it is fundamental to get that balance 
right. Water is the basis of peoples’ lives, society and the economy. Water is 
needed for practically everything, from growing food, making clothes, over 
the computer people work on, to the bicycle people ride. On the other 
hand, the ecosystem needs environmental flows, hence it needs a certain 
amount of water to function, especially under the water scarcity and 
droughts situations, where it is absolutely crucial to leave a minimal 
amount of water to the ecosystem that it can continue functioning (WWF-
EPO official 2010). 
Participation of member groups is considered crucial in order to be 
able to run a European network. The work on the Water Scarcity and 
Droughts policy is done in very close cooperation in a team with one water 
policy officer in Brussels and further people in the national cities, who are 
all contributing through advising on papers, talking to their governments or 
writing up case studies and showcasing practical solutions with first-hand 
information from the ground. To prepare for EU conferences for example, 
there are back-to-back team meetings with the EU water policy officer and 
everybody who is available from the network. Work on the national level 
and in the WWF priority river basins is taken as a basis for WWF policy 
recommendations and policy tasks. WWF-EPO with its network tries to find 
the common position between all the offices, using examples from 
everywhere to package it as a WWF position towards the Commission and 
other decision-makers. WWF-EPO officers send the position round to 
offices, which comment or provide project cases and knowledge. The case 
study information is either provided by local WWF offices themselves who 
have prepared a report or else WWF-EPO works closely with them to 
prepare it. In the case of water scarcity and droughts, one of the key WWF 
programmes is Coto Doñana in Spain where the situation has been quite 
acute for a number of years. For example, through its campaigning against 
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the national Spanish hydrological plan as an example of pure supply side, 
the WWF developed alternatives to achieve the same level of economic 
development and economic activities whilst retaining the health of the 
ecosystems. The report developed by WWF Spain and their experience and 
provision of specific practical data for water saving technology and 
potential formed the basis for some of EPO’s thinking.102 The Coto Doñana 
wetlands in Spain is a project where WWF is trying to develop a plan that 
ideally creates a win-win situation for local agriculture, supermarkets, the 
ecosystem and cultural and religious demands. WWF works both with 
farmers and supermarkets to help save the Doñana wetlands through 
irrigation, helping to reduce the water used in the national park. By 
showing what can be done and showing the benefits to the EU, WWF tries 
to influence some of the major policy recommendations and how the 
Commission deals with member states through the Water Scarcity and 
Droughts policy subsequently. 
In bilateral meetings with EU bodies it is usually the WWF-EPO staff 
attending, but on occasions of conflicting appointments, or if someone with 
experience from a national group is needed, a national group expert will 
attend: for example a national group expert involved in improving irrigation 
efficiency projects. After meetings the WWF-EPO water policy officer 
reports to his policy network, highlighting action points, referencing to 
presentations and discussing points with the reference group. In response 
to the Commission consultation, the WWF-EPO water policy officer 
submitted the Water Scarcity and Droughts position paper on behalf of 
WWF as a whole, after the paper had gone through consultations with 
national offices.         
At the same time, WWF is fundamentally based on surrogate 
representation, expressed in its understanding of its role in “giving a voice 
to nature in the European Union” (Annual Report 2010: 28). WWF-EPO also 
                                                      
102
 The Spanish WWF project was in fact funded by the EU life+ funds. 
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expresses that it represents civil society or more precisely the civil society 
sector (WWF-EPO official 2010). This sector does not really have a voice 
and is often not really part of discussions and sometimes silent in meetings 
of the Commission attended by representatives of various industries or 
agriculture.  
“The actual biodiversity discourse for example, or the 
Sturgeon or the carp are not really part of the discussions and 
sometimes the role of WWF-EPO is to bring the concerns of the 
silent sector to the discussion paper” (WWF-EPO official 2010).  
This aim reflects the representation of important perspectives of 
society or rather the environment in the political domain, which are 
otherwise neglected. This surrogate representation, where positions are 
formed based on empathy, is a core role not only of WWF-EPO, but WWF 
internationally and is the driver behind its activities.  
BirdLife Europe 
BirdLife International, according to its slogan, is “working together for 
birds and people” or “nature and people” (BirdLife Europe Annual Report 
2011, 2). BirdLife sees its role in protecting nature based on its “wisdom 
and knowledge about nature” (BirdLife Europe Annual Report 2011, 3). It 
uses scientific data as basis for policy positions and employs professional 
staff to identify threats to the environment and develop solutions, but also 
works in cooperation with volunteers and national member group staff in a 
“local to global approach” to get local input of experience and data (BirdLife 
Europe Annual Report 2011, 3). BirdLife's role is not representing members 
as such, but “a cause which is voiced by [its] members” (BirdLife official 
2010). Success for BirdLife is “changing policy for the better” (BirdLife 
official 2010) and “preserve the beauty of nature” (BirdLife Europe Annual 
Report 2011, 3). In general for the group this is halting the loss of 
biodiversity, using birds as indicators based on research by BirdLife’s 
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scientific team. Overall policy goals are thus guided by the group’s 
principles, based on expertise and member group experience.  
Moreover, BirdLife represents the interest of biodiversity and birds 
that have no voice, and also the interests beyond its member groups and 
their supporters in turn. This is a claim for surrogate representation. 
The position formation on the Water Scarcity and Droughts policy 
worked slightly differently with regard to issues that the BirdLife Europe 
office has set up task forces and staff to work on. There is no BirdLife task 
force on water and thus the position formation and representation towards 
the European Commission was led by its national member group, the RSPB, 
active on and interested in the issue. BirdLife's position on the Water 
Scarcity and Droughts policy was formed primarily by the RSPB based on 
scientific research (including BirdLife’s reports), knowledge on the ground 
and in consultation with interested BirdLife member groups, who were 
asked to provide input of their knowledge and experience on the ground.  
The scientific motivation for the RSPB water scarcity and droughts 
position is reflected in its policy goals and the potential threat the group 
sees for the environment and the people living in it, if specific steps are not 
taken. The general Water Scarcity and Droughts policy goals for the RSPB 
are to safeguard the most important bird habitats across Europe, many of 
which are threatened by water management in one form or another, in 
particular by strategies of countries to combat water scarcity and droughts. 
The RSPB, for example, sees great potential risks to some of Europe’s most 
important wetlands. There are potential risks through future strategies 
such as water transfers or major dam building, damming head waters of 
rivers and changing the wild, which would hit a number of Europe’s most 
important terrestrial habitats as well. According to the RSPB risks are 
already apparent from existing poor water management such as water 
extraction as well as the strategic government’s responses to deal with this 
poor water management. The reason why the RSPB got engaged on the 
Water Scarcity and Droughts issue is the potential direct impact on the 
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environment. The key risk the RSPB associated with the policy was that 
particular protected area standards in the EU Water Framework Directive, 
where water scarcity and droughts were considered a serious issue, were 
weakened. Member states would be allowed widespread derogations from 
achieving Water Framework Directive targets, if they could claim they had 
water scarce areas. The Water Scarcity and Droughts policy could have 
allowed certain states to go ahead with major building or projects to build 
themselves out of a water management problem. Or the policy could have 
led to legitimated increases in water consumption or less of an emphasis 
on reducing water consumption by consumers, which would have 
maintained a continuous erosion of the quality of the water environment, 
because of the continuous and unnecessary use of excessive amounts of 
water (RSPB official 2010).  
The RSPB also attended all stakeholder meetings in Brussels. Two 
meetings were about the development of the Water Scarcity and Droughts 
policy; one meeting in 2010 was devoted to discussing progress against that 
policy. Prior to going to a meeting, the RSPB informed the BirdLife office 
that it wished to represent BirdLife. BirdLife then inquired within the 
network whether there were any other groups intending to do so. There 
was no decision on who should go to the water working group meetings, 
but it was a matter of willingness and ability. The RSPB either informed 
BirdLife informally what view it was going to put forward or, if it was a 
formal response, the position went through BirdLife and its membership 
first, as was the case with the consultation position. After meetings, 
feedback was provided to BirdLife. Generally, BirdLife informs member 
groups about the outcome of advisory meetings it attends, if it believes 
that it is relevant to the members. Member groups are however made 
aware of these stakeholder meetings and they also know that BirdLife and 
member groups are participating in these generally.  
BirdLife Europe provided informal input as well as the communication 
infrastructure for the exchange of experience and expertise amongst 
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members in order to reach a common BirdLife position paper. The RSPB 
inquired through BirdLife whether any other members had raised an 
interest in representing BirdLife on the Water Scarcity and Droughts policy 
at the stakeholder meetings. This had not been the case and in a second 
step the respective RSPB water policy officer and the head of water policy 
drafted the position, which was then broadcasted to all BirdLife member 
groups by the Brussels office. There was little feedback, mostly from the 
Spanish member ‘SEO (Sociedad Española de Ornitología)/BirdLife’, and 
also the Portuguese member the ‘Portuguese Society for the Study of 
Birds’, both very concerned about water scarcity and droughts. Both did not 
have enough staff and resources to engage in EU water policy themselves, 
but they discussed their views and experiences in their specific cases with 
the RSPB. SEO/BirdLife for example reported on its local problems 
particularly with irrigation and major water transport schemes, which could 
be a serious issue for coastland wetlands and the Mediterranean. In 
support of the RSPB’s position SEO/BirdLife provided and discussed case 
studies and local information the RSPB could use to exemplify and diversify 
the BirdLife position paper. The RSPB had to inform BirdLife about the draft 
position it was going to submit to the Commission's consultation and 
BirdLife members then had the opportunity to respond with amendments 
or disagree. 
This is similar to the process when BirdLife staffs represent a policy 
issue of its core working groups. Those working groups, or ‘task forces’, are 
established by BirdLife Europe policy staff together with member groups in 
order to “exchange information and experiences, develop policy positions 
and coordinate advocacy activities”. 103  BirdLife forms positions in 
coordination with its members and will not put a formal position paper 
forward to the Commission by itself or in coalition with EU-groups, if its 
member groups disagree. In the event of conflicts of interest, for example 
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 BirdLife Europe website (accessed 10/09/2012: 
http://www.birdlife.org/action/change/europe/index.html). 
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with the EU food security paper, BirdLife uses personal meetings and emails 
to negotiate until member groups find an agreement. Or if groups do not, 
there is the option to leave it as a discussion paper (BirdLife official 2010). 
All national member directors meet annually and can choose to work in 
thematic groups into which they are elected and to which head of themes 
are elected (BirdLife official 2010). BirdLife policy positions are formed by 
the individual task forces who meet twice per year and communicate per 
mailing-list throughout the year. During the time of interviewing, the 
official rules on how to form policy positions were being specified. 
Generally the national directors determine how BirdLife’s positions get 
decided, thus who can initiate a position, who drafts it and how much time 
is needed. There is a vote on a draft, and then the final position is drafted 
on which groups vote again and which decides the final task force position 
(BirdLife Europe official 2010). Member groups can set and amend policy 
agendas which are sent around by BirdLife before task force meetings. 
Whether or not BirdLife should have a position on an issue is decided at 
these task force meeting and depends on the type of issue and on the 
perceived relevance of the issue. BirdLife Europe at times will advise to take 
national routes of influence rather than EU channels, if it believes that they 
are national or local issues (BirdLife official 2010). 
The European and Central Asian Committee facilitates BirdLife’s 
overall compliance with the environmental and conservation goals and acts 
as a board. It guides and advises BirdLife Europe on behalf of the member 
groups and the Global Council. It approves BirdLife’s general policy lines, 
develops the European programme, assists BirdLife Europe in its 
implementation and monitors the common achievements, advises on the 
work plan and budget of the European division, decides on high-level 
European policy, reviews the development of the European Partnership, 
helps secure funding for the European Programme and Division operating 
costs, assists in communication, convenes regional partnership meetings 
and represents the European Region in the Global Council. About seven to 
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eight directors of member groups make up the committee. The directors 
and the chair of the Committee are appointed from amongst the member 
group directors for two-year terms (BirdLife official 2010).  
BirdLife’s organisational structures and strategies thus combine 
aspects of gyroscopic and surrogate representation. The crucial indicator 
for the judgement of BirdLife's acceptability dimension of 
representativeness is what it bases its positions on. These decisions on 
‘why’ positions are formed are based on gyroscopic and surrogate factors 
such as BirdLife’s own scientific research and the expertise of the group and 
its membership. It further adheres to the group’s guidelines and common 
sense, also seeking advice on the relevance of certain issues for the 
European level from people in its Brussels circuit. The input to policy 
positions by member groups is considered crucial, because of their 
particular national and local expertise and experience in their reserves. It is 
for the reason of the protection of birds, biodiversity and the people that 
groups form positions and want BirdLife to get active on EU-issues for 
them. However, the process of position formation, thus the decisions on 
the ‘how’ of the position formation on specific policies within task forces, is 
participatory. Policies are always decided in consultation with member 
groups. “We would not do anything without the support of member 
groups” (BirdLife official 2010). 
Represented	by	EU	environmental	groups:	The	acceptance	
dimension	
Representation is more than ‘standing in for’. Whom or what a group 
represents is reflected in ‘who it is’ (WWF-EPO official 2010). What a 
group’s philosophy is, its mission, its organisational credibility, reputation 
and expertise, who it speaks on behalf of, what type of group it is, its 
structures (statutes), its constituency is and its historical record. These 
factors are also the basis of choice for member groups and individual 
supporters when they decide which group or campaign to support. It is 
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what motivates members and supporters to join or support a group. ‘Who 
a groups is’ or a group’s image also constructs the expectations of member 
groups and supporters. A group’s is representativeness rests not only on 
how positions are formed or a considerable degree of member 
participation (acceptability dimension), but also on whether members and 
supporters accept the advocacy group as representative (acceptance 
dimension). 
Important for the acceptance dimension is that member groups and 
individual supporters who sign up to a group understand how the group or 
campaign they support interprets “participation” and what channels of 
inclusion are available. Organisational structure and strategies matter and 
environmental groups come in various types and employ a variety of 
different strategies (environmental group officials 2010/11; see Pickerill 
2003, 47 for an overview of the literature). Environmental groups tend to 
follow gyroscopic and surrogate representation because of the nature of 
their issue, described as “objective-driven nature of green thinking” 
(Dobson 2000, 122). Supporters thus will be inclined to support these types 
of environmental groups, because they have a similar ‘green thinking’.  
This study thus suggests that representativeness is made up of two 
dimensions. The traditional assumption of representativeness is however 
concerned only with the first dimension, neglecting that ‘representative 
claims’ (Saward 2006) do not only have to be acceptable because of the 
position formation process (acceptability dimension), but they also have to 
be accepted as representing their interests by the members and supporters 
(acceptance dimension)(based on the definition of government legitimacy 
drawing on Kielmansegg 1971, 368; in Dingwerth 2007, 14). Acceptance 
requires no participation in the position formation. Although in promissory 
position formation voting is the main act of acceptance, acceptance can be 
expressed in a variety of ways. 
Judging the representativeness of a group is predicated on what a 
group bases its position formation on (organisational strategies and 
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structures), which in turn affects the indicators by which the acceptance 
dimension can be judged. In the case of gyroscopic and surrogate 
representation, the acceptance dimension is separate from the 
acceptability dimension, and is all the more crucial for the judgement of 
representativeness, precisely because support from the members and 
supporters has not been expressed during the formation and vote on the 
position.  
Acceptance can be directed at a group and its missions and visions in 
general or at specific policy positions and campaigns. The number and 
amount of regular subscriptions to a group, number of volunteers, amount 
of donations, number of ‘Facebook likes’ and Twitter followers for example 
indicate the general acceptance of the group’s principles and positions. 
Specific support can be expressed by signing offline and online petitions 
and campaigns, volunteering for specific issues, giving project-specific 
donations, taking campaign action such as writing to or ringing MPs, liking 
and sharing Facebook events and campaigns or tweeting about campaigns 
and positions.  
The support by constituencies, or their acceptance of a group as well 
as its positions, is based on trust, organisational credibility, and reputation. 
Professionalism in this context is crucial in particular for gyroscopic, but 
also surrogate groups, because they represent claims that are rooted in 
expertise as well as empathy, which requires a professional understanding 
of the beneficiaries.  
Marketing requires professionalism, but a group also has to 
understand the limits of media professionalisation (Frantz 2007). Groups 
have to be true to their mission and responsive to the views of civil society, 
or their credibility and reputation suffer. This vulnerability to threats to 
reputation serves as powerful control mechanism to keep [groups] honest” 
(Risse 2006, 190). Professionalism thus has to be accompanied by 
responsibility or accountability, in order to retain trust (CPRE official 2011). 
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By member groups 
In umbrella networks, such as BirdLife, the expectations of member 
groups are different to EU groups that have members belonging to the 
same global organisation, such as WWF. BirdLife member groups look to it 
for coordination, information and outreach and choose to get actively 
engaged when a policy is of core interest or they have experience and data 
to feed into a common position. WWF has global positions and campaigns 
by default. National and local policies and campaigns are always in line with 
the broader policy strategy.  
WWF- European Policy Office 
WWF staff interviewed, both at EU or national level, generally speak 
of “WWF” meaning the whole organisation as such. This reflects the sense 
of being ‘one’ global organisation, with one global strategy. Interviewees 
were very aware of each other’s work, use of social media and surveys that 
had been carried out. Groups are well connected and conceive each other 
and each other’s work under one coordinated objective. This is extremely 
relevant for the acceptance dimension, as it expresses the acceptance 
national member groups have for WWF-EPO’s advocacy. There is awareness 
and clarity about what each level does, and this forms the basis for support 
for the general, but also policy specific, advocacy and campaigning (WWF 
officials 2010/11).  
The fact that WWF-EPOs representativeness is based on surrogate 
and gyroscopic representation also forms the basis for the acceptance of 
their representative claim by member groups, supporters and beyond. 
Member groups are considered important and their views are 
incorporated into the policy positions. Member groups form part of the 
policy formation processes, delivering crucial experience from the ground 
and at times carrying out research often in cooperation with other 
institutions. The decisions WWF-EPO takes and the issues it works on are of 
concern to the groups and the mission of the group. Decisions go through 
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very rigorous consultation and agreement with WWF programmes and 
offices. For the Water Scarcity and Droughts policy for example, the largest 
part of the time and resources was invested in communication with 
member groups and media, closely followed by lobbying the Commission 
and the Parliament (WWF-EPO official 2010). This also means that member 
groups know the position brought forward and they trust it to be 
representative of their, or rather WWF’s, values. 
However, the sense was not that the WWF-EPO represents its 
member groups, but that member groups feel represented by WWF-EPO 
(WWF officials 2010/11). Acceptance is related to expectations. WWF 
offices and WWF International expect WWF-EPO to form positions based 
on gyroscopic and surrogate representation, guided by WWF International 
and WWF-EPO itself through a formal framework and by the member 
network through informal cooperation and exchange. WWF-EPO was set up 
to play an expert role in influencing policy, using technical research and 
experience provided by the member groups  to package solutions. The 
general goal of EPO is to support the WWF European and global network in 
better understanding, interacting and changing EU policy legislation. This 
includes supporting the network of national members through relevant 
timely information and knowledge of processes in Brussels, letting them 
know about opportunities arising in Brussels, as it did with the Water 
Scarcity and Droughts policy, giving advice on what the EPO can do and 
what the national offices can do and why it is important, i.e. talking or 
writing to their ministers, and playing the gatekeeper for national networks’ 
access to EU funds (WWF-EPO officials 2010). Moreover, the member 
groups together with WWF International initiated the establishment of 
WWF-EPO and decided on how WWF-EPO should function and what role it 
should play in line with the overall goals and principles of WWF in the first 
place, creating a basis of trust in how the office is run. This forms a basis for 
the acceptance of WWF-EPO’s representativeness by its member groups. 
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The WWF and WWF-EPO are very professional groups in terms of 
their technical expertise and the education and experience of staff. The 
large office is staffed with 41 people, who come from various backgrounds, 
some have Commission experience or corporate experience, but the 
majority comes from NGO background. Staffs interviewed have university 
degrees, experience working for WWF locally and nationally and for other 
NGOs, as well as some experience in government administration. Since the 
WWF is science-based and solutions oriented, this expertise is crucial for its 
credibility. The WWF flagship analysis ‘the living planet report’ is not only a 
guideline for WWF-EPO, but also for member groups and supporters. The 
membership of WWF-EPO or rather WWF is based on the belief that WWF 
acts in order to achieve its ultimate goal for “people living in harmony with 
nature”. WWF’s credibility is very much its currency, along with experience 
and expertise. “With the name WWF we have a reputation, a brand value. 
You take great care to protect it” (WWF-EPO official 2010). Knowledge is 
also an important factor in the water policy consultations. It matters that a 
group can demonstrate that it knows its subject and that information 
provided is reliable. The WWF-EPO trades in information and ideas. The 
data and solutions it brought to the Commission on the Water Scarcity and 
Droughts, according to staff, have been considered reliable by the network 
(WWF officials 2010/11).  
In order to create a basis of trust, the WWF for example uses its 
‘brand’ to facilitate the marketing of its credibility and reputation as a 
professional, global group. WWF-EPO’s organisational credibility and its 
media reputation are both important factors for the acceptance of its 
leadership. Working very closely with media, for example, when following a 
dossier as a way to reach decision-makers, has an impact on public opinion, 
but also reaches some of the member groups and thereby raises WWF-
EPO’s profile. Some of the national groups in turn include examples of 
WWF-EPO’s work when they communicate with their supporters and they 
report what they have done with supporters’ money (WWF officials 
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2010/11). Both, the experience communicated through case studies as well 
as media reputation create a basis for trust and thus acceptance of the EU 
leadership’s representativeness by member groups as well as supporters. 
Other indicators of acceptance are public awards, for example the 
WWF-EPO won the ‘NGO of the year’ award for its policy influence and 
awareness raising through its advocacy campaign aimed at conserving 
biodiversity in Europe ‘Make Space for Nature’.104 The award was voted on 
by people working in groups listed in the EU transparency register or in the 
European Public Affairs Directory and thus represents an acceptance of 
their professional cause work amongst advocacy groups and other lobby 
groups at EU level. This in turn creates a reputation as basis for acceptance 
for WWF-EPO within its own member network. 
Importantly, the funding by member groups and supporters is one of 
the very key aspects of WWF, which help it be independent. More than 50 
per cent of WWF-EPO’s funding comes from membership next to some 
funding from governments and private companies.105 Though WWF-EPO 
assures that it keeps its independence and right to criticise products from 
funding companies, funding by member groups and supporters gives the 
group a lot of flexibility and independence. This also allows the group to 
take a particular position based on science and understanding, without 
being biased towards a particular economic sector (WWF officials 2010/11). 
BirdLife Europe 
BirdLife is an umbrella group of a network of independent national 
advocacy groups. Here the judgement of the acceptance dimension is more 
complicated and requires the study of both, the acceptance by member 
groups and by their members and supporters in turn. It thus depends on 
BirdLife’s and the national groups’ communication structures and whether 
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 European Public Affairs Awards website (accessed 14/09/2012: 
http://www.epaawards.com/index.php/winners). 
105
 54% of the WWF-EPO income came from the WWF network in the 2010 financial year (WWF-EPO 
Annual Review 2011, 21). 
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or not supporters are aware of their group’s EU activities and supportive of 
these. BirdLife's acceptance dimension is thus two-dimensional.  
One part of the acceptance dimension is expressed by BirdLife’s 
group memberships, who have the choice of being members of the 
umbrella. Groups become members of BirdLife, because they agree with 
BirdLife's approach to representing their values and positions. Like BirdLife, 
both the RSPB and NABU are active for environmental conservation and 
birds and their habitats are their flagships. The conservation goal is also 
reflected in the role of member groups’ supporters: For the NABU 
supporters are “the backbone of [its] financial independence” for 
conservation work (NABU official 2010) and RSPB officials note “the aim of 
having more supporters is finance, and finance is only a means to an end 
and the end is more conservation” (RSPB official 2011). 
The member groups’ acceptance of BirdLife’s representative claims 
based on its gyroscopic approach to representation takes place within a 
structural framework of broader policy guidelines. Positions have to be 
formed according to overall guidelines, thus providing a structural and 
principled basis for trust in BirdLife to take decisions according to groups’ 
values. The European and Central Asian Committee, which guides and 
advises BirdLife Europe, is made up of seven or eight directors of member 
groups, providing some further control and thus acceptance over, and thus 
acceptance of, BirdLife’s general policy activities. 
If national groups wish to represent their interests at the EU level, 
they need to become members of EU umbrella groups, because the 
Commission does not generally engage with national groups. National 
environmental groups have an interest in having their views represented at 
the EU level, because about 80 per cent of national environmental policy in 
the EU is discussed and decided upon in Brussels. Thus national groups 
want their voice heard on issues already discussed at EU level or that they 
believe should be discussed at EU level, but they themselves do not 
generally speak the Brussels language, know the EU decision-making 
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process and contacts for the issues or have the expertise and resources to 
get active at EU level. They thus join EU umbrella groups of like-minded 
environmentalists in order to pool resources and enhance political weight. 
They have chosen to be members of an EU-group precisely because it 
would lobby EU-institutions for them as well as inform and indeed filter and 
frame EU issues relevant in their national context. Member groups chose 
not to get involved, but they support BirdLife to do so for them (BirdLife 
and RSPB officials 2010/11). There are a number of environmental umbrella 
groups active at EU level and BirdLife is one of them, representing the 
values of environmental conservation groups. With their choice member 
groups of BirdLife thus trust it to represent their voices in the way they 
would like to be represented. Another general indicator of the national 
members’ acceptance of BirdLife’s representativeness is moreover the fact 
that members make up over a third of the funding of BirdLife Europe.106 
In the case of the Water Scarcity and Droughts policy, member groups 
accepted and trusted the RSPB to represent their interests as BirdLife in the 
Commission consultation and in the stakeholder meetings. The 
representation relied on the belief in the expertise of the RSPB to be able 
to comprehend policy implications and present the case of not only the UK 
position but that of BirdLife as a whole (BirdLife, RSPB and NABU officials 
2010/11), because BirdLife and its members share the same environmental 
values and believes in gyroscopic and surrogate representation (RSPB 
official 2011):  
“So the Spanish and the Portuguese BirdLife members are 
interested in water and they give us feedback as to what we might 
want to say in those meetings, but we are the people who have the 
staff and resources who go to those meetings and they trust us to 
represent their interests.” 
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 In 2011, BirdLife Europe was funded by about 35 per cent by its member groups (‘partners’), by 
about 29 per cent by the Commission and by about 21 per cent by grants and donations plus about 
15 per cent from other sources (BirdLife Europe Annual Report 2011). 
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In the Water Scarcity and Droughts policy case study trust would have 
been a particularly sensitive issue for the Southern European partners, 
because historically, there has been a different sense of urgency between 
the Southern and Northern countries on the issue of water scarcity and 
droughts. In the policy on the water scarcity and droughts it was thus in 
particular the Southern countries who fed their long-standing experience 
into the BirdLife position drafted by the RSPB, thereby generating trust in 
representativeness of their concerns in the final policy position (RSPB 
official 2011). 
Member groups of BirdLife also trust the RSPB to represent their 
interests when working in coalition with other groups at EU level. On the 
Water Scarcity and Droughts BirdLife/RSPB worked in coalition with the 
WWF. At the Commission meetings there were usually both, WWF and the 
RSPB/BirdLife present. If neither were available to go to a meeting where a 
representation was considered beneficial, they would try to get someone 
else to go along. Limited amounts of conflict of interest between the 
different groups were reported, decreasing the need to compromise, and 
therefore facilitating trust (BirdLife and RSPB officials 2010/11). 
Environmental groups interested in the Water Scarcity and Droughts policy 
agree with the associated risks the RSPB sees based on gyroscopic 
reasoning and there is genuine fear amongst groups that wrong decisions 
are being taken at the European level cascading down to the member 
states - a risk groups want to avert (Environmental group officials 2010/11).  
By member groups’ members and individual supporters 
The case studies find that it depends on organisational structures and 
strategies (including issues) what indicators are adequate to judge 
representativeness or rather the acceptance dimension.  
For example, whilst any WWF supporter knows that s/he is part of a 
global advocacy groups and is hence clear about what the WWF-EPO is 
active for, for EU umbrella groups such as BirdLife, the breadth or 
166 
 
narrowness of the cause is a consideration. If an EU umbrella represents a 
single, individuals, even if unaware of the membership and EU activities of 
the national groups they are supporting, are still bound to be in line with 
the values represented. The individual supporter is clear about what exactly 
a group is supporting and what issues and positions the group will thus 
represent at EU level. Crucially, groups can likewise be clearer about their 
supportership, their character and their views enhancing the ease of 
responsiveness. If the EU umbrella on the other hand represents a general 
cause, then it is important that individual supporters know the EU activities 
and positions their group is engaging in.  
WWF- European Policy Office 
In the case of the WWF the acceptance dimension can be judged 
based on the number of supporters within Europe, since members and 
supporters have a sense of belonging to a global group with a global 
mission and strategy. The WWF-EPO is the EU representation of an 
international advocacy group, whose principles are known by national 
member groups as well as individual supporters to be global and thus the 
same at international, EU or national level. WWF-UK supporters understand 
that they belong to a group that is active EU-wide and globally. 
Not only member groups, but also individual supporters know WWF’s 
structure to achieve its aim when they chose to become supporters or 
support specific campaigns. The WWF flagship analysis ‘the living planet 
report’ presents what WWF as a whole and WWF-EPO is active on and for 
what reason. This includes the fact that WWF’s structure of representation 
is based on science and show cases rather than democratic participation. 
Although WWF-EPO does not formally ask its supporters whether they 
support a particular position, 3.5 million people still subscribe to WWF 
membership, donate, sign petitions and get active in campaigns, because 
they support the general and specific issues as representative of their 
values. WWF-EPO member groups are aware of this support and the role 
WWF-EPO’s work plays for this support (WWF officials 2010/11). 
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The representativeness of the WWF’s EU policy positions is 
established through the acceptance of values (WWF-EPO official 2011):   
“When we are advocating a particular position vis-à-vis the 
European institutions we didn't really go back and ask all our 
members whether they support this position or not, but by people 
supporting a particular cause or by giving a particular value to 
biodiversity for example, yes I think we do have a legitimacy to go 
and advocate for the protection of this biodiversity for example or 
for protection of in my case the rivers, lakes, groundwater that are 
providing us with extremely important ecosystem services which a 
lot of the people, both our supporters and non-supporters, very 
much benefit from or whose livelihoods very much depend on this.” 
WWF-EPO’s priorities are based on the mission of the organisation, 
which has two large meta-goals, one is biodiversity protection, and the 
other one is reducing the carbon foot print. These are the values WWF 
supporters and also member groups are supporting and which WWF, and 
WWF-EPO, represent. 
In context with expectations and acceptance it is also important to 
consider what supporters believe the role of WWF-EPO to be. In response 
to what the role of WWF is and whom WWF-EPO represents as advocacy 
group, one official expressed it is about ‘who you are’, which is much more 
holistic than ‘whom you represent’. It is the combination of a number of 
factual statements, rather than only the mission statement of ‘representing 
everyone who is concerned about for example birds disappearing from 
Northern Europe’. It is about who a group speaks on behalf of, who it 
represents, which type of organisation it is, what statutes, what members, 
what mission statement and what historical record working with the 
Commission on its mission it has and what partnerships with other 
respective individuals and groups it enters. It is a number of segments that 
define who a group is. In other words, supporters do not simply chose 
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WWF for whom or what it represents, but for who it is, what its philosophy 
is, its organisational credibility, reputation and expertise. Thus 
representativeness is also about trust in the image of a group (WWF-EPO 
official 2010): 
“What we are trying to do is have an image which is science 
based, which is solutions oriented. And of course with the name 
WWF we have a reputation. So it's not just science, it is actually 
our brand values. You take great care to protect it” (WWF-EPO 
official 2010).  
Fundraising campaigns in WWF member groups are also a key 
mechanism to determine which issues are of interest to supporters. 
Supporters commit their money to a specific cause or policy, for example to 
a particular campaign protecting a river or stream in their local county. The 
amount of support shown reflects the interest in the campaign and issue 
and ultimately WWF’s representativeness. 
BirdLife Europe 
As mentioned above, because BirdLife is an umbrella group of a 
network of independent national advocacy groups, the acceptance 
dimension is two-dimensional. It is partly expressed by BirdLife’s group 
memberships. But the acceptance by the independent member groups 
does not necessarily mean the acceptance by their members and individual 
supporters in turn. Individual supporters of RSPB might not be aware of the 
issues BirdLife represents in the name of RSPB; hence there is no direct 
conscious acceptance of BirdLife’s representativeness by individual national 
group members and supporters. Supporters of BirdLife’s national member 
groups such as the RSPB in the UK or the NABU in Germany do not 
necessarily realise that their groups are members of an EU umbrella 
representing their interests in Brussels. Here, the differentiation of 
supporters’ expectations and the communication of issues and 
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transparency are particularly important for the acceptance dimension of 
representativeness. 
For the judgement of the acceptance dimension of the EU-umbrella 
BirdLife and the water position put forward by RSPB in its name, it is crucial 
that individual supporters of national groups are aware of the EU 
engagement of the advocacy group they are a member or supporter of, 
such as the RSPB (over one million individual supporters) or NABU (500,000 
individual members and supporters).107 However, the degree of information 
required also depends on the expectations of individual members and 
supporters. Individual members and supporters of NABU do not have a 
direct say in the group’s national or EU politics. But NABU’s federal 
democratic structure means its member groups in which individuals engage 
might demand transparency and information as basis for decisions. 
However, of the 500,000 supporters, only a few thousand are active 
members who get engaged in local groups and the vast majority are passive 
financial supporters, who are not interested in more than the odd issue 
(NABU official 2010). Thus the basis of acceptance for active members will 
be different to passive supporters and the need for feedback and 
communication by NABU to these groups varies. Moreover, in Germany, the 
Grüne Liga coordinates the German advocacy groups’, including NABU’s, 
position on the Water Framework Directive. This adds another level of 
complexity to the awareness of the federal group’s members and individual 
members and supporters. NABU consequently has very informative and 
detailed national and sub-national websites. In relation to the water 
scarcity and droughts policy the NABU has published elaborate information 
on the background and decision-making structure, including a table 
illustrating the work division around the Water Framework Directive 
between EU groups, national, subnational, regional and local groups.108 The 
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NABU also makes its cooperation with international and EU groups clear on 
its website and social media sites. The information and communication 
structure of the NABU thus is transparent, creates awareness and sets a 
very good basis for the acceptance dimension of the group as a whole. 
The RSPB has a very large supportership, but the general feedback it 
gets is that supporters are not very interested in the governance of the 
group and they do not expect the RSPB to be a ‘democracy’ or expect to 
influence policy (RSPB official 2011):  
“Our market research suggests that most of our members 
express an opinion that we do pretty much ... they back the stuff 
we talk about. They might not have a great interest in all the 
details of water policy or anything, but they can see why we get 
involved.” 
Most supporters expect to know what the RSPB is doing in general, 
without being interested in the mechanics of it (RSPB officials 2011). The 
RSPB also does not inform all its subscribers about every step it takes in 
forming specific EU policy positions. Rather its specific involvement is 
supported by trust of its members to act in the interest of the group’s 
values: “If we didn't have that trust of supporters it would be difficult for us 
in certain places” (RSPB officials 2011).  
Individuals support the RSPB in a variety of ways, most importantly 
financially. Hence, the RSPB has a number of different ways of interacting 
with its supporters and through which they express their support for 
national member groups. This takes place for example through offline and 
online subscriptions, donations, or through social media sites. Individuals 
also express their active support in volunteering for the RSPB nature 
reserves and in the offices. In June 2012 the RSPB reported to have almost 
18,000 volunteers nationwide who volunteered over 1 Million hours of 
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work in 2010/11.109 But the support always has the same conservation 
objective. In its current campaign “stepping up for nature”, the aim of the 
RSPB is precisely  
“to remind people that everything, every tiny step you take 
with us, whether it is taking part in the big garden bird watch or 
signing a pledge, matters and helps us in our end goal to better 
nature conservation” (RSPB official 2011).  
This complex support, however, can only be counted as acceptance of 
BirdLife’s activities, if the RSPB makes its supporters aware of its BirdLife 
membership, or rather, if they know what they are supporting. The RSPB 
also makes the scope of and financial contribution to the work with BirdLife 
clear on its website:110  
“We carry out all our international work as part of the 
BirdLife International partnership. […] The RSPB is the UK Partner 
of BirdLife International and supports both the BirdLife Secretariat, 
which co-ordinates the work of the partnership, and individual 
partner organisations around the world. […] We are strongly 
committed to the principle of mutual assistance and co-operation 
that underpins BirdLife and we work with, and in support of, local 
partners in all our international efforts. We support BirdLife 
partners with regular, predictable financial contributions, 
complemented by expert advice and technical assistance.”  
The RSPB has a marketing and media department using a whole 
range of different market research techniques in order to understand what 
positions supporters and the general public support. In the case of the 
water policy there was no feedback or input from supporters, but support 
                                                      
109
 RSPB volunteering Facebook site post of 1 June 2012 (posted 30/06/2012: http 
http://www.facebook.com/RSPBVolunteering) and RSPB website (accessed 12/09/2012: 
http://www.rspb.org.uk/about/facts.aspx). Earlier data of 12,000 volunteers delivering some 
700,000 hours of assistance, were claimed to be worth over £3.7 million, the equivalent of around 
360 additional members of staff (cited in Maloney 2009, 283). 
110
 RSPB website (accessed 12/09/2012: http://www.rspb.org.uk/international/birdlife.aspx). 
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was measured through previous work in the field. Some of the thoughts 
that went into the policy position paper came from previous RSPB work in 
the UK context which had involved some of its supportership, for example 
people who work on water company investment or water efficiency who 
wrote letters in support of the RSPB’s position, which was used for the 
European position. The general sense in the RSPB interviews was that 
supporters trust the RSPB in representing their interests professionally, but 
have no interest to engage in governance. The dominant supporter profile 
is that of nature lovers who wish biodiversity to be protected and who give 
money to the RSPB to do so. Many also volunteer in the nature reserves or 
even in the headquarters, but very few are interested in getting engaged in 
more political work at EU level (RSPB officials 2011). 
Professionalisation	in	gyroscopic	and	surrogate	
representation	
The differentiation of representativeness has crucial consequences 
for the implications of professionalisation. Firstly, the narrow understanding 
of professionalisation in the traditional sense of bureaucratisation carries 
implications primarily for groups whose acceptability dimension is based on 
the traditional promissory representation. Thus if positions are formed 
through member participation, the loss of member influence in formal 
decision-making structures negatively affects the representativeness of the 
position, or the representative claim. In the case of gyroscopic and 
surrogate representation, the bureaucratisation or rather the absence of 
member and supporter participation in the formal position formation does 
not matter, since the position is formed based on scientific evidence and 
expertise on the ground (gyroscopic) and empathy (surrogate) and because 
the acceptance dimension is a separate act from the acceptability 
dimension.  
173 
 
Still, informal communication with member groups is important in 
order to ensure the position formation is based on experience in the field. 
But crucial in gyroscopic and surrogate representativeness is that 
professionalisation can play a positive role for the acceptance dimension: 
professionalisation in new media technology facilitates the mediation – and 
indeed the judgement – of support. Also in the case of promissory and 
anticipatory representation new media technology provides additional and 
more fluid channels for formal and informal participation in position 
formation as well as channels for group responsiveness to member and 
supporter attitudes (Pickerill 2003, 27; Maloney 2009, 283f; Gibson et al 
2004, 198). 
The section below explains what the bureaucratisation implications 
for the gyroscopic and surrogate groups WWF-EPO and BirdLife were and 
how new media professionalisation affects their dimensions of 
representativeness. 
Bureaucratisation	 and	 gyroscopic/surrogate	
representation	
The traditional professionalisation, or bureaucratisation literature, 
expects EU groups to represent by putting forward a “relatively unmediated 
version of the constituents will” (promissory representation, Mansbridge 
2003, 516). The EU group is then accountable to its member groups (and 
they in turn to their members) in the traditional principal-agent sense. If EU 
groups then professionalise as detected in the literature, centralising their 
decision-making structures with an elite leadership remote from member 
groups, their positions might not reflect the preferences of their members 
anymore. Professional staff in EU groups would become motivated by their 
paid position and the survival of the organisation, rather than the 
representation of member interests and their needs. The fear in the 
literature is that members would lose power over the preferences of EU 
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groups, which would hence fail to keep their promises and not be 
representative of their constituency. 
Groups may also predict the positions that the members they claim to 
represent will agree with in hindsight, creating a reciprocal power relation 
and enabling continuing mutual influence between the point of position 
formation and re-election/affirmation of support (anticipatory 
representation). If EU groups professionalise as assumed in the literature, 
with their participation and communication streamlined and elite staff 
taking decisions on behalf of members, it will be difficult for them to 
predict members’ preferences. Moreover, EU groups professionalising their 
marketing strategies and media appearance (Frantz 2007; Frantz and 
Martens 2006) might manipulate the preferences of members in their own 
organisational survival interest rather than educate members’ preferences 
in the interest of the original environmental mission (Mansbridge 2003, 
517, 519). EU groups would create conditions of choice leading members to 
make choices not in their interest. EU groups would thus lose 
representativeness. 
The assumptions in the group professionalisation literature are that 
groups apply modern marketing strategies to market their positions and 
gain support, rather than focus on bottom-up opinion formation; they 
employ experts who know about the issues in question but not about 
grassroots opinions; they employ full-time workers with business motives 
rather than volunteers who want to promote a cause, and organisational 
structures become streamlined to be more effective rather than inclusive 
(Frantz 2007; Frantz 2005). The latter includes the rise of groups with 
decision-making structures that exclude members from participation in 
opinion formation (see Saurugger 2008 for an overview, Sudbery 2003, 87; 
Warleigh 2001, 2004) reducing their role to financial supporters, so-called 
cheque-book participation (Maloney 1999). The literature assumes that 
internal professionalisation furthers the gap between what EU umbrella 
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groups put forward as the opinion of civil society and what grassroots civil 
society opine (Kohler-Koch 2008; Saurugger 2008). 
Both BirdLife Europe and WWF-EPO form part of the first 
mushrooming of EU environmental groups in Brussels (Wurzel and Connelly 
2011, 214). Both have full-time staff with high levels of specialisation and 
expertise. Offices are small (BirdLife) to medium sized (WWF-EPO) in 
comparison to national offices and other lobby groups in Brussels, 
employing specialised policy officers responsible for different issue areas 
such as water policy or climate change. They also employ a number of 
administrative personnel responsible for the areas of external 
communication and media as well as finance and office management 
(division of labour). WWF-EPO moreover has a sophisticated fundraising-
department and management structures. Staffs have professional 
qualifications and are generally highly educated. Policy officers tend to be 
educated to university degree in their policy areas and are familiar with the 
Brussels circuit, but they also tend to have advocacy experience at EU 
and/or national/subnational level, often with member groups. 
Administrative staffs tend to be qualified in the relevant finance, 
management, administration or communication subjects. Neither of the 
groups outsources their lobbying to agencies, but they engage in 
sophisticated scientific research in collaboration with research institutions 
and agencies.  
The EU groups interviewed thus match the picture of 
professionalisation anticipated in the literature to some degree, although 
with WWF-EPO in particular this is not simply a response to recognition but 
rooted in the group’s principles and strategy since its foundation. The 
implications for the representativeness of said groups nevertheless have to 
be differentiated and are not necessarily all negative. Whilst the 
professionalisation of promissory groups can pose serious risks to their 
representativeness, for the gyroscopic and surrogate groups analysed this is 
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not necessarily the case and in fact appears helpful to the cause in most 
incidents. 
WWF-EPO 
WWF-EPO was set up with the objective of influencing increasingly 
complex and technical EU policy (WWF-EPO officials 2010). Its gyroscopic 
position formation is based on scientific research and experience in the 
field and a professional lobbying strategy that entails working in 
partnership with government and business.   
The WWF have had to professionalise their gyroscopic policy 
formation over the years. With changing complexities of policy issues 
(complex targets such as stopping climate change as opposed to local single 
species conservation), the information required by decision-makers is 
changing rapidly and requires new types of partnership (WWF-EPO official 
2010):  
 “Nowadays another contextual feature is just the complexity 
of the policy areas we are working in. So the types of partnerships 
we are talking about now are with people like McKinsey and 
Earnest and Young and some of the big consultancies on energy 
and grits, Ecofys, these people. […] We are scaling up. This is not 
the kind partnership where Unilever and WWF invented the marine 
stewardship certificate. This is sophisticated econometric analysis 
of different scenarios for energy and so forth.” 
In a gyroscopic group such as the WWF-EPO, this type of 
professionalism is exactly what is needed to ensure its policies are working 
towards the bigger goal of the protection of the natural environment and 
to stay true to its original mission. 
The acceptance of its policies is also based on this professionalism. 
WWF member groups are part of the same global group and follow the 
same strategy. They expect WWF-EPO to be professional in their work, 
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using the latest scientific evidence to form their positions. They also expect 
WWF-EPO to have the specialised administrative, managerial, fundraising 
and communication skills their 41 professional staffs demonstrate. 
Supporters are equally likely to expect this professionalism, since they 
joined the WWF based on its principles of a solutions-oriented professional 
group. 
BirdLife Europe 
Professionalism is similarly crucial for the gyroscopic position 
formation in BirdLife. BirdLife’s lists of endangered birds as indicators for 
the health of biodiversity is what BirdLife Europe and the member groups 
work with and which is expected to be produced based on professional 
knowledge and expertise. 
Also, BirdLife Europe’s office is staffed with an international team of 
15 permanent staff, who collectively provide a wide range of experience 
and skills within the fields of conservation, capacity building, policy, 
management, finance, fundraising, advocacy, science, ornithology, 
communication, marketing and administration and European languages111. 
Whilst line staff is educated in general fields like communication or finance, 
the staff working on policy content generally has advocacy group 
experience and most have worked prior for national BirdLife partners. 
Some have EU-institution experience, too. 
There is a strong degree of trust that member groups have in BirdLife 
and the way it selects, represents and advocates on environmental issues. 
This trust is based on BirdLife’s organisational credibility and expertise. 
BirdLife’s professional activities over the years have resulted in a good 
reputation and positive feedback from the media, which in turn has an 
impact on the acceptance of BirdLife’s work as skilful and influential by its 
constituency and beyond (BirdLife and RSPB officials 2010/11). The ‘bigger 
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 See the Birdlife International website (accessed 8/5/2012: 
http://www.birdlife.org/regional/europe/partnership.html) as well as the Birdlife Europe Annual 
Report (2009, 5). 
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vision’ paper on agriculture, for example, led by BirdLife Europe, attracted 
national media and organisations from across the different member states. 
This media image impacts the acceptance by members and supporters of 
the direct national member groups and beyond. 
Professionalisation	in	new	media	technology	
The traditional professionalisation argument is based on a too narrow 
conception of professionalisation, which is mostly restricted to 
bureaucratisation such as the centralisation of organisational structures 
and specialised elite staff (though social movement literature broadens the 
term professionalisation to include network structures Kriesi et al. 1995 in 
Saurugger 2005, 267). It ignores crucial implications of professionalisation 
in new media technology for both representativeness dimensions, but 
particularly for the acceptance dimension.  
Though gyroscopic groups do not claim to represent members, their 
organisational structures of representation nevertheless have to facilitate 
input of member group experience in order to form their positions. 
Depending on the group structure and strategies, different degrees of 
feedback and input to positions via differing formal and informal channels 
are appropriate and have to be valued accordingly. Here, 
professionalisation understood as a concept going beyond the traditional 
account of bureaucratisation and instead including professionalisation in 
new media technologies. This has the potential to enhance 
representativeness. For gyroscopic, and indeed for surrogate 
representativeness, new media professionalisation is significant.  
New media technology has become incredibly important and 
influential in the social, business and government environments. The drive 
towards an increasing application of new media by EU advocacy groups is 
also a response to the usage of the medium by individuals, supporters and 
the public. New media technology, with its network characteristics of 
communication, is changing society and impacts on how people 
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communicate, what they spend their time on and how people want to be 
informed, or rather inform themselves since new media tends to give the 
user much more agency over what and how she consumes (Castells 2000). 
Crucially, it also changes how people participate in political activities and 
how they want to be represented (acceptance dimension). Several 
interviewees observed a generational shift not only in the usage of 
different or rather new media, but also a generational shift in participation 
attitudes. 112  One interviewee explained how its organisational and 
participation structure fits the ‘old’ member generation, but young people 
are not following because they are less willing to enter formal, binding 
structures. Instead, mobile phones and the internet enhance the attitude of 
not entering binding agreements or commit (WEED official 2011). 
When talking about the benefits of the internet it is important to 
recognise its exclusive factor. The internet is still not accessible to all and 
some people, in particular young, educated males, are traditionally said to 
be more affluent internet users than others (Pickerill 2004, 172). However, 
in the context of this research, which looks at the EU and in particular at 
Great Britain and Germany as case studies, this argument does not carry 
the same weight. There has been a great change over the last years during 
which the internet infrastructure and its speed have been massively 
improved in the countries and the generations up to in their forties’ grew 
up with the internet through most or all of their lives. For example, in 1997 
a FoE supporter survey showed that only eighteen per cent of supporters 
were using the internet or emails at a daily basis (see reference in Pickerill 
2003, 72). Today, mailing-lists, including regional and topical mailing-lists, 
activist-led, campaign-specific and broad issue hubs which can be set up by 
activists and campaigners themselves, e-petitions, Twitter and Facebook 
form an important part of the group’s communication and campaign 
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 WWF’s Facebook sites indicate the most popular user age group is 18-24 years (accessed: 
14/09/2012: https://www.facebook.com/WWF/likes). 
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repertoire.113 Moreover, the internet has penetrated work and social life 
across societies, which means people have generally gained the minimum 
skills to use social media websites and write emails across generations. 
There is of course partly some resistance to new media, such as Facebook, 
because of its infringements of privacy. Groups thus apply a variety of new 
media combined them with traditional forms of communication. This is also 
a strategic reaction to the changes of journalism and news coverage, which 
has also been affected by the rise of the internet. For example, groups use 
the internet to raise their profile, reach more audiences and gain media 
attention (see also Pickerill 2003, 71 on a short summary of examples). 
The statistics on internet and Facebook usage express how new 
media technologies have entered the social and political lives of individuals. 
On 31 December 2011 there were 2,267 million internet users in the world 
(32.7 per cent of the world population at the time). The population 
estimate of the world was 6,930 million. There were 900 million active 
Facebook users in May 2012 that is 39.7 per cent of the world's internet 
users. The population in Europe was 816.4 million, of which 500.7 million 
were internet users and 235.5 million were on Facebook.114 In other words 
61.3 per cent of the European population is online and 47 per cent of the 
internet users are on Facebook.115 If ‘Facebook.com’ were a country, it 
would be bigger than Europe population-wise. Interestingly, there are 
decisive national differences with regards to Facebook usage. 84 per cent of 
the UK population use the internet, of which 57.9 per cent are Facebook 
users. In Germany on the other hand, 82.7 per cent of the population are 
internet users and only 32.8 per cent of them are Facebook users.116   
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 FoEE, FoE and BUND officials (2010/11) and FoE websites (accessed 20/08/2012: 
www.foe.co.uk/resource/guides/campaign_hubs_guide.pdf; 
http://www.foe.co.uk/get_involved/act_online_index.html). 
114
 Population and internet user estimates are from 31 December 2011, Facebook estimates from 
May 2012 (accessed 07/07/2012: http://www.internetworldstats.com/). 
115
 Note that not every user on Facebook is an individual; hence the numbers are only indicative. 
116
 UK: population 62.7 million, internet users 52.7 million (84 per cent of the population), Facebook 
users 30.5 million (57.9 per cent of the internet users). Germany: population 81.5 million, internet 
users 67.4 million (82.7 per cent of the population), Facebook users 22.1 million (32.8 per cent of the 
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Facebook has become a major source of information and 
communication for people. On the one hand this means people are 
changing their attitudes to where and how they look for information, but it 
also provides new ways of engaging with issues, for example by re-posting, 
commenting, messaging and liking. Campaigns are shared via social media, 
emails and online newsletters, which users subscribe to online, which they 
otherwise might not have. Engagement is quick, effortless and regardless of 
time and place (other than requiring an internet connected device).  
Importantly, being able to make use of new media software on new 
technology devices such as smart phones further impacts information, 
communication and participation attitudes. Advocacy groups have to 
respond to the changes in society and particularly changing attitudes of 
communication, participation and representation. Promissory and 
anticipatory groups who represent members’ interests have to respond to 
their demands of how they wish to voice their interests. Gyroscopic and 
surrogate groups particularly have to use new media to expand and align 
their channels of acceptance to what supporters expect. Crucially, social 
media can build a sense of community and solidarity. 
Online channels are constantly improved, but their application by EU 
groups is still in its infancy and is not used to its full potential. This is partly 
because EU groups tend to use it reactively to users demands as opposed 
to innovatively and experimental.117  
Impact	of	new	media	technology	on	the	two	dimensions	
New media technology has an impact on both representative 
dimensions. On the one hand, professionalisation in new media 
                                                                                                                                       
internet users). Data from 31 March 2012 (accessed 07/07/2012: 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/). Note that there are national social media sites who may be 
more popular, such as StudiVZ in Germany or Bebo in the UK. 
117
 This became apparent through interviews with the groups, but also by looking at when groups 
started using Twitter and Facebook, as well as emails and other technologies that have been 
available for many years. Pickerill suggests that large more hierarchical and formalised groups are 
slower and less innovative in their use of new media technologies, whilst small non-hierarchical 
structures benefit the most of using innovative technologies (Pickerill 2004). 
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technologies facilitates expert knowledge and case study input to issues on 
the agenda and policy positions from member groups, essential for 
gyroscopic position formation. On the other hand, new media technology is 
a medium through which member groups, individual supporters and the 
general public can express their acceptance of a group as well as its policy 
positions, campaigns or goals.  
New media and acceptability 
New media technology helps to create and reinforce existing 
networks of communication and linkages between EU member groups as 
well as network members (Pickerill 2003:76). The linkages also enhance the 
relationship between national groups and their local member groups 
(Washbourne 2001, group officials 2010/11). New media can thus help 
inclusion amongst already existing member groups and supporters (Pickerill 
2003, 64). Moreover, it encourages individual staff working on policies to 
communicate, and spreads a sense of solidarity amongst staff in member 
groups and supporters alike, reducing feelings of isolation (Warf and 
Grimes 1997). New media technology thus helps to facilitate local 
connection and coordination with EU offices as well as coordination and 
exchange of experiences between national member groups and with EU 
offices (environmental group officials 2010/11). This input and exchange of 
expertise in the field with EU groups is crucial to enable gyroscopic 
representation.   
There is a clear development towards incorporating new media 
technology into organisational and communication structures amongst the 
group interviewed. Organisational structures and strategies impact on how 
fast groups adopt the different new media technologies and the width 
(access) and depth (variety) of the new media tools employed. The 
application of tools in policy teams moreover depends on the computer 
knowledge officials have (environmental group officials 2010/11).  
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WWF- European Policy Office 
Although the WWF-EPO decision-making structure has hardly 
changed, the informal participation and communication structure has 
changed and improved considerably through new media technologies and 
web 2.0. This has helped WWF-EPO to be responsive to the Brussels 
political environment, whilst receiving input and feedback from the WWF 
network, counteracting some traditional bureaucratisation tendencies 
(WWF-EPO official 2010): 
“We have to resemble the institutions we are trying to lobby. 
That means that we have to look like, and act like, and be on a 
similar time frame as the official institutions. And so all the 
difficulties they have with organising technical working groups, 
council meetings, council formations, interacting with the 
parliament, is exactly the same thing as what we have. The only 
thing that you could say may be slightly easier, in fact massively 
easier is communication, because of internet, because of the video 
conferencing and other things that have made some life easier. But 
the processes themselves they are all the same.” 
Informal channels of participation are incorporated into existing 
formal decision-making at two different levels. One is in the overall 
strategic direction and priorities of the office, adjusting and amending it in 
light of the needs of member groups. Secondly, it is incorporated in the 
specific policy initiatives that the about 20 networks of the WWF-EPO ‘hub’ 
take, aligning and adjusting positions with what national WWF offices say is 
acceptable to them (WWF-EPO official 2010).  
Input for the strategic direction and priorities of WWF-EPO are 
determined in the strategic meetings every five years, but WWF-EPO has 
recently started to commission surveys sent through to the network via 
email in support of formal channels (WWF-EPO official 2010): 
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“We get results from surveys and put that into revisions of 
strategy plans to see if there are new issues emerging that we may 
not have been aware of. We are just in the course of doing one 
now and it is proving to be a very useful tool. It's the start of a 
more regular sounding out.” 
The use of new media in the specific policy teams has informative, 
communicative and participatory objectives. Communication with the 
policy and national network is the responsibility of the policy advisers. It 
thus depends on the policy area and policy officers and how 
communication technologies are employed, partly because some staffs are 
more technologically savvy than others. WWF-EPO’s water policy staffs for 
example do not apply social networks much for the Water Scarcity and 
Droughts policy, but the area of social networks such as Facebook has been 
identified as one of the areas that the team would like to explore more 
(WWF-EPO official 2010). WWF-EPO generally meets relatively frequently 
in Brussels as well as alternate places outside Belgium, but the technology 
helps communication and to make information available in the meantime 
and across member groups, networks and teams. 
Since water is a cross-cutting issue, encompassing economic, social, 
environmental and cultural factors, it is relevant for various policies. The 
water policy network thus uses a comprehensive integrative 
communication approach and the network includes experts from WWF’s 
parallel teams such as marine or agricultural teams. WWF-EPO officials still 
consider personal meetings crucial for information and participation, and 
phone conversations and conferences are important mechanisms in 
particular in really urgent cases, or to update people and to discuss 
problems (WWF-EPO officials 2010). But new media technologies have 
become most important for internal information and participation. Even 
though participation is not understood in the sense of democratic 
representation in order to be representative of members, it is nevertheless 
considered “crucially important if you run a European network to get input” 
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(WWF-EPO official 2010). WWF-EPO relies extensively on Emails and 
mailing-lists and since recently also an intranet working with Google 
Applications and documents. Google docs form an integral part of WWF-
EPO’s web content management system (CMS). 118  WWF-EPO has a 
partnership with the Google site and Google documents are used as 
repository of all documents and to share news. It is considered extremely 
helpful for revising documents, sharing presentations and having online-
discussions. For example questions can be posed to the policy team which 
anyone can offer advice on who might have experience or knowledge and 
members can put forward changes to positions. The use of online 
conferences and Skype, the latter having the advantage of indicating 
availability as well, is becoming more popular, too (WWF-EPO-officials 
2010). WWF’s organisational culture is solution-oriented (problem-solving) 
thinking and new media technology is applied to that objective. That means 
member groups are able to deliver experience and knowledge through the 
new media tools mentioned and are consulted and give their consent 
through them. These are also the channels through which WWF-EPO and 
its member network set and report on deliverables.  
BirdLife Europe 
New media technologies are the core mechanisms to raise awareness 
of issues and discuss and form positions that then represent BirdLife. New 
media technologies allowed for scheduling flexibility and geographical 
independence of staff and member groups involved in decision-making. 
Participation is not only enabled via personal meetings or rather the bi-
annual formal meetings, but new media technology professionalisation 
complements the more formal structures of decision-making within the 
group. Personal meetings are very valuable, but not always manageable, 
and the mailing lists are the most effective tool for information and 
                                                      
118
 WWF-EPO uses a content management system (CMS), also called a Web management system, 
which in their case is a group of Google applications and tools that enable the organisation to 
seamlessly create, edit, review and publish electronic text. Staff can access the CMS online using a 
web browser.  
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participation for BirdLife (BirdLife official 2010). The BirdLife mailing lists 
are its core and very actively used tool for the discussion of position papers 
and exchange of views generally. In the water policy case the RSPB 
formulated the position, which was then emailed around the BirdLife 
member groups for input, comments and amendments. New media 
technologies enable EU policy officers and directors of national member 
groups to communicate, detect policy interests and form positions on 
policy issues informally and without the requirement to meet face-to-face 
(BirdLife and RSPB officials 2010/11).  
Mailing lists are also a way for BirdLife to send out lobbying 
opportunities and collect signatures, encouraging member groups to sign 
campaigns. For example for the marine bycatch action plan it collected 
about 30.000 signatures (BirdLife official 2010). Google documents and the 
intranet are further tools applied to discuss and receive input of member 
groups though it depends on the member groups’ usage whether and to 
which degree these are employed. Input and dialogue are further enabled 
mutually through individual emails, phone conversations and phone 
interviews, providing a more private space for the exchange of specific 
views and insights.  
Generally, input through new media technologies is informally taken 
into account and assessed and its relevance judged on the secretariat level 
for BirdLife’s European purposes. For example, if input is considered too 
marginal for example, in the sense that it is about a local problem rather 
than a European one, BirdLife will try and direct the groups to the channel 
it thinks is more appropriate (BirdLife official 2010).  
New media and acceptance 
New media technology also has an impact on the acceptance 
dimension of representativeness. Existing networks of communication and 
linkages between EU and member group staff, as well as supporters, 
encourage staff to connect on policies and help create and reinforce trust 
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and solidarity (Pickerill 2003, 76), moreover reducing feelings of isolation 
(Warf and Grimes 1997). Solidarity is the basis for empathy and is 
particularly important for the acceptance of EU groups’ activities across 
national boundaries.  
Groups use the internet to create new channels of acceptance, by 
raising their profile, reach more audiences and gain media attention (see 
also Pickerill 2003, 71 on a short summary of examples).  
WWF- European Policy Office 
Professionalism is a core part of WWFs and WWF-EPOs image, to 
which people subscribe. The WWF-EPO was established to play precisely 
that professional role because member groups felt that this was necessary 
to represent their interests. EU groups have to be professional, know how 
the EU institutions function and have knowledge and a track record in the 
specific policy fields (WWF officials 2010/11). Professionalisation in new 
media technologies in particular makes it possible for WWF-EPO to carry 
out its role to influence policy through expertise and packaging experience 
and showcases into solutions for EU institutions. This professional image in 
turn postulates a continuing professionalisation, including in new areas 
such as new media, for the group to be accepted as representative of what 
it stands for. 
By being an informative and communicative tool, new media 
technology provides the basis for the acceptance dimension of WWF’s 
representativeness. Improving the communication of WWF-EPO’s activities 
and goals is crucial for members and supporters, as well as potential 
supporters, in order to have a clear idea of who they are supporting and 
why. At the same time, new media technology is a medium through which 
member groups, individual supporters and the general public can express 
their acceptance of policy positions, campaigns or goals.  
For WWF-EPO itself, new media technologies have enabled 
responsiveness to the interests of its member groups and to the attitudes 
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of individual supporters and the general public. This includes 
responsiveness to empathy expressed by supporters and the public for 
specific causes, improving the quality of surrogate representation. This in 
turn enables WWF-EPO to make sure member groups and in particular 
supporters, who have no formal say in the formation of positions, accept its 
gyroscopic positions. Whilst Google documents are used for internal 
communication and participation, Facebook is used for external 
communication and as a way to reach new audiences that the WWF had 
not reached otherwise and to raise awareness of issues with a larger 
audience. Communication and channelling acceptance through social 
networks is mainly through WWF asking to support online petitions, asking 
for feedback, inquiring about what supporters think and about public 
opinion and ideas and to generally interact with and inform supporters and 
the public.  
Being a global advocacy group, it is less important for WWF-EPO 
specifically to play the informative and communicative role with 
supporters. This is a role the WWF as a network performs. Supporters 
accept the WWF-EPOs activities because they understand the WWF as one. 
To communicate its positions and values, the WWF uses an extensive and 
interlinked mixture of new media technologies, in particular social media, 
which are very popular. On their professional websites national and EU 
groups inform about each other’s work and national groups make their EU 
involvement clear. 119  Facebook (WWF International (1,039,362 likes), 
Germany (104,322), UK (24,754)) and Twitter (WWF-EU (1,679 followers), 
Germany (17,354), UK (14,474) and UK Public Affairs (2,729)) are also used 
extensively and link to each other.120 There are various tools for individuals, 
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 See for example WWF Germany (accessed 14/09/2012: http://www.wwf.de/aktiv-werden/wwf-
und-soziale-medien/ and http://www.wwf.de/themen-projekte/politische-arbeit/eu-
foerdermittel/projekte-des-wwf/bruesseler-koalition/). 
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WWF Facebook sites (accessed 14/09/2012: http://www.facebook.com/WWFWWFs, 
http://www.facebook.com/WWFUnitedKingdom?v=app_7146470109, 
http://www.facebook.com/wwfde). Twitter accounts for the EU, Germany and the UK (accessed 
14/09/2012: https://twitter.com/WWFEU, https://twitter.com/WWF_Deutschland/following, 
https://twitter.com/wwf_uk, https://twitter.com/WWF_UK_Politics). 
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but also groups, to express support for WWF. A relatively new tool to 
express general support is the option to “donate a tweet a day” to WWF by 
simply signing up to Justcoz.121 
BirdLife Europe 
BirdLife uses new media to create channels of acceptance for its 
member groups as well as their individual supporters in turn, and to build a 
reputation and its global image.  
For BirdLife member groups, new media technologies provide ways to 
be informed about activities and positions of the EU group as well as other 
national groups in the network. They can thus observe and chose to get 
involved according to their interest and capacities. The transparency 
provided further enables groups to accept and trust the BirdLife leadership 
as well as the network. It enables an exchange of information as well as 
communication on activities and policies between groups that does not 
require top-down or one way facilitation through hierarchy. BirdLife, RSPB 
and NABU cross-reference each other on their websites and link to EU and 
national press releases and studies of each other, as well as informing 
about EU-wide campaigns. This provides a basis for gyroscopic 
representation through experience and expertise, as well as enhancing 
trust, credibility and a feeling of solidarity.122 
New media technology facilitates the expression of support and 
hence acceptance in a number of ways. Though not applied in the case of 
the Water Scarcity and Droughts policy, on several issues 
campaigning/signatures were used and are considered a method of 
participation which express acceptance of the position and representation 
by member groups as well as individual supporters of member groups, 
depending on how these tools are employed. Social media channels are 
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 Justcoz website (accessed 20/09/2012: http://justcoz.org/). 
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 BirdLife website (accessed 12/09/2012: 
http://www.birdlife.org/regional/europe/partnership.html), RSPB website (accessed 12/09/2012: 
http://www.rspb.org.uk/international/birdlife.aspx) and NABU website (accessed 12/09/2012: 
http://www.nabu.de/nabu/birdlife/). 
190 
 
further informing about opportunities to get involved in BirdLife and its 
member groups. Facebook and Twitter for example provide crucial 
channels for members and supporters to express their acceptance, 
however BirdLife Europe does not have its own pages and the social media 
is managed at the international level. On the international page people can 
post about issues they support, share them, tweet and re-tweet them and 
‘like’ Facebook campaigns and events set up in support of specific issues. 
The official BirdLife Facebook page has about 19,000 ‘likes’ (May 2012). The 
other Facebook page of BirdLife International, “the unofficial fans page”, is 
liked by over 7,700 people (May 2012). On these pages supporters have the 
opportunity to like also campaigns and events organised in other countries 
around the globe as well as in European neighbour countries.  
Importantly, new media technology also helps BirdLife to create a 
reputation and report on international stories of experience and expertise, 
in order to create a basis for (European) acceptance. BirdLife International’s 
presence on Facebook and Twitter (13,094 followers)123 for example helps 
to create a reputation amongst members, supporters and beyond. 
Moreover, stories on social media get picked up by the press (RSPB official 
2011). BirdLife International’s social media links to BirdLife Europe member 
groups such as NABU and RSPB as well as their regional/local member 
groups. BirdLife’s Facebook page publicly informs about the work BirdLife 
International does across the globe, including local, national and 
international stories, as well as political news, conferences, opportunities 
to get involved and other events related to wider conservation issues. 
BirdLife uses Facebook (BirdLife International) and Twitter to inform about 
relevant local, national and EU political news, as well as on events and 
conferences. 
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 BirdLife Twitter (accessed 14/09/2012: https://twitter.com/BirdLife_News). 
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Also the national groups’ usage of supporter newsletters, Facebook 
and Twitter (NABU: 6,804 followers)124 and their blogs are crucial for raising 
awareness amongst supporters of their group’s EU activities in order to 
enable them to express or decline support and thus acceptance. Messages 
clarifying the belonging to the global BirdLife network, for example the 
RSPBs mission sections on its Facebook pages raise such awareness: “The 
RSPB is the UK charity working to secure a healthy environment for birds 
and wildlife, helping to create a better world for all of us. We belong to 
BirdLife International, the global partnership of bird conservation 
organisations.”125  
But at the same time it is important to differentiate between 
supporters. National member groups such as the RSPB have a large 
supportership, made up of all sorts of identities, such as subscribers 
(people who give money), volunteers, people who sign pledges, who lobby 
politicians, or passionate bird-lovers who participate in activities such as 
the Big Birdwatch to encourage bird habitats in their gardens. “In theory 
there is a core purpose of the RSPB that then relates out to those [types of 
supporters]” (RSPB official 2010). This also means that the channels of 
acceptance for the RSPB have to be diverse in order to accommodate how 
these supporters wish to get involved and express their support, but also 
how much feedback and information they would like in return. Social media 
has great potential here. In response, the RSPB has thus diversified its 
channels of support (RSPB official 2011): 
“[We set up a team] on how we can update our technology 
infrastructure to enable us to communicate with our supporters in 
a way that is relevant to them. We're very good at doing that in 
face-to-face situations, but when it comes to email and social 
media, our hands are tied because we just don't have the right 
technology and processes in place. [...] our ultimate objective is to 
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 NABU Twitter page (accessed 14/09/2012: https://twitter.com/NABU_de/following). 
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 RSPB Facebook site (accessed 12/09/2012: http://www.facebook.com/RSPBVolunteering/info). 
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build the capability to get to know more about who our supporters 
are, what they're interested in, and what their expectations are. 
Only then can we start to have a meaningful dialogue with them.”  
The RSPB uses a variety of means, such as its community and 
volunteer blogs, Twitter (31,381 followers)126 and Facebook. On Facebook 
itself the RSPB again has several pages accommodating different supporter 
types. It has the national ‘RSPB love nature’ page (24,385 likes),127  as well 
as various regional/local pages mostly used by supporters with some 
official RSPB input. There are event sections and information about annual 
general meetings, member weekends, events, campaigns and other 
activities.128 In addition there is the RSPB volunteering Facebook site (4,150 
likes), reporting about national and some European and international policy 
activism, campaigns and volunteering events, and linking to other 
environmental and conservation groups.129 
The advantage of social media is that it is not only about what a 
group choses to put out to its supporters, but it facilitates supporters to 
have the conversation that supporters wish to have with a group (RSPB 
official 2011). For the RSPB this is predominantly gardens and birds. The 
RSPB as an organisation does not wish to be seen simply as that, because it 
engages in many more fields. But it also recognises that  
“if that is what people come to us about we have to honour 
that conversation, before you can start educating them about 
something else and probably they’ll listen better to the other 
messages we’re putting out. It is important to remember that 
Facebook is an open channel and people have made it what they 
want it to be” (RSPB official 2011). 
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 RSPB Twitter page (accessed 14/09/2012: https://twitter.com/natures_voice). 
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 RSPB official Facebook site (accessed 12/09/2012: 
http://www.facebook.com/RSPBVolunteering/info). 
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 For example RSPB in the East (accesses 12/09/2012: http://www.facebook.com/rspbintheeast). 
129
 RSPB volunteering Facebook site (accessed 12/09/2012: http 
http://www.facebook.com/RSPBVolunteering). 
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Thus being transparent about what a group does and at the same 
time responsive to what supporters want to hear and engage in can be 
conflictual. The example of the RSPB shows how the group has to balance 
its wish to educate its supporters about policies, campaigns and action-led 
news with the actual supporter engagement interests. The acceptance of a 
group as representative does also require a group to learn which messages 
to put out to which audience and how.  
“Ultimately we want to try and change people’s perception 
of the RSPB [but] the majority does not want to talk to us about 
climate change […] it just doesn’t get an ear. If we put a post it just 
doesn’t get any response at all. If it doesn’t work we’ll try and put 
it out in a different way” (RSPB official 2011).  
Here social media has great potential, because groups can observe 
what people engage in and how as they engage with each other.  
At the same time, it allows groups to communicate contentious 
messages, which are more difficult to put out indirectly through the press. 
It takes out the intermediate channel and enables direct and targeted 
conversation with selected audiences (RSPB official 2011):  
“When you rely on a third party, press, media, the chances 
are the message is not quite the same. In that respect we are using 
social media as if it were face-to-face. We are getting more directly 
to the right audience.” 
The most revolutionary aspect of social media is the sense of 
community and solidarity it creates between strangers and people who are 
in no geographical proximity.  
“Facebook clearly has a community about it. You can see the 
interaction and conversation. People talk to each other, so we 
could really clearly see what their interests were. Twitter is easier 
for us to use as broadcast channel, but we also find out what 
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people are talking about as well and by running searches and using 
hash tags you can get a sense of what the conversation topics are, 
but it is harder to get that sense of community. But we recently 
had ‘Big Garden Birdwatch’. It was the first time that we could see 
just how many people were talking on Twitter using hash tags, 
complete strangers were making jokes and the sense of community 
was really really strong. Whilst on a day to day basis it is harder to 
see on Twitter, with Facebook you can see everyone’s interaction 
visibly there on the screen, fitting in together” (RSPB official 2011).  
The example of the RSPB shows how much potential it has in helping 
groups understand their members and supporters as well as providing new 
channels of acceptance, ultimately enhancing groups’ representativeness. 
The better awareness of NABU and RSPB supporters in turn provides 
representativeness to BirdLife’s positions and activities. 
Conclusion	
This case study shows that advocacy groups representing a cause do 
not tend to have promissory or anticipatory, but predominantly gyroscopic 
and surrogate, representation structures. Environmental groups by their 
very nature are active on behalf of the environment and the people 
depending on that environment. Thus when environmental EU groups note 
that “[…] my role is not to encourage the most participatory governance, 
but to ensure the best results for the environment” (Sudbery 2003, 91f), 
this is because most environmental groups have a gyroscopic and surrogate 
representation structure representing a cause. They do not violate 
participatory principles of promissory representation. Moreover, for most 
environmental groups, in particular those dealing with climate change, the 
urgency of the matters they deal with leads them to prioritise taking action 
in order to prevent climatic and environmental catastrophes as opposed to 
how or through which agency to achieve the decision on action (Goodin 
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1992, 120). This is in line with the gyroscopic argument of representing 
based on scientific findings and common sense, rather than by democratic 
votes of members. The formal and informal decision-making structures 
serve to establish agreement on the ‘how’ rather than the ‘what’ with 
member groups, thus they make sure policy positions are aligned with 
lobbying strategies and campaigns carried out at the national level as well 
as safeguarding the compliance with both visions and missions of the 
groups.  
Environmental groups form their positions based on scientific 
research and expertise on the ground, not because members and 
supporters have formed and formally voted on a position. The nature of the 
environmental cause they represent explains why the acceptability 
dimension here is gyroscopic. In addition, the acceptability dimension is 
surrogate, because they stand in for the environment and future 
generations, which themselves have no voice. They form positions around 
topics and points of view that are not, or only insufficiently, represented in 
the political discourse, such as nature, biodiversity or the poor in the 
developing countries.  
Both WWF and BirdLife rely on scientific data, expertise and 
experience on the ground when they form their positions. Expertise is the 
tool to reach a normative goal which is set in a group’s mission and visions. 
Groups are professional in their use of scientific data and expertise, and 
their main scientific references are studies produced by the groups in 
cooperation with research centres. For both groups the support of member 
groups for positions is considered important, but it varies according to the 
issue and member group interest, and to which degree this support is 
presented. Gyroscopic and surrogate representation is not independent 
from support through members and supporters. Rather than responding to 
direct votes on positions, these groups have to make sure that the scientific 
data they form their positions on is reliable, that the experience they draw 
on is relevant and that their arguments are in line with their group 
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principles. If they do not follow these rules, their reputation and credibility 
are in danger and that in turn means a loss of support and impact.  
The difference between the two groups is their organisational type, 
which has an impact on the way the acceptance dimension can be judged. 
The WWF-EPO is the EU representation of an international advocacy group, 
whose principles are known by national member groups as well as 
individual supporters to be global, thus the same at international, EU or 
national level. In the case of the WWF the acceptance dimension can thus 
be judged based on the number of supporters within Europe, since 
members and supporters have a sense of belonging to a global group with a 
global mission and strategy. WWF-UK supporters understand that they 
belong to a group that is active EU-wide and globally. BirdLife on the other 
hand is an umbrella group of a network of independent national advocacy 
groups. The acceptance dimension is partly expressed by BirdLife’s group 
memberships, who have the choice of being members of the umbrella and 
agreeing to BirdLife acting in their name. However, supporters of BirdLife’s 
national member groups do not necessarily realise that their groups are 
members of an EU umbrella representing their interests in Brussels or that 
as in the water case study, national groups represent their interests through 
the BirdLife network and name at EU level. Here, the communication of 
issues and transparency according to supporter expectations is particularly 
important for the acceptance dimension of representativeness. However, 
the examples of the RSPB and NABU show that their new media usage, 
such as websites, supporter newsletters, Facebook, Twitter and their blogs 
raise awareness amongst supporters of their group’s EU activities. They 
thus enable their supporters to express or decline support and thus 
acceptance.  
The fact that gyroscopic and surrogate groups in the case studies 
connect their representative claims to existing government commitments 
and regulations strengthens the claim that positions are formed in the 
interest of the environment and specifically the general public and future 
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generations. The policy goals on water scarcity and droughts are set in the 
frame of EU standards and (binding) legislation for environmental 
protection, including that on the quality of water (for example the 'Birds' 
and 'Habitats' Directives adopted by EU member states and the European 
Parliament). Further EU commitments on paper that are strengthening the 
relevance of BirdLife’s representation request are the principle of 
sustainable development and the goals to reduce greenhouse gases in the 
fight against climate change.130 
Another mechanism for gyroscopic and surrogate groups to ensure 
positions are formed in the interest of the environment and specifically the 
general public and future generations are public opinion polls and surveys. 
The water policy relates to climate change. Opinion surveys reveal that 
action against and adaption to climate change are primary concerns of the 
European public. Over two thirds of Europeans see climate change as a 
‘very serious problem’ and almost 80 per cent believe that fighting climate 
change can ‘boost the economy and jobs’. Europeans see climate change as 
‘the second most serious problem facing the world’, ‘more serious than the 
economic situation’ (TNS Political and Social, 2011). Groups fighting against 
climate change thus form their position based on empathy with a 
constituency that goes beyond the member- and supportership and is in 
the general interest of the public. The fact that they do so thus strengthens 
the acceptability dimension of surrogate groups. The public opinion poll 
helps judge the strength of the (surrogate) acceptability dimensions in this 
case. Opinion polls also help understand what supporter expectations may 
be − and how they may vary. For example, over one third of Eurobarometer 
respondents across the EU think that the EU should propose additional 
measures on water-related issues, and want to be able to express their 
views on such measures (37 per cent). An almost equal proportion (36 per 
cent) think the EU should propose additional measures, but are not 
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 BirdLife Europe website (accessed 10/09/2012: 
http://www.birdlife.org/eu/EU_policy/why_EUpolicy.html). 
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interested in having a say on them (TNS Opinion and Social 2012, 18). 
Moreover, at least three quarters of respondents also consider floods (79 
per cent), and droughts and overconsumption of water (75 per cent) to be 
serious problems (TNS Opinion and Social 2012, 9). 
  
199 
 
7	 Emission	Reductions:	Greenpeace,	
Friends	of	the	Earth,	Climate	Action	
Network	Europe	
The assumption that groups necessarily lose their representativeness 
as a result of professionalisation has to be revisited taking into account 
varying organisational structures and strategies and considering the two 
dimensions of representativeness established in chapter two and three. 
The case study analysis is therefore divided into three parts: 
introduction to the groups and case, organisational structures and 
strategies of representation, and professionalisation. Firstly, the 
Commission’s emission reductions communication is introduced and EU 
groups engaged with the policy are presented (Friends of the Earth Europe, 
Greenpeace Europe, Climate action Network Europe). Secondly, the 
promissory (and anticipatory) representation structure as assumed in the 
existing literature is reviewed and compared with the predominantly 
gyroscopic and surrogate position formation found in the empirical 
examples. Moreover, the consequences of distinct organisational structures 
and strategies of representation for the acceptance dimension of 
representativeness found in the case study groups are explained. Thirdly, 
the assumptions of the impact of professionalisation, or bureaucratisation, 
on group representativeness in the existing literature are reviewed and re-
visited taking into account gyroscopic and surrogate representation 
structures. The conception of professionalisation is then extended to 
include new media technology and its implications for the two dimensions 
of representativeness. Empirical findings support the thesis that group 
representativeness is two-dimensional and more complex than hitherto 
assumed in the professionalisation and representativeness dichotomy 
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literature. Moreover groups increasingly professionalise their new media 
application constituting alternative channels of support and feedback; and 
hence providing further potential to positively impact representativeness. 
Organisational	structure	and	strategy	of	
representation	
The thesis suggests that in order to understand the 
representativeness of a group, it is necessary to look at its organisational 
structure and strategy. The following section first reviews the 
representation structures and strategies the literature assumes groups 
have, presuming that representatives’ preferences are induced by the 
constituency. The cases of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and Climate 
Action Network Europe then reveal that these environmental groups have 
different organisational structures and strategies of representation. They 
form their positions based on science, rather than on members’ votes or 
preferences, and member groups and supporters often express their 
acceptance of the position represented via means other than democratic 
votes or participation in governance structures. Taking into account the two 
dimensions of representativeness, combined with the distinct 
organisational structures and strategies, it becomes apparent that the 
evaluation of representativeness depends on and varies according to the 
structures and strategies of interest representation. 
Forming	positions	
The literature on the professionalisation of EU advocacy groups 
assumes that professionalisation negatively affects group 
representativeness (on a threshold of media performance 
professionalisation see Frantz 2007; Frantz and Martens 2006; Saurugger 
2005). One of the arguments in the literature, set out in chapter one, is that 
there is a lack of member and supporter participation (see Saurugger 2008 
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for an overview, Sudbery 2003, 87; Warleigh 2001, 2004). Moreover, 
institutionalisation of advocacy groups is said to lead to the centralisation 
and bureaucratisation of organisational structures and the creation of elite 
leadership remote from members and supporters, or grassroots interests 
(Kohler-Koch 2010, 111, Kohler-Koch 2008; Warleigh 2001). Positions put 
forward by EU groups in Brussels no longer represent the interests of their 
member- and supportership, because members and supporters have no or 
little say in the formation of EU positions (Sudbery 2003, 87; Warleigh 
2001). 
The assumption in the literature is thus that groups form their 
positions based on democratic member votes or participation in 
organisational governance. Their positions are induced by the preferences 
of the members’ interests and the grassroots supporters. In other words, 
positions are formed to represent members’ preferences. Representatives 
are ‘acting for’ (Pitkin 1969) members and members cause changes in the 
groups’ representative behaviour (Mansbridge 2003, 521). The 
organisational strategy is to represent ‘humans’, since the interests 
represented are those of the constituency, thus of the members. The 
human characteristic further includes that the constituency (members) 
could potentially speak for themselves (Halpin 2006, 926).  
The EU groups might thus put forward a “relatively unmediated 
version of the constituents will” (promissory representation, Mansbridge 
2003, 516). The EU group is accountable to its member groups (and they in 
turn to their members) in the traditional principal-agent sense. EU groups 
have to keep their promises in order to be representative of their 
constituency. Or EU groups might put forward a position they predict 
members will agree to in hindsight (anticipatory representation, 
Mansbridge 2003, 517). This creates a reciprocal power relation and 
enables continuing mutual influence, because it leaves room for members 
to change their preferences and for EU groups to influence members’ 
preferences (2003, 517f).  
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In short, to be representative, the literature expects members of EU 
environmental groups to have a say in the governance of the group. This 
implies that member groups participate in EU position formation and that 
they internally provide for participatory structures down to the grassroots 
in a way that assures their opinion is reflected in EU positions. Structures of 
representation would give member groups and their members in turn 
power over the EU groups’ representative activities. Judging 
representativeness is based on either the numbers of members/supporters 
(promissory) or the deliberative qualities of the communication between 
EU groups, member groups and grassroots (anticipatory).  
However, positions may also be formed based on values, principles 
expertise or empathy. In the traditional promissory and in the anticipatory 
forms of representation the representatives’ preferences are induced by 
the constituency whilst in gyroscopic representation, the representatives’ 
preferences are internally determined. Neither gyroscopic nor surrogate 
representations require participatory position formation as promissory 
representation claims do. 
The case studies show that groups represent environmental interests 
not primarily through participatory decision-making structures as assumed 
in the traditional literature. Groups form their positions based on 
gyroscopic factors such as scientific knowledge, experience and common 
sense among the leadership. Decision-making structures tend to be in place 
to make sure national and sub-national experience and expertise is 
considered in the position formation and to decide on the ‘how’ rather 
than the ‘what’ (Greenpeace Germany official 2011). Moreover, their 
position formation reflects the interests of future generations and the 
environment, such as nature, the climate and biodiversity, and is thus a 
surrogate representation.  
The important difference between promissory or anticipatory and 
gyroscopic or surrogate representation is not about whether or not 
member groups get involved in the formation of a policy position. It is 
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about whether the policy position itself is based on a bottom-up issue that 
individual and group members have raised, or whether the need for action 
is based on scientific, experience and common sense factors. In other 
words, the promissory representation requires a democratic structure that 
resembles the specific needs and interests of the members themselves, 
whilst the gyroscopic representation primarily resembles the interest of a 
cause based on scientific analysis, experience in the field and common 
sense, though this is of course happening in the interest of member groups 
and individual supporters or else they would not be supporting such a 
cause (acceptance dimension). Consensus or agreement structures are in 
place to receive agreement for proposed policies based on gyroscopic 
reasoning, rather than to enable democratic participation in which the 
interests of the base are represented at the top. 
Representation	 in	 EU	 environmental	 groups:	 The	
acceptability	dimension	
Friends of the Earth Europe 
FoEE's official slogan is "for the people, for the planet, for the future". 
FoEE is active for the environment and the people, but it is the member 
groups that decide on the broad topic areas and how to facilitate 
campaigns in their countries and communities in that interest. As one FoEE 
official sums up (2011):  
“We have to take account of our member organisations, we 
are a democratic organisation, so our member organisations have 
a say in how the organisation is run, but I don’t think we work 
exclusively in the interest of our members. More generally we 
represent the voice of European people and the environment, 
really.”  
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In order to facilitate that the group acts in the interest of the 
environment, actions are evidence-based and rooted in findings of climate 
science. As one interviewee explains (FoEE official 2011):  
“if we take it on an issue by issue basis, we can see what 
climate science is telling us […] most of us would agree that there 
is overwhelming consensus on climate change, and so our actions 
are underpinned by an understanding of climate science. That we 
have a certain carbon budget available to us and we cannot safely 
exceed certain amounts of emissions and at the moment Europe is 
emitting far too much and has historically emitted far too much. So 
we have to take action on that.” 
FoEE is moreover a surrogate group, since it represents the 
environment and future generations, which have no voice. In this context it 
also represents equitability values, in other words it tries to balance the 
(in)equitable causes and effects of environmental problems on people from 
the North and the South. It therefore bases its positions on empathy with 
‘the people’. Although FoEE and its member groups consider themselves 
active in the interest of the general public beyond members and 
supporters, sometimes the interest of the environment can stand in 
contrast to the personal interests of individual citizens. In that case the 
protection of the environment is the decisive indicator (FoE-EWNI 2011):  
“The starting point would have to be the environment […] on 
occasions […] the support for the environment is not necessarily 
widely supported, so an example is increasing taxes on fuel duty or 
petrol. We think that it is necessary to drive down carbon 
emissions and our supporters that are close to us think that it is 
necessary, but it is clear that the bulk of the British population at 
least wouldn't be supportive of that. But we still have to advocate 
that position.” 
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FoEE's members decide on the response to science in the form of 
positions, lobbying and campaign strategies. But their motive for action is 
based on science, rather than on individual member interest. Actions are 
not induced by members, as explained by a FoEE official (2011):  
“That’s not something which our members are … I mean… on 
the one hand [action against emissions] is what our members are 
telling us, but that follows from an analysis of the reality of the 
environment. Same if we look at biodiversity, same if we look at 
the impacts of farming, both in Europe and globally, same if we 
look at global consumptions and resources.”  
Research is carried out either by member groups or is commissioned 
together with other groups, since FoEE is not primarily a research group. 
The extent of in-house research also depends on the programme, for 
example the FoEE food and agriculture programme might undertake more 
of its own research (FoEE official 2011). In the context of climate, one of 
the most significant pieces of research over the last years is the study on 
the possibility of a 40 per cent reduction of emissions across Europe, 
released by Stockholm Environment Institute in partnership with FoEE 
(FoEE official 2011). FoEE has issued further publications on emissions 
reductions applying scientific and economic analysis, and proposing policies 
in order to meet climate change goals.131 
Despite FoE's (and FoEE's) hierarchical structure, FoEE conceives itself 
not as superordinate EU lobby office, but as the network hub of its 30 
member groups (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 3). Although FoEE has a 
scientific approach to position formation, stating that its “demands have 
always remained true to both science and justice” (2011, 3), it puts great 
emphasis on voicing local struggles and interprets its role as representing 
“European voices collected in member groups” (FoEE official 2011). Its task 
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 See for example 'The EU Emissions Trading System: failing to deliver 2010 (accessed 08/07/2012: 
http://foeeurope.org/climate/download/FoEE_ETS_Oct2010.pdf) 
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is to facilitate the dialogue between its member groups in order to engage 
in a more coherent approach with EU institutions and hence influence 
policy. It is the member groups that set the policy and strategy at headline 
level. Most of the main policy positions, the main directions within groups, 
come from demands of member groups or have been checked and agreed 
to by member groups (FoEE official 2011). For example, the FoEE strategy 
plan is agreed by member groups, five of whom also make up the board of 
FoEE (2011/12). However, the EU office plays a big role in having an 
overview of the situation in Europe, such as what issues are being lobbied 
on. FoEE is governed by a mixture of formal and informal decision-making. 
The formal Annual General Meetings, the decision-making body of FoEE, 
are attended by senior representatives from all member groups, where 
they take part in evaluation, planning and decision-making, and the 
election of the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee meets four 
times a year to take strategic decisions between Annual General Meetings 
and to oversee the implementation of the decisions made by the Annual 
General Meetings. The Executive Committee also appoints the FoEE 
director and delegates operational decision-making to her.132FoEE has core 
programmes set around issues such as climate justice and energy, each of 
which has a steering group with four or five group members who are 
actively working on it and who generate campaigns. Central Europe-wide 
campaigns are thus set at the EU level by FoEE and senior national 
representatives. The national groups work on the main issues affecting 
their own country and choose to participate in the European and 
international campaigns which are relevant to them. In turn, the local 
campaigners can work on local, national and international campaigns. 
Varying from campaign to campaign, FoEE will have conferences and most 
programmes have face-to face campaigner meetings with those working on 
an issue. At the campaigner meetings on climate at alternating locations, 
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for example, there are around 20 people from 10 or 15 member groups, if 
possible subsidised by FoEE (FoEE official 2011). 
The motive for these positions and campaigns, however, is scientific 
research done by FoEE itself or other bodies as well as FoEE office's 
experience with the Brussels political environment. Its ultimate concerns lie 
with the (ab)use of the environment and the affect it has on the people. 
“We fly the civil society flag in the European debate on resource use, 
addressing Europe’s overconsumption of natural resources by pushing for 
the robust measurement of Europe’s land, water, carbon and material use” 
(FoEE Annual Review 2011, 4). For FoEE, participatory democracy and other 
forms of participatory decision-making processes are the means by which 
to reach its “vision of a peaceful and sustainable world based on societies 
living in harmony with nature”.133 The FoEE grassroots strategy means that 
it looks for local solutions in response to global problems. For example, “by 
building a European-wide campaign for truly transformational change in 
Europe’s energy production and consumption, putting community and 
citizen-controlled renewable energy and energy efficiency projects at the 
core of reaching 100 per cent renewables” (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 15). 
FoEE’s acceptability dimension of representativeness is based on gyroscopic 
and surrogate representation, combined with participatory structures that 
facilitate local experience input and ‘how’ to realise local responses for the 
people, the planet and the future. 
Greenpeace EU 
“Greenpeace exists because this fragile Earth deserves a voice. It 
needs solutions. It needs change. It needs action. It needs YOU!”134 
Greenpeace's mission is to achieve peaceful confrontation to get attention 
for important environmental issues. This is achieved via three ways: 
research, direct action and global advocacy. For Greenpeace EU, research, 
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 Greenpeace EU website (accessed 18/09/2010: http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/en/about/). 
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raising awareness and influencing policy are the most important roles 
(Greenpeace EU official 2010). As staff remarks, if an environmental 
problem is detected (Greenpeace official 2010),  
“we first want to have sufficient scientific proof of the 
problems and know how the process works. Then we start 
dialogues with companies and governments. If this all doesn't 
deliver the results we want then we take action, confront 
companies that do not want to commit to solutions for the 
environment.”  
In the case of the emission reductions communication, its position 
was guided by scientific data and results of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), who defined the goal to limit global warming to 
below two degrees above pre-industrial level taken on by the EU as 
threshold.  
Greenpeace is clear about its gyroscopic and surrogate 
representation and does not claim to represent its member groups and 
supporters via democratic participation. It also has no official position as to 
what participation is. Instead, its position formation is grounded in 
scientific knowledge, expertise and common sense. As one interviewee 
states (Greenpeace EU official 2010):  
“I think overall the influence of all these sources 
[communication and participation channels for member groups 
and supporters] on the position of Greenpeace are not very 
relevant. Of course when it would be a clear indication that there is 
a big decline of supporters, because Greenpeace supports 30 per 
cent emission reductions instead of 20 per cent or 30 per cent 
instead of 50 per cent, if there would really be a clear indication, 
then of course it would have an impact. But generally speaking I 
think that our positions are formed, more shaped by contact with 
experts and professionals, research and science input, our 
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assessment of what is politically feasible and what not, then that 
our supporters have a direct say over our positions.” 
Science is not only the motive for action, but Greenpeace EU also 
considers science and professional knowledge crucial for its specific policy 
goals and suggested solutions. Greenpeace has a research unit in 
Amsterdam and a science unit at Exeter University to provide input. It also 
hires external consultants to do specific research, develop a specific policy 
mechanism or do legal analysis. Based on this research, Greenpeace EU 
forms its positions, which are discussed and sent round to member groups. 
The exact policy goal, in this case whether a Greenpeace group pushes for 
40 per cent such as in Germany or for 30 per cent such as in the EU, is 
discussed within the EU climate policy team and also with CAN-E at EU level 
(Greenpeace Germany official 2010).  
The interest of individual member groups or supporters is not the 
priority of Greenpeace in this context, although the support of 
Greenpeace’s global campaigns on the ground is of course essential for 
carrying out these campaigns. Greenpeace does not aim to represent 
member groups and supporters in a promissory sense, but it has set itself a 
global environmental mission, which people can choose to support. 
Supporters are there to support the cause if they share Greenpeace’ values 
and approach, but they are not there to formulate policies or decide on the 
pressing issues. The role supporters play in Greenpeace’s organisational 
structure reflects this gyroscopic and surrogate representation. They are an 
integral part of Greenpeace and have opportunities to co-decide on ‘how’ 
campaigns are run, but the positions are mainly formed based on science 
(Greenpeace EU official 2010): 
“We act on behalf of a planet in danger. Those that want to 
support us in the struggle can do that financially or volunteer. 
People who support financially can decide to withdraw their 
donations. This way they vote with their feet, they can decide not 
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to support us anymore. For those who have a very active role, who 
volunteer, have an educational role, or are an activist, they of 
course have the opportunity sometimes to think with the 
organisation how we should do certain campaigns but this is not 
[…]. And they in fact are also part of Greenpeace themselves; the 
volunteers do our actions abroad.”  
According to Greenpeace staff, decisions on policy positions happen 
in different formal/informal ways each time, it is “always a bit of an organic 
emerging process” (Greenpeace EU official 2010). The EU unit is governed 
by a General Assembly, which consists of the Executive Directors of 
Greenpeace EU's national offices, who take care of the annual planning. 
The members of its board are mainly elected from among the members of 
this General Assembly as well as a representative of Greenpeace 
International.135 
The position on the emission reductions communication was formed 
because “climate change is the biggest environmental problem of our time” 
(Greenpeace EU official 2010). It was informed by scientific research and 
agreed to by the network of Greenpeace groups to ensure internal support 
and coordinated with CAN-E coalition partners to increase its potential 
influence (Greenpeace EU official 2010):  
“Formally speaking, this unit signs off all positions of 
Greenpeace on EU issues. However, of course we need to have 
support on the position throughout the European and global 
organisation. At the same time, we are also a member of CAN-E, so 
we also have to coordinate our work with them. NGOs have 
relatively little financial resources compared to business lobbyists 
and compared to governments. So we need to also combine our 
forces to have an influence. So there are three things, the EU unit 
                                                      
135
 Greenpeace EU website (accessed 09/07/2012: http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-
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that formally signs off the procedures, then of course we need to 
find internally and externally adequate support for the position. 
Then of course the position has to be well informed. So what we do 
is we have our research unit in Amsterdam, a science unit in Exeter 
University in the UK, who provide us with input. And then we 
regularly hire external consultants to do specific research, develop 
a specific policy mechanism that we could apply, do a legal 
analysis of existing legislation. We meet to discuss the position and 
also send it round.” 
There is however no regulation as to how many people or groups 
have to support a position. The position formation is rather informal, and 
according to staff most of the time consensus or a compromise can be 
reached (Greenpeace EU official 2010),  
“[…] but in the end Greenpeace is a global organisation, not 
a horizontally structured organisation, so in the end if it would not 
be possible to agree on a position it would be on the high level 
where the decision would be made. Greenpeace International or 
here depending on what the situation is. [In ad-hoc situations you 
don't consult?] It depends. I think that formal procedures here do 
not always help a lot […].” 
Greenpeace EU, nevertheless, as well as other Greenpeace groups, 
has to adhere to the programme set at the international level, providing an 
international guideline and coherence of international action. Greenpeace 
International decides on country specific proposals and develops 
campaigns. The international programmes, set around specific topics and 
regions, decide on priorities and objectives and establish task blocks, which 
in turn are implemented by the EU and national offices. The decision-
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making structure of ‘Greenpeace as a whole’ follows ‘mutual consultation’ 
in order to achieve international coherence:136 
“All National/Regional Offices, as well as Greenpeace 
International, clearly articulate and regularly review their long-
term development plans to ensure programme and development 
coherence, realistic budgeting, and long-term financial self-
sufficiency. These development plans are drawn up and evaluated 
annually in mutual consultation.” 
The cooperation between EU level and national groups is increased, 
when the EU-office receives similar tasks to national offices at the 
international programme meetings. Prioritising issues is a 'complicated' 
process and the international programme is a kind of 'problem council' 
(Greenpeace EU official 2010), where groups present all kinds of positions, 
agree on the programme, which is then adapted by the directors of the 
organisations and by the Greenpeace council (made up of different 
representatives of boards of national organisations) (Greenpeace EU official 
2010).  
The formation of Greenpeace EU's specific position on the emission 
reductions communication involved all EU national offices and the 
Greenpeace EU climate and energy policy director. The latter for example 
worked closely with Greenpeace Germany's director for climate and energy 
campaigns on the policy, who also co-represents at the international 
climate conferences. The EU climate and energy policy director or the 
director of the EU-office also represent Greenpeace EU externally on this 
policy and report to the EU-office in meetings or emails.   
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Climate Action Network Europe 
The role of CAN-E is to carry out a formalised regional cooperation, 
collaboration and networking of “organisations brought together by a 
common concern” (CAN Charter, 5f). The coordinating role of CAN-E in the 
interest of the climate change cause is expressed by a CAN-E official (2010): 
“we represent our members which are united in the cause over climate 
change, so we also represent the cause through our members.” 
CAN-E members have administrative independence and pursue their 
own mandates, organisational aims and objectives,137 but there has to be a 
participatory, accountable and transparent decision-making, enshrined in 
the CAN code of conduct, which CAN-E has to follow (CAN Charter, 28). 
What unites CAN-E members is their advocacy in the interest of 'a healthy 
environment' (gyroscopic and surrogate representation) and a consistent 
vision. CAN-E’s surrogate representation is made explicit in CAN 
International’s statement that CAN member groups “place a high priority” 
on development that  
“meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland 
Commission). CAN's vision is to protect the atmosphere while 
allowing for sustainable and equitable development worldwide”.138 
“CAN-E works to prevent dangerous climate change and promote 
sustainable energy and environment policy in Europe. [The 
worldwide network…] CAN is based on trust, openness and 
democracy. […] CAN's mission is to support and empower civil 
society organisations to influence the design and development of 
an effective global strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
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 CAN International Facebook page (accessed 20/07/2012: 
https://www.Facebook.com/CANInternational/info). See also CAN Charter, 6. 
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and ensure its implementation at international, national and local 
levels in the promotion of equity and sustainable development”.139 
Member groups agree to the broader strategic and political goals as 
well as annual work plans at the general assembly in Brussels, whilst 
specific policy recommendations are on-going throughout the year. CAN-
Europe has a Board of Directors, which is appointed by its general 
assembly.140 The office prepares a work plan which then gets signed off by 
the general assembly and the board, but “there is some leeway” (CAN-E 
official 2010). But the bigger strategies get signed off by the network. 
Moving to a 30 per cent production goal had to be signed off by the 
network. The general assembly looks back on what CAN-E has done, and 
CAN-E informs about the work plan, which members can also influence and 
feedback on, suggests themes and seeks agreement of member groups 
(CAN-E and DNR officials 2010). Member groups form the strategy of CAN-
E's work, “they are the backbone of what we do, we do not exist without 
our members, they are behind everything we more or less do” (CAN-E 
official 2010). Depending on the issues, either CAN-E or member groups 
will work on the policies on which they have expertise. CAN-E for example 
works on the Emissions Trading Scheme or on policies which are within the 
framework of its general policy goals. On highly technical issues CAN-E does 
not have any experts in its office, it asks experts from amongst member 
groups to work on that. Renewable energy is not something the CAN-E 
office really focuses on for example, but within Greenpeace or FoE there 
are experts, the same holds for forestry and land use change. CAN-E staff 
working on a policy represents CAN-E’s position in meetings, but also 
member groups may represent a position. Meetings are reported back via 
email. 
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However, if there is a new communication by the Commission or a 
new policy proposal coming out which is on an issue area CAN-E already 
focuses on, then there is no need for CAN-E to agree on the proposal 
formally. Generally, CAN-E forms joint positions with its member groups 
before it interacts, but in many cases CAN-E already has an agreed position 
and so the office can move forward without the need to double-check. In 
ad-hoc cases, CAN-E will interact with members as long as time and 
resource allow.  
Generally, any new position is sent through the mailing list on which 
member groups have a week to give feedback and comment. The position 
is then finalised or becomes a strategic paper. A CAN-E official comments 
on the issue of conflicts that (2010): 
“it rarely happens. So if we have dissenting opinions then we 
don't have a position on that. On this policy [emission reductions] 
there was no problem. It actually almost never happened that we 
have issues.”  
CAN-E formed its position on emission reductions through gyroscopic 
and surrogate representation based on science, principles and common 
sense. CAN-E, together with Greenpeace and WWF, engaged the Öko-
Institut and the Institute for European Environmental Policy to explore the 
different options for the EU member states to contribute to a 30 per cent 
carbon target in-depth. Based on this analysis, CAN-E, Greenpeace and 
WWF summarised policy suggestions in a report. CAN-E’s policy goal of the 
emission reductions communication changed around 2007/08, when a new 
ICCP report came out. The new findings made CAN-E change their 30 per 
cent goal to 40 per cent by 2020. The move was mainly due to scientific 
elements in the ICCP report so as to be consistent with avoiding dangerous 
climate change; however there was in addition strategic reasoning. CAN-E 
and its member groups wanted to take the lead on the 40 per cent target 
with the European Union and there was the thought that asking for more 
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might help to raise the middle ground (CAN-E official 2010). Those 
members with the interest to get involved were involved in shaping the 
policy, and, according to one interviewee, there is consensus on the 
emission reductions communication (WEED official 2010).  
Some of CAN-E’s member groups, such as Greenpeace EU, WWF-EPO 
and FoEE, also act with the Commission and the Parliament individually. 
These groups and CAN-E however, try to find a joint position, a joint 
outreach. Although CAN-E works with all its member groups, the core 
groups involved in the emission reductions communication are Greenpeace 
EU, FoEE, WWF-EPO, Oxfam International, Aprodev, Heal and Sandbag. 
Most of these are members or associated members.  
Represented	by	EU	environmental	groups:	The	acceptance	
dimension	
Representation is more than ‘standing in for’. Whom or what a group 
represents is reflected in ‘who it is’ (WWF-EPO official 2010). What a 
group’s philosophy is, its mission, its organisational credibility, reputation 
and expertise, who it speaks on behalf of, what type of group it is, its 
structures (statutes), its constituency is and its historical record. These 
factors are also the basis of choice for member groups and individual 
supporters when they decide which group or campaign to support. It is 
what motivates members and supporters to join or support a group. ‘Who 
a groups is’ or a group’s image also constructs the expectations of member 
groups and supporters. Whether a group is representative rests not only on 
how positions are formed and whether there is a considerable degree of 
participation (acceptability dimension), but also on whether members and 
supporters accept the advocacy group as representative (acceptance 
dimension). 
Important for the acceptance dimension is that member groups and 
individual supporters who sign up to a group understand how the group or 
campaign they support interprets “participation” and what channels of 
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inclusion are available. Organisational structure and strategies matter and 
environmental groups come in various types and employ a variety of 
different strategies (environmental group officials 2010/11; see Pickerill 
2003, 47 for an overview of the literature). Environmental groups tend to 
follow gyroscopic and surrogate representation because of the nature of 
their issue, described as “objective-driven nature of green thinking” 
(Dobson 2000, 122). Supporters thus will be inclined to support these types 
of environmental groups, because they have a similar ‘green thinking’.  
This study thus suggests that representativeness is made up of two 
dimensions. The traditional assumption of representativeness is however 
concerned only with the first dimension, neglecting that ‘representative 
claims’ (Saward 2006) do not only have to be acceptable because of the 
position formation process (acceptability dimension), but they also have to 
be accepted as representing their interests by the members and supporters 
(acceptance dimension)(based on the definition of government legitimacy 
drawing on Kielmansegg 1971, 368; in Dingwerth 2007, 14). Acceptance 
requires no participation in the position formation. Although in promissory 
position formation voting is the main act of acceptance, acceptance can be 
expressed in a variety of ways. 
Judging the representativeness of a group is predicated on what a 
group bases its position formation on (organisational strategies and 
structures), which in turn affects the indicators by which the acceptance 
dimension can be judged. In the case of gyroscopic and surrogate 
representation, the acceptance dimension is separate from the 
acceptability dimension, and is all the more crucial for the judgement of 
representativeness, precisely because the support by members and 
supporters has not been expressed during the formation and vote of the 
position.  
Acceptance can be directed at a group and its missions and visions in 
general or at specific policy positions and campaigns. The number and 
amount of regular subscriptions to a group, number of volunteers, amount 
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of donations, number of ‘Facebook likes’ and Twitter followers, for 
example, indicate the general acceptance of the group’s principles and 
positions. Specific support can be expressed by signing offline and online 
petitions and campaigns, volunteering for specific issues, giving project-
specific donations, taking campaign action such as writing to or ringing 
MPs, liking and sharing Facebook events and campaigns or tweeting about 
campaigns and positions. 
The support by constituencies, or their acceptance of a group as well 
as its positions, is based on trust, organisational credibility, and reputation. 
Professionalism in this context is crucial in particular for gyroscopic, but 
also surrogate groups, because they represent claims that are rooted in 
expertise as well as empathy, which requires a professional understanding 
of the beneficiaries. 
Marketing requires professionalism, but a group also has to 
understand the limits of media professionalisation (Frantz 2007). Groups 
have to be true to their mission and responsive to the views of civil society, 
or their credibility and reputation suffer. This vulnerability to threats to 
reputation serves as powerful control mechanism to keep [groups] honest” 
(Risse 2006, 190). Professionalism thus has to be accompanied by 
responsibility or accountability, in order to retain trust (CPRE official 2011). 
By member groups 
In umbrella networks, such as CAN-E, the expectations of member 
groups are different to EU groups that have members belonging to the 
same global organisation, such as Greenpeace. CAN-E member groups look 
to it for coordination, information and outreach and choose to get actively 
engaged when a policy is of core interest or they have experience and data 
to feed into a common position. Greenpeace has global positions and 
campaigns by default. National and local policies and campaigns are always 
in line with the broader policy strategy. FoEE tackles global problems with a 
grassroots structure promoting local solutions. 
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Friends of the Earth Europe 
FoEE is a large, popular international environmental group with at 
least 700 staff and numerous volunteers in national offices and at local 
level across Europe (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 13). Its popularity amongst 
the general public, its perception as an internationally active group with a 
global vision and mission staying close to the grassroots are sources of trust 
and hence acceptance of the representativeness of FoEE's cause by 
European member groups, supporters and the public. It is also, what 
member groups and supporters will expect of FoEE. 
FoEE perceives its role as both, a campaigning group as well as 
lobbying group. In that respect, FoEE helps to coordinate EU-wide 
campaigns as well as lobby EU-decision-makers on policies relevant to the 
group's core issues.  
“We support our network of member groups with 
representation, advice and coordination in European and EU policy 
making, and by sharing knowledge, skills, tools and resources. We 
enable people to participate in international campaigns through 
local activist groups and national organisations in 30 European 
countries”.141 
FoEE has 30 member groups within Europe.142 Member groups send 
their senior representative to FoEE Annual General Meetings in order to 
participate in the decision-making of FoEE, but the individual policy officers 
engaged in specific policy issues are not necessarily in contact with FoEE 
policy officers (BUND official 2010). In the BUND for example it is the 
director who is responsible for the coordination with FoEE, who also sits on 
the board of FoE International (BUND official 2010). But even if not 
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Ukraine (FoEE official 2010). 
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involved with FoEE directly, BUND policy staffs are aware of what FoEE 
stands for and what interests it represents (BUND official 2010):  
“We are the active partner of Friends of the Earth in 
Germany. It is in this spirit that we are active. We are active for the 
preservation of our beautiful earth.”  
Thus same vision and values, as well as thematic focus, create trust in 
member groups that FoEE represents their views.  
FoEE is a special case, because it is an international advocacy group 
with a global brand name, but at the same time it emphasises its grassroots 
structure and decentralisation. Its member groups are autonomous and 
many of them were established before joining FoEE. They thus are very 
diverse member groups, although all have similar grassroots values. Most 
FoEE member groups became a member to have European representation 
and to be part of a like-minded European network. Beyond vision and 
values, the German member BUND and FoE England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland (EWNI) for example also share its visions of organisational 
structures and strategies to pursue these values with FoE. Similar to FoEE’s 
claim, the BUND has a grassroots structure. It was set up in 1975 as an 
association of numerous citizens initiatives rooted in the anti-nuclear 
movement and has a federal structure, with 2000 regional and local groups 
across the Bundesländer and 480,000 individual members and supporters. 
BUND is thus seen as the service provider, who facilitates the cooperation 
of bottom-up initiatives by its subnational member groups and volunteers. 
Positions can evolve top-down or bottom-up, but never against the 
member groups’ interest. The BUND gives autonomy to its federal member 
groups, who are run by volunteers. Coherence is provided through the 
same values and guidelines that have been set up over the years of working 
together, and through good communication that enables the understanding 
of each other’s work. Still, BUND is active for a cause which is in the 
interest of its members and technical issues are decided at national level by 
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BUND’s scientific advisory council. FoE-EWNI, founded in 1971, also defines 
itself as a grassroots organisation and its local groups are largely 
autonomous, but most work on at least some national campaigns, such as 
climate change. Still, unlike BUND, EWNI is seen as the national central 
body by the more than 200 local groups, which makes it easier for the 
national office to encourage local engagement in EU-wide campaigns (FoEE 
official 2011).143 
Thus the reason national groups become members of FoEE is very 
much that they share the 'vision for social and environmental justice' (FoEE 
Annual Review 2011, 13). Member groups carry out their own independent 
campaigns, but join at least some of the international and EU-wide 
campaigns set at FoEI or FoEE level relevant to their national and local 
activities. On climate, FoEE member groups support the 'vision of 
community energy' in order to reach 100 per cent renewable energy. The 
FoEE strategy to make this vision work is by massively increasing the share 
of community and citizen-owned renewable energy and energy efficiency 
projects. Member groups work closely on this strategy in the form of 
‘affinity groups’ to discuss problems and support each other in promoting 
the campaign and mobilizing people. 'Strengthening the network' of FoEE, 
national and local groups and individual supporters is the premise on which 
the vision is built (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 7). The engagement of local 
groups and supporters is thus the key of the strategy, creating a strong 
sense of vision, direction and community amongst member groups, but 
also amongst local groups and individual supporters. Carrying out Europe-
wide campaigns such as 'the big ask' campaign for example help groups to 
identify with the network, because national members and their local 
member groups, who focus on local priorities, are tied into the broader 
mission and visions (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 13). This, through the 
experience of actively supporting the same visions and campaigns, creates 
a more defined basis of acceptance of FoEE's representativeness. 
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Member group fees and member project contributions are often a 
channel of acceptance; however in FoEE they only account for eight per 
cent of FoEE's income and hence are not a significant indicator of 
acceptance amongst FoEE member groups. The largest part of the income 
is from foundations (43 per cent) followed by EU operational grants (30 per 
cent) (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 14). 
Greenpeace EU 
Greenpeace staff interviewed, both at EU or national level, generally 
speak of ‘Greenpeace’ meaning the whole organisation as such. This 
reflects the approach of being ‘one’ global organisation, with one global 
strategy. Interviewees were aware of each other’s work, use of advocacy 
tools and surveys that had been carried out. Groups seem well connected 
and conceive each other and each other’s work under one coordinated 
objective. This is extremely relevant for the acceptance dimension, as it 
expresses the acceptance national member groups have for Greenpeace 
EU’s advocacy. There is awareness and clarity about what each level does, 
and this forms the basis for support for the general, but also policy specific, 
advocacy and campaigning.  
Greenpeace International’s campaign focus is centring on a variety of 
issues, including the halting of climate change, which in turn impacts a 
number of other issue foci, such as the defence of the oceans, and the 
encouraging of sustainable trade and agriculture. The issue areas are the 
same for Greenpeace offices around the world, including Europe, and 
campaigns tend to be global or are connected to global issues, giving 
Greenpeace a coherent image on what it stands for to member groups and 
supporters independent of their location. 
Greenpeace EU includes over 40 national offices and spends most of 
its time communicating with its member groups. Greenpeace member 
groups fund Greenpeace International by about 97 per cent (Greenpeace 
International Annual Report 2010) and that money also funds Greenpeace 
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EU. The national groups' income in turn comes mainly from individual 
supporters and donations. Greenpeace EU thus is accountable to 
Greenpeace International. Nevertheless, it works in close cooperation and 
is responsive to Greenpeace national offices. Important channels that 
enable responsiveness in the EU are the EU issue groups, in which the 
respective policy directors of the EU office and national offices work closely 
together on issue-specific policies and campaigns. The intense exchange 
enables trust and support based on expertise and common positions. There 
is a strong “we”-feeling towards the activities to influence EU policy and 
achievements at EU level (interview Greenpeace Germany). As a 
Greenpeace Germany official expresses (2010): “The EU office functions 
best and very good.”  
The exchange and contact has continuously grown closer over the last 
years, partly because the increased number of lobbyists in Brussels has 
made it more difficult for individual groups to have an impact on policies. 
The other reason is that EU climate politics increasingly determines 
national politics (Greenpeace Germany official 2010). Member groups are 
thus aware of and appreciate the importance of the EU offices work and 
their coordinated action. There are no differences in opinion within 
Greenpeace according to one interviewee at a national member group 
(Greenpeace Germany official 2010). Being used to work together with 
Greenpeace EU and in coalitions on climate policy generates trust amongst 
member groups. This trust is further based on the credibility created by 
learning the expertise Greenpeace EU and member groups have to offer, 
their strategic connections to other stakeholders, and access to policy 
makers Greenpeace EU provides. This includes the collaboration with CAN-
E, the closest partner Greenpeace works with at EU level. Also national 
offices have an exchange of information with CAN-E and at times member 
groups have particular common campaigns on the same content 
(Greenpeace Germany official 2010). The long established expert 
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relationships in coalitions create member group trust and credibility in 
Greenpeace EU’s work (Greenpeace EU official 2010):  
“because they are networks we used to work with, that we 
trust, that have expertise, that have a good connection, gives us 
access to policy makers, significant amount of support and 
credibility that helps to increase political pressure.” 
Climate Action Network Europe 
The acceptance dimension in CAN-E is partly expressed by the 
number of member groups, who have the choice of being members of the 
umbrella and agreeing with CAN-E acting in their name.  
CAN-E is united in its shared vision; and remaining true to its vision, 
mission and objectives is one of the commitments CAN-E as well as its 
member groups had to enter as part of CAN International (CAN Charter, 8, 
28). This commitment is fundamental for the trust of member groups as 
well as individual supporters of member groups in CAN-E’s position 
formation and activities. CAN-E is based on principles of accountability to 
its members and on transparency. Rules and codes of conduct and CAN-E’s 
statements should not be in conflict with the provisions of the CAN Charter 
or in contradiction with CAN International statements (CAN Charter, 25f).  
Sharing the same vision does not mean member groups are all the 
same. In fact CAN-E’s member groups are very diverse, ranging from 
network of their own such as Heal or Aprodev over international advocacy 
groups such as Greenpeace or WWF to small niche-experts such as 
Sandbag. CAN-E also works with other organisations around issues of 
mutual concern, such as with the European Climate Foundation (one of the 
funders), the Centre for Clean Air Policy, Client Earth and the Climate 
Group. In addition, member groups from the same country work together 
on national advocacy on emission reductions, which in turn strengthens the 
network as well as mutual understanding. It is the climate change cause 
that is a common denominator for all (CAN-E official 2010). As one 
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interviewee explains, the 150 groups all look at this same policy goal from a 
different angle. There are development groups who focus more on the 
adaptation towards the negative consequences of climate change, 
organisations that focus more on the renewable aspect, groups that focus 
more on green jobs, and again others that are focussed on really strong 
targets. But reducing the emissions is the common denominator (CAN-E 
official 2010). And this is what member groups consider to be the strength 
of CAN-E and which is their reason to join. The broad spectrum of expertise 
and studies commissioned on specialised knowledge and shared within the 
network is very much appreciated by member groups (WEED, Greenpeace 
Germany and Sandbag officials 2010). 
The scientific consensus, or what groups understand the scientific 
consensus to be, dictates what the threats are, what the scale of action 
needed is and the pace. Member groups sharing the same vision means 
they also rely on scientific data, experience and common sense of their 
leadership when it comes to position formation in the interest of the 
environment and the people. For the specific policy goal scientific studies 
or international treaties were crucial indicators also for member groups 
(WEED, Greenpeace, Germanwatch, DNR, CPRE and Sandbag officials 
2010). Reasons for member groups to support the CAN-E position are 
climate security, energy security in the EU and the moral credibility of the 
EU beyond the field of climate change. Germanwatch, co-founder of CAN-E, 
is a close co-operating partner on the emission reductions policy, also 
because German corporations play a destructive role with regards to the 
policy goals. It is very active on this policy, because  
“the EU target breaches the central article two in the UN 
climate convention and is not consistent with the two degree limit. 
It is important the the EU sets itself a high target and it is also in 
the economic interest” (Germanwatch official 2010).  
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CPRE staff remark that the reason CPRE got active on the emissions 
issue is that “carbon emissions are probably the largest long-term threat to 
the countryside” (CPRE official 2011). Thus groups prioritise scientific and 
common sense reasons rather than member and supporter representation 
in their line of argument why acting is important and why they support 
CAN-E. In this vein CAN-E’s work is also supported by the less or hardly 
active member groups. As one member group official states (WEED official 
2010):  
“CAN-E‘s work, though not WEED’s core issue at the moment, 
is in our interest, otherwise we would not be a member. Conflicts 
are less about fundamental questions, but about ‘how’ we do 
something. […] Do we have a conference, a demonstration, or not. 
Finding a consensus works in 90 per cent of the cases. If there is no 
consensus, only a subset goes along. That is the advantage of a 
network.”  
Information and transparency are key elements in facilitating support 
and they are considered as such by CAN-E: “CAN-Europe has more than 150 
member organisations in 27 European countries. The wider and better 
informed group we are, the stronger our voice!”144 Groups make up their 
opinion about CAN-E through direct and media reporting on CAN-E’s 
activities and choose to join or continue to support the group. Therefore, 
communicating with reporters is an activity CAN-E invests a lot of time in. 
The large increase of membership since 2009 (Copenhagen run-up and 
after) (CAN-E Report 2010, 6) reflects an acceptance by groups of CAN-E’s 
widely publicised activities in response to political events.  
“In 2009, climate change also saw an unprecedented amount 
of public interest. This time in the spotlight allowed CAN Europe to 
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 CAN-E website (accessed 08/07/2012: http://www.caneurope.org/about-us/membership). 
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raise its public profile, increase media presence and increase 
membership by seven groups” (CAN-E Report 2010, 3).  
According to its own reporting, the strength of the network and trust 
amongst groups has grown since (CAN-E Report 2010, 11):  
“As lobbying activities reached a near-frenzied peak before 
Copenhagen in December, our network frequently pulled together 
to create common positions, which meant we all became more 
comfortable working together. Ties between network members are 
now the strongest they have ever been, giving us a sound base for 
our joint work in 2010. This includes contributing to EU climate 
legislative processes, such as the communication on a -30 per cent 
reduction target, working with Connie Hedegaard, the 
Commissioner of the European Commission’s newly-created 
Directorate General for Climate [...].”  
A number of member groups interviewed view CAN-E as one of the 
central actors in EU lobbying on the emission reductions issue (Greenpeace 
and DNR officials). Staff interviewed felt that the activities with regards to 
the policy raised the profile in the eyes of the constituency: “These are our 
members; sure that is what we are supposed to do. If we do our work well 
and we have some results, we get feedback from them” (CAN-E official 
2010). Trust in and satisfaction with the representativeness of CAN-E as 
well as its professional representation was also expressed by member 
groups. A Germanwatch official for example comments (2010): “yes, they 
also have their resource problems and restricted capacities, but I think they 
do a good job.” The appreciation by the broader constituency, such as 
citizens on a whole and also by other stakeholders, depends and is more 
difficult to determine. Some of the work CAN-E does is not appreciated by 
the business community for example (CAN-E official 2010). CAN-E helps 
member groups with information about Brussels politics, such as when 
there is a need for member groups to participate in Commission 
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consultations individually. This knowledge and the fact that almost all staff 
have general advocacy group and/or civil society experience at local, 
national and EU level, including member groups (CAN-E official 2010), are 
additional factors enhancing trust.  
Only 4.45 per cent of CAN-E’s budget comes from membership fees 
and contributions. 145  Financial contributions thus are not a voice of 
acceptance for CAN-E member groups. By far the largest contribution to the 
budget comes from philanthropic foundations (about 55 per cent) and 
about 28 per cent of the funding share from the European Commission.146  
By member groups’ members and individual supporters 
The case studies find that it depends on organisational structures and 
strategies (including issues) what indicators are adequate to judge 
representativeness or rather the acceptance dimension.  
For example, whilst any Greenpeace supporter knows that s/he is 
part of a global advocacy groups and is hence clear about what Greenpeace 
EU is active for, for EU umbrella groups such as CAN-E, the breadth or 
narrowness of the cause it represents is a consideration. If an EU umbrella 
represents a single cause, individuals, even if unaware of the membership 
and EU activities of the national groups they are supporting, are still bound 
to be in line with the values represented. The individual supporter is clear 
about what exactly a group is supporting and what issues and positions the 
group will thus represent at EU level. Crucially, groups can likewise be 
clearer about their supportership, their character and their views 
enhancing the ease of responsiveness. If the EU umbrella on the other 
hand represents a general cause, then it is important that individual 
supporters know the EU activities and positions their group is engaging in.  
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 CAN-E Website (accessed 02/07/2012: http://www.climnet.org/about-us/caneuropesfundings). 
146
 CAN-E Website (accessed 02/07/2012: http://www.climnet.org/about-us/caneuropesfundings). 
Main sources of funding in 2009: 46.4 per cent by foundations, 32,7 per cent by European 
Commission (CAN-E report 2010, 8). 
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In umbrella networks, such as CAN-E, the expectations of member 
groups are very different to those EU groups that have members belonging 
to the same organisation, such as Greenpeace. CAN-E member groups look 
to it for coordination, information and outreach and choose to get actively 
engaged when a policy is of core interest or they have experience and data 
to feed into a common position. Only a number of groups of the large 
network work together at any point in time on specific policies. They 
moreover exchange tactics and advocacy repertoires ranging from simple 
feedback on the technicalities of online petitions to the efficiency poll 
software. Greenpeace on the other hand has global positions and 
campaigns. National and local policies and campaigns are in line with the 
broader policy. CAN-E is thus representative of its policies and the groups 
supporting the individual policies. Greenpeace EU’s positions on the other 
hand are representative of the entire Greenpeace network, as they are all 
aligned through the Greenpeace International and the global strategy.  
Friends of the Earth Europe 
Similar to member groups, FoEE supporters in the UK, Germany and 
across the globe are aware that they are supporting not only a European, 
but a global federation spanning over 70 countries that has been around 
for over forty years. FoEl's earliest national group dates back to 1909 (FoEE 
Annual Review 2011, 13). This long time of taking actions and gaining 
experience “provides a backdrop of credibility and confidence with which 
we continue to address the social and environmental challenges facing our 
planet” (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 3). FoEE's and FoE's experience as a 
whole has created a credibility and a certain image of what they stand for. 
Supporters know whom they support, and FoEE in turn has to make sure it 
stays credible to the mission supporters lend their help or voice to. It is 
global values that national groups and individual supporters sign up to and 
get active for with Friends of the Earth. For example FoE-EWNI stand for  
“A beautiful world: We depend on the planet, so let's keep it in good 
shape. A good life: A healthy planet is one that works for people too. A 
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positive relationship with the environment: Acting together for the planet 
and everyone who lives on it.”147  
The reference is clearly to the earth as a whole, understanding that 
each individual is part of the bigger environment, for which FoEE stand. 
This also comes across on national groups’ new media channels of 
communication with supporters and the public. FoE-EWNI’s Facebook page, 
with its 8,458 likes and 823 shares since it joined Facebook in April 2010, 
states in its slogan that it is striving to “making life better for people by 
encouraging solutions to environmental problems”. This is not only a 
general, global aim, but it is also one that is following a gyroscopic 
representation that people express their support with. In the case of the 
FoEE the acceptance dimension can be judged based on the number of 
supporters within Europe, because there is a sense of belonging and 
support for the same European or rather international vision and mission. 
FoEE describes itself as a bottom-up grassroots group, or as described 
by interviewees as an equal ‘group of like-minded’ with strong links to 
member groups (FoEE, FoE-EWNI and BUND officials 2010/11). The image 
of an EU grassroots group means that FoEE member groups and their 
members and supporters in turn might expect opportunities of 
participation as well as being kept up to date on policies. FoEE thus has to 
live up to its grassroots claim in its organisational strategies and structures 
in order to be accepted as representative by its member groups. At the 
same time, its gyroscopic representation means that positions are in the 
interest of the environment. Sometimes, the interests of the environment 
can be in contrast with the public’s views or even the supporters. In such 
cases, FoE groups will debate the issue with their supporters based on 
scientific reasoning (FoE-EWNI official 2011):  
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 Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland website (accessed 05/07/2012: 
http://www.foe.co.uk/what_we_do/about_us/friends_earth_values_beliefs.html).  
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“So, for example, if we are researching just how much carbon 
the UK can release to keep within its fair share of a global carbon 
budget to prevent plus 1.5 degree rising global temperatures, that 
would lead to the need for very stringent reductions indeed in the 
UK and for us to consider options that we would perhaps not 
necessarily like to consider. For example nuclear power. We would 
need to carry out that research and have that debate with our 
supporters before we then change our public position.”  
But grassroots for national FoE groups in particular means that their 
(local) member groups are independent groups of local activists who 
choose to act as members of FoE. Their acceptance of FoE’s global values is 
through their choice to be active in the name of FoE. As one FoE-EWNI 
official explains (2011): 
“These are people who are first and foremost activists 
working in partnership with us. They do not do fundraising for us 
for example. They do not have that purpose. They have a choice of 
what they want to work on. We do not tell them what to work on, 
but they choose to work with us in partnership.” 
One way to keep a close connection with the grassroots is through 
continuous information and updates on FoEE's work and positions on 
current environmental issues. For that matter FoEE produces a number of 
publications with background information to the various issues it is active 
on (also mentioned in the annual review 2011). These are available for free 
online or in print and range from simple information sheets to more in-
depth analysis and policy suggestions, offering a choice how and to which 
degree supporters like to stay informed. 
Information about FoEE’s activities and participation opportunities 
are also transmitted through the national member groups, through 
personal contact, TV, radio, print, websites and social media such as 
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Twitter.148 The degree of communication depends on the organisational 
structure of the national groups as well as on national media reporting. The 
UK for instance has some very visible stories on Europe, such as on 'the big 
ask campaign', which is a Europe-wide campaign asking for a 40 per cent 
reduction of emissions not only in Brussels but also the national level. In 
Germany on the other hand, 'the big ask' campaign has not been very 
actively run across the country, since it has been more difficult for FoEE to 
direct the information down to a more local level. This has partly to do with 
the bottom-up structure of the BUND, where information runs from the 
local to the national level and local groups see the national office as a 
service office rather than taking a lead from it, as is the case with Foe-EWNI 
(FoEE official 2011). Still, local groups in Germany carried out their own 
political activities in support of the common move towards renewable 
energies and emission reductions which are related to the big ask 
campaign, such as halting the construction of two new coal power 
plants.149 And of course the internet makes information available to those 
interested. 'The big ask' campaign has its own website, where anyone can 
get details about the aims and objectives of the campaign, political 
demands and activities and achievements by national groups as well as 
read the scientific study or its summary.150 
FoEE's 30 national member groups “represent more than 2,500 local 
groups all over Europe” (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 13), who are supported 
by individuals as volunteers or financially. Supporters thus show their 
acceptance of FoE and thus FoEE values and campaigns through regular 
subscriptions, donations, volunteering and other means. With the choice 
individuals make in how to express their support, they also decide on the 
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 See for example FoE-ENWI (accessed 20/09/2012: 
http://www.foe.co.uk/what_we_do/about_us/friends_earth_news.html). 
149
 The Big Ask (accessed 12/07/2012: 
http://www.thebigask.eu/The%20Big%20Ask%20in%20your%20country/overview-of-progress-
towards-climate-laws-1.html).  
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 The Big Ask (accessed 12/07/2012: http://www.thebigask.eu).  
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degree to which they wish to be involved in FoE groups (FoE-EWNI official 
2011):  
“Our local group supporters [activists] do not have to pay us 
any money. Our local group supporters are much closer to us and 
we work much more closely with them in terms of developing 
strategy. Individual group supporters [subscribers] are people who 
pay us a small amount of money each month by direct debit or 
bank transfer. Our individual supporters who we are trying to build 
a better relationship with tend to be people who support what we 
are doing, are very time-limited and therefore they are happy to 
give us money to do the job for them. Of course if we do not do the 
right job, they can cancel their membership.” 
The national member groups, such as FoE-EWNI (71.4 per cent in 
2011 and 96 per cent in 2010)151 and the German BUND (70.5 per cent: 
34.2 per cent membership fees and 36.3 per cent donations in 2011),152 are 
mainly financed by individual supporters and donations. In particular, the 
share of individual supporters indicates their acceptance of the national 
groups’ representativeness. That includes their activities at the EU level or 
rather FoEE's activities at the EU level in so far as they are aware of 
activities and/or these are taken in the spirit of FoE, thus in line with the 
shared visions of social and environmental justice.  
Acceptance is also expressed by the number of volunteers, since it is 
these who carry out the core political and conservation work at the local 
level. Because member groups such as the BUND are based on volunteers, 
they also have to be responsive to citizen interests.  
“Groups work together with social and environmental 
movements to inspire and mobilise citizens to act, and in the past 
two years we have empowered more than 1,000,000 people to 
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 Friends of the Earth Limited Annual Accounts (2010-2011:11). 
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 BUND website (accessed 17/07/2012: http://www.bund.net/ueber_uns/finanzen/einnahmen/).  
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take action, both online and on the streets” (FoEE Annual Review 
2011, 13).  
The BUND for example cooperates politically with local citizen 
initiatives and sees their 'representation' as part of its role. This close 
cooperation in turn provides a basis for supporters' and the public's 
acceptance not only of the BUND, but also of FoEE and FoE as a whole. 
FoEE and its member groups, through a number of activities aiming to 
'strengthening the network', also get in contact with local people who are 
not members or supporters of FoE. The Young Friends of the Earth Europe 
group for example ran a summer camp where they, amongst other issues, 
learned about climate effects by the local residents and their first-hand 
experiences (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 7). 
A further way of expressing acceptance of FoE groups’ positions and 
thus their representativeness is through signing petitions. FoEE member 
groups for example collected 635,000 signatures demanding a phase-out of 
nuclear power across Europe (FoEE Annual review 2011, 5). 
Additionally, in order to be responsive and enable the acceptance of 
its campaigns and thus its representativeness also by its constituency 
beyond the national member groups, FoEE either undertakes or 
commissions surveys. To understand which issues are important to its 
constituents in the field of climate change, FoEE and a coalition of national 
member groups, for example, initiated a survey on fuel efficiency labelling 
conducted in the UK, Germany and four other countries. 
Greenpeace EU 
It is clear to any individual supporter of Greenpeace that they are 
part of a global network. Greenpeace describes itself on Twitter as “an 
independent global campaigning organisation acting to change attitudes 
and behavior, to protect the environment and promote peace” 
(independent referring to independent from politics, political parties and 
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industry according to Greenpeace Germany).153 This sense of belonging to a 
global group transcends also when looking at Facebook. The ‘about’ section 
on the site makes clear that all groups are part of Greenpeace International 
or rather of one “Greenpeace” network facilitated by the international 
office. This is the same for national Facebook sites. The Greenpeace UK 
Facebook site says:154 
“[it is about] positive change through action. Defending the natural 
world and promote peace. We campaign to prevent climate change, to 
protect oceans and ancient forests, to eliminate toxic chemicals, to stop the 
release of genetically modified organisms into nature, and for nuclear 
disarmament and an end to nuclear contamination.”  
This is the same global message as any Greenpeace group puts out to 
its supporters and the public. In the case of Greenpeace EU the acceptance 
dimension can thus be judged based on the number of supporters within 
Europe, since members and supporters have a sense of belonging to a 
global group with a global mission and strategy. Greenpeace EU supporters 
understand that they belong to a group that is active EU-wide and globally. 
Individual Greenpeace supporters, who are affiliated with 
Greenpeace International by donations or national and subnational groups 
by subscriptions and volunteering rather than Greenpeace EU, which has 
no individual supporters, would not expect to be involved in shaping the 
emission reductions policy. In fact, the link on the Greenpeace EU website 
to ‘support’ the group links to donations for Greenpeace as such 
(Greenpeace International). Supporters know Greenpeace’s decision-
making structure, making it clear to them what role they play or do not play 
in decision-making and position formation. This is also reflected in the fact 
that Greenpeace EU staff has a positive sense that activities towards this 
policy raised the profile of Greenpeace EU in the eyes of its member groups 
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 Greenpeace Twitter page (accessed 20/07/2012: http://twitter.com/Greenpeace). 
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 Greenpeace UK Facebook (accessed 20/07/2012: http://www.facebook.com/greenpeaceuk/info).  
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and supporters, despite the fact that they did not have an impact on the 
position directly (Greenpeace EU official 2010). 
Acceptance is shown through the expression of support. There are a 
number of alternative ways for individual supporters and volunteers to 
participate and express support for Greenpeace. One obvious way to 
express general support is financially, whether through monthly 
subscription or donations. Greenpeace EU is funded by Greenpeace 
International. Globally, Greenpeace relies wholly on supporter 
subscriptions and voluntary donations of around three million individual 
supporters (98.7 per cent of total income in 2010) and on grant support 
from independent foundations (1.3 per cent of total income in 2007). 
Though money goes to different accounts, it goes to “Greenpeace”, not 
Greenpeace International or Greenpeace UK or Germany and it is made 
clear that it supports Greenpeace as a whole.155 Greenpeace EU in turn is 
funded by Greenpeace International. Greenpeace does not seek or accept 
donations from governments (including the EU institutions), corporations 
or political parties.156 It is thus effectively the supporters who provide the 
majority of the funding for Greenpeace EU, although they have no say on 
what share goes to the EU office and into which EU campaign. Being a 
supporter of Greenpeace by paying monthly subscriptions is therefore the 
most obvious way for individuals to express their general support for 
Greenpeace. If they no longer agree with Greenpeace's mission and/or 
actions, then people who support financially can decide to withdraw their 
subscriptions:  
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 An abundance of ways for supporters to engage with Greenpeace is shown on Greenpeace 
International and UK’s websites (accessed 20/09/2012: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/getinvolved/ and 
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00). 
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“People who support financially can decide to withdraw their 
donations. This way they vote with their feet, they can decide not 
to support us anymore” (Greenpeace EU official 2010).  
Another crucial way of expressing support for Greenpeace in a more 
targeted way is by choosing to actively engage in specific campaigns, for 
example as volunteer, in an educational role, or as an activist. Greenpeace 
activists, who support specific campaigns and actions, are not necessarily 
supporters that financially subscribe to Greenpeace.  
Greenpeace is a campaign as well as lobby group. Its primary image 
amongst the public is a group carrying out peaceful, spectacular actions, 
generating public pressure via public actions. Greenpeace tries to influence 
corporations, the public and policies via its public campaigns and mass 
mobilisations. Lobbying is another important leg of its work. This becomes 
clear through its various own communication channels, such as websites 
and reports. Supporters can also get active in both, they can decide to get 
active as direct activists in campaigns, or they can engage in lobbying work 
themselves, such as writing letter to MPs. In that regard, Greenpeace UK 
for example has set up different supporter email lists, the 'Get Active' 
newsletter and for the activists and the lobbying network for lobbyists. 
Both channels for active support are communicated via the online member 
group and both newsletters. 
Next to Facebook, Twitter, the website and blogs, volunteers have the 
opportunity to attend meetings and skills shares, as well as trainings for 
activists. Individuals can participate in campaigning and collecting 
signatures or they can give their signature in an act of support. 
Participation or the expression of support can also mean giving feedback, 
which Greenpeace EU can be responsive to (Greenpeace EU official 2010). 
Tools for feedback are personal meetings and phone conversations, but 
also opinion polls, the Facebook page, Twitter, some of Greenpeace EU's 
websites which have the possibility to leave comments, paper surveys, 
online surveys and blogs. One Greenpeace EU official remarks (2010):  
238 
 
“Personal meetings are very effective; you really get a 
chance to ask more in-depth questions, what if you would change 
this, what is the most appealing argument. Personally I like very 
much this focus group when you develop a position or campaign 
you can test it with the focus group. Where you have 
representativeness from different parts of society, like students, 
different levels of education test the idea of the campaign or the 
lobby you want to do.”  
However, Greenpeace EU plays a slightly different role within the 
global organisation, focussing on EU lobbying in coordination with member 
groups. Greenpeace EU has no direct contact with supporters and the 
communication with supporters on precise EU positions instead is down to 
the international and national offices. According to Greenpeace staff, this is 
also because there are 28 different countries in the EU with 28 national 
debates in their national newspapers. The national member groups choose 
a communications line (framing of issues) that fits into this national context 
and that is most effective in this national context (Greenpeace EU official 
2010). The Greenpeace national and regional offices are firmly rooted 
within the local environmental communities in the countries they operate. 
They maintain direct contact with the public; all Greenpeace offices can be 
directly contacted by phone or email. Greenpeace International maintains 
contacts with supporters and donors in countries where Greenpeace does 
not have offices.157  
At the national level there is much more communication with the 
supporter base, since groups such as Greenpeace Germany are solely 
funded by supporter subscriptions and donations. Although there is no 
grassroots democracy structure, at this level the sense of 'duty' towards 
supporters and volunteers is much more prominent. “Credibility is our most 
precious asset” (Greenpeace Germany official 2010). In other words, 
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 Greenpeace International website (accessed 20/09/2012: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/). 
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although key issues are decided by the national group, there is an emphasis 
on being accountable and responsive to supporter demands. Greenpeace 
Germany, for example, discusses themes and supporter responses within 
the team and informs supporters through the supporter magazine and the 
online newsletter on global, EU and national Greenpeace news. The 
Greenpeace Germany office keeps close contact with its supporters; 
supporters call the office and there is an open dialogue, where each 
supporter gets an open ear and can voice wishes and criticism. There are 
regular targeted image surveys to understand supporter opinions and their 
demands. These opinion surveys tend to give more general responses and 
are carried out by external organisations amongst members, including in-
depth interviews with about 100 people. A specific survey on the 30 per 
cent emission reductions communication was not conducted, since this 
according to Greenpeace staff is too detailed. As a Greenpeace EU official 
explains (2010):  
“You have to put this political demand in a broader campaign 
communication strategy. We usually test our campaign 
communication strategy with our supporters but not directly the 
policy demands that are linked to it.” 
But surveys in hindsight show that supporters subscribe to the 30 per 
cent aim, because they give insights to how supporters view and judge 
Greenpeace's engagement (Greenpeace Germany official 2010). Moreover, 
the policy is part of the greater combat against climate change, which is a 
major campaign issue for all Greenpeace groups. Greenpeace UK also 
informs on the EU emission reductions policy, and related policies such as 
the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and the general EU 20/20 goals and 
respective global, national and local campaigns on its blog, its get active 
email newsletter, and through its annual review.  
Greenpeace member groups are also able to actively seek feedback 
and news of supporters by a variety of means. National offices carry out 
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regular consultations and surveys of member group and supporter 
interests. Greenpeace EU staff explains (2011):  
“This depends on the national offices who have their own 
fundraising and supporter policies, but many of our offices do 
interact with supporters, ask them what their perception of 
Greenpeace is, what campaigns they like, what campaigns they are 
less interested in. The EU office does not do it, because we do not 
have direct contact with supporters. We get our money from 
Greenpeace International. Not the role of our office like national 
offices.” 
Although Greenpeace members know who Greenpeace is, whether it 
is Greenpeace International, the EU office or a national group, information 
about specific policy positions and political developments in that respect 
are important to enable individuals and groups to follow Greenpeace's 
work. Greenpeace EU, for example, reports on its website as well as in its 
annual review about policy positions and political developments with 
regards to the issues they are active on, including emissions. It further 
published a number of detailed reports on the topic of emission reductions, 
such as on the emissions trading scheme together with WWF. Continuous 
reporting also through national media channels is important to create 
public credibility for Greenpeace’ work. For example, the Greenpeace view 
on the topic of the UN climate change conferences and the goal to reduce 
emissions on climate change and emission reductions was aired on the 
German public national news, next to the views of the German 
environmental minister (Tagesschau 12pm 16/07/2012).  
Climate Action Network Europe 
Acceptance by the grassroots for a EU network group such as CAN-E 
uniting independent member groups requires the network to be 
transparent and forward information about CAN-E’s work. Supporters of its 
national member groups such as Sandbag in the UK or Germanwatch might 
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not necessarily realise that their groups are members of a EU umbrella 
representing their interests in Brussels. Some member groups are 
themselves umbrellas of groups, making communication and information 
networks all the more vital. Groups interviewed often felt it was important 
to pass on information to their member groups and individual supporters. 
Some umbrella groups, such as the Deutscher Naturschutzring in Germany, 
function precisely as that EU information hub for Germany and its member 
groups and informs via news magazines, mailing lists and member group 
EU-news (Deutscher Naturschutzring official 2010 and Facebook).  
The media is also an important channel to inform on policies and 
issues. A CAN-E official remarked that he spent the same time 
communicating with reporters putting out the message of his work as he 
did on lobbying EU institutions (2010). CAN-E reports that its media work is 
effective in reaching out to the public: “In 2009, climate change also saw an 
unprecedented amount of public interest. This time in the spotlight allowed 
CAN Europe to raise its public profile, increase media presence [...]” (CAN-E 
Report 2010, 5). The very active press work over the past two years (CAN-E 
Report 2010, 14) is enhancing the public profile of CAN-E as well as 
improving the transparency of CAN-E’s work for member groups, individual 
supporters and the public. CAN-E's activities have been mentioned in a 
large number of European and national press articles, news wires, websites 
and publications (details in CAN-E Report 2010, 14). 
Even if member groups do not inform their members and supporters 
about the work CAN-E does, they can raise awareness of their group being 
a member of CAN-E on their websites and in reports. Some of the less or 
hardly active groups in CANE-E do not point out their membership on their 
websites or Facebook, such as CPRE, WEED or Sandbag, though they state 
their involvement in European and international networks in general and 
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with those actively involved.158 WEED for example clearly says on its 
Facebook site:159 
“The social and environmental effects of globalisation, 
demand for reshaping financial, economic, ecological and trade 
policies towards more justice and sustainability. WEED assesses the 
existing problems and their causes and advocates positive 
solutions. We are actively participating in national and 
international civil society networks, and advocacy initiatives. WEED 
analyses world-economic, ecological and socio-political issues, and 
generates studies and working papers.” 
For the niche group Sandbag specialised in emission trading 
technologies, part of the EU emission reductions communication, the EU is 
its core advocacy focus. Though the CAN-E membership is not mentioned, 
subscribers, who are electronic followers and/or financial supporters, know 
about Sandbag's EU activities through information and reports, often in 
coalition with other EU groups, through its website, Facebook and its 
newsletter. CAN-E also asks subscribers to actively engage with the EU 
policy by signing petitions or writing to MEP’s or Commissioners. Sandbag 
is information led, does in-house research and its several thousand 
subscribers similarly tend to be very informed individuals with an interest in 
expert analysis who will expect in particular to be informed about 
technological and related political developments (Sandbag official 2011).  
Very active member groups tend to make their membership and 
activities explicit on their websites and often via other channels. 
Germanwatch, for example, also publishes an annual Climate Change 
Performance Index together with CAN-E, which evaluates and compares 
the climate protection performance of 57 industrialised and developing 
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 For example CPRE, WEED and Sandbag: (CPRE Annual Review 2011/12, 2), WEED website 
(accessed 20/07/2012: http://www.weed-online.org/about/index.html) and Sandbag website 
(accessed 20/07/2012: http://www.sandbag.org.uk/about/).  
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 WEED Facebook page (accessed 20/07/2012: https://www.Facebook.com/WEED.Berlin/info). 
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countries (i.e. Harmeling 2012). In fact Germanwatch understands its role 
in making sure that German actors play a constructive role in the EU-
context, for example by lobbying for the support of a 30 per cent target by 
the German government and are well informed. The Deutscher 
Naturschutzring, active on the energy efficiency side to the policy, similarly 
sees its role in informing its member groups and the public about 
important political events in the EU and nationally, related to environment. 
EU coordination is considered an essential part of its engagements, 
explicitly including CAN-E, and its member groups appreciate these 
activities according to one interviewee (Deutscher Naturschutzring official 
2010). Member groups as well as anyone interested can find an extensive 
amount of current and archived information, including reports on the 
emission reductions policy by CAN-E on the Deutscher Naturschutzring 
website, in special issues, through its news RSS feed, through its email 
newsletter or through its Twitter channel ‘Umweltnachrichten’. 
CAN-E is active on a single cause. This means that member groups 
and their members and supporters in turn are relatively clear about the 
issues tackled and positions put out by CAN-E, even if they are not well 
informed. CAN-E’s member groups support the network, because the issue 
is relevant to them and in line with their own cause. This means that their 
members and supporters are likely to know and support CAN-E’s positions. 
There is thus less demand to report and inform of a single cause group such 
as CAN-E.  
Professionalisation	in	gyroscopic	and	surrogate	
representation	
The differentiation of representativeness has crucial consequences 
for the implications of professionalisation. Firstly, the narrow understanding 
of professionalisation in the traditional sense of bureaucratisation carries 
implications primarily for groups whose acceptability dimension is based on 
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the traditional promissory representation. Thus if positions are formed 
through member participation, the loss of member influence in formal 
decision-making structures negatively affects the representativeness of the 
position, or the representative claim. In the case of gyroscopic and 
surrogate representation, the bureaucratisation or rather the absence of 
member and supporter participation in the formal position formation does 
not matter, since the position is formed based on scientific evidence and 
expertise on the ground (gyroscopic) and empathy (surrogate) and because 
the acceptance dimension is a separate act from the acceptability 
dimension.  
Still, the informal communication with member groups is important 
in order to qualify the position formation is based on experience in the 
field. But crucial in gyroscopic and surrogate representativeness is that 
professionalisation can play a positive role for the acceptance dimension: 
professionalisation in new media technology facilitates the mediation – and 
indeed the judgement - of support. Also in the case of promissory and 
anticipatory representation new media technology provides additional and 
more fluid channels for formal and informal participation in position 
formation as well as channels for group responsiveness to member and 
supporter attitudes (Pickerill 2003, 27; Maloney 2009, 283f; Gibson et al 
2004, 198). 
The section below explains the bureaucratisation implications for the 
three gyroscopic and surrogate groups interviewed and how new media 
professionalisation affects their dimensions of representativeness. 
Bureaucratisation	 and	 gyroscopic/surrogate	
representation	
The traditional professionalisation, or bureaucratisation literature, 
expects EU groups to represent by putting forward a “relatively unmediated 
version of the constituents will” (promissory representation, Mansbridge 
2003, 516). The EU group is then accountable to its member groups (and 
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they in turn to their members) in the traditional principal-agent sense. If EU 
groups then professionalise as detected in the literature, centralising their 
decision-making structures with an elite leadership remote from member 
groups, their positions might not reflect the preferences of their members 
anymore. Professional staff in EU groups would become motivated by their 
paid position and the survival of the organisation, rather than the 
representation of member interests and their needs. The fear in the 
literature is that members would lose power over the preferences of EU 
groups, which would hence fail to keep their promises and not be 
representative of their constituency. 
Groups may also predict the positions that the members they claim to 
represent will agree with in hindsight, creating a reciprocal power relation 
and enabling continuing mutual influence between the point of position 
formation and re-election/affirmation of support (anticipatory 
representation). If EU groups bureaucratise and streamline their 
participation and communication and remote elite staff take decisions on 
behalf of members, it will be difficult for them to predict members’ 
preferences. Moreover, EU groups professionalising their marketing 
strategies and media appearance (Frantz 2007; Frantz and Martens 2006) 
might manipulate the preferences of members in their own organisational 
survival interest rather than educate members’ preferences in the interest 
of the original environmental mission (Mansbridge 2003, 517, 519). EU 
groups would create conditions of choice leading members to make choices 
not in their interest. EU groups would thus lose representativeness. 
The assumptions in the group professionalisation literature are that 
groups apply modern marketing strategies to market their positions and 
gain support, rather than focus on bottom-up opinion formation; they 
employ experts who know about the issues in question but not about 
grassroots opinions; they employ full-time workers with business motives 
rather than volunteers who want to promote a cause, and organisational 
structures become streamlined to be more effective rather than inclusive 
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(Frantz 2007; Frantz 2005). The latter includes the rise of groups with 
decision-making structures that exclude members from participation in 
opinion formation (see Saurugger 2008 for an overview, Sudbery 2003, 87; 
Warleigh 2001, 2004) reducing their role to financial supporters, so-called 
cheque-book participation (Maloney 1999). The literature assumes that 
internal professionalisation furthers the gap between what EU umbrella 
groups put forward as the opinion of civil society and what grassroots civil 
society opine (Kohler-Koch 2008; Saurugger 2008). 
All three groups form part of the first mushrooming of EU 
environmental groups in Brussels (Wurzel and Connelly 2011, 214). They 
have full-time staff with high levels of specialisation and expertise. Offices 
are small (CAN-E, Greenpeace EU) to medium sized  (Friends of the Earth 
Europe) in comparison to national offices and other lobby groups in 
Brussels, employing specialised policy officers responsible for different 
issue areas such as climate change. They also employ a number of 
administrative personnel responsible for the areas of external 
communication and media as well as finance and office management 
(division of labour). Staffs have professional qualifications and are generally 
highly educated. Policy officers tend to be educated to university degree in 
their policy areas and are familiar with the Brussels circuit, but they also 
tend to have advocacy experience at EU and/or national/subnational level, 
often with member groups. Administrative staffs tend to be qualified in the 
relevant finance, management, administration or communication subjects. 
Neither of the groups outsources their lobbying to agencies, but they 
engage in sophisticated scientific research in collaboration with research 
institutions and agencies.  
The EU groups interviewed thus match the picture of 
professionalisation anticipated in the literature to some degree. The 
implications for the representativeness of said groups nevertheless have to 
be differentiated and are not necessarily all negative. Whilst the 
professionalisation of promissory groups can pose serious risks to their 
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representativeness, for the gyroscopic and surrogate groups analysed this is 
not necessarily the case and in fact appears helpful to the cause in most 
incidents. 
Friends of the Earth Europe 
The international scope of FoEE’s strategy resembled in the name 
‘Friends of the Earth’ was essential to its founders, and requires the 
expertise and knowledge to grasp the bigger picture. FoEE forms its 
positions based on science and ecological and social values with an 
international objective. The formation of its international positions 
moreover relies on input from communities, and alliances with indigenous 
peoples, farmers' movements, trade unions, human rights groups and 
others.160 This in turn requires a professional team that connects with and 
maintains relationships with these groups.  
FoEE has expanded its issues and tools since its foundation. Starting 
out as an anti-nuclear power movement, it today spans a number of issues, 
such as climate change, policies that promote unsustainable consumption 
and production and place biodiversity protection above free trade priorities 
– although all are true to the original aim to create environmentally 
sustainable and socially just societies. This expansion is partly due to “the 
emergence of ever more global and social problems”.161 Moreover, its 
marketing strategies now include using big names, such as Radiohead for 
the European Big Ask campaign. 
Member groups of the FoEE network and also individual supporters 
will thus expect FoEE to be professional and knowledgeable in their 
formation of positions and in how and with whom they form alliances. They 
will further expect FoEE, and FoEI as as a whole, to be able to keep up to 
date with scientific knowledge and pressing environmental issues in order 
to fulfil their original mission. This includes having professional staffing at 
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 FoEI website (accessed 17/09/2012: http://www.foei.org/en/who-we-are/about). 
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 FoEI website (accessed 17/09/2012:http://www.foei.org/en/who-we-are/about/25years). 
248 
 
EU level which is able to incorporate latest environmental science, Brussels 
know-how as well as the diversity of its grassroots network into its 
advocacy and campaign strategies. The use of marketing strategies using 
prominent names can be helpful if member groups and supporters find it is 
an acceptable way to raise awareness for the cause. The repercussion of 
the big ask campaign and its accepted impact on for example UK legislation 
in the media can be interpreted as positive for FoEE’s reputation and 
credibility and thus the acceptance of its representativeness in the broader 
public.162 
Greenpeace EU 
In its mission to represent the health of the planet and stop 
environmentally destructive policies, Greenpeace set up its European office 
in Brussels. The fact that 80 per cent of environmental legislation in the EU 
is decided at EU level made it necessary for Greenpeace to advocate also 
directly with EU institutions.163 Greenpeace EU looks at EU politics from a 
global perspective and aims to have certain environmental standards in the 
EU that can have a positive impact globally. It aims to monitor and analyse 
EU institutions work, expose EU policies and laws it considers deficient, and 
challenge EU decision-makers to implement ‘progressive solutions’. To fulfil 
these tasks Greenpeace EU employs 15 staff, mainly as policy officers, as 
well as some directing, managing and communication staff.164 
Professionalisation for Greenpeace is necessary to be able to form 
gyroscopic positions and promote solutions in protection of the 
environment. Greenpeace member groups, but also sub-national groups 
and supporters, expect Greenpeace to be skilful and professional in their 
development of strategies that combine research, advocacy and action. 
This also means that members and supporters, in order to fulfil these highly 
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 FoE website (accessed 24/09/2012: 
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technical tasks, will expect Greenpeace EU to employ professional and 
skilled staff.  
Greenpeace’ professionalism has helped the group to attain a global 
reputation and credibility, whilst still considered “radical” by European 
Commission staff (DG ENV official 2010). Particularly its professionalisation 
in new media technology has helped the group to expand its tools for its 
long-standing strategy to raise funds and engage activists in support of its 
campaigns and cause. 
Climate Action Network Europe 
CAN-E’s task is to coordinate positions and lobby activities both in 
Europe but also at the international climate change negotiations. The 
coordinating role by CAN-E entails mostly supporting its member groups 
offering logistical and informational support about policy and climate 
change. There is also an outreach element in its role in the sense that it 
talks to other stakeholders.  
In order to coordinate positions and provide useful information, CAN-
E member groups thus expect it to have professional staffs in the climate 
change policy areas, with experience in international negotiations and EU 
politics and policies. They further expect CAN-E to have the insight to 
Brussels politics which in particular members not based in Brussels find is 
hard to get. In line with these expectations, CAN-E employs 12 staff, 
including policy officials, as well as staff in the areas of members’ outreach, 
office, finance, and communication management and fundraising.165 Staff is 
professional and highly educated in particular in the social sciences 
backgrounds. Almost all have NGO and/or civil society experience and 
started off with local or national CAN-E member groups, or other advocacy 
groups. Some of the staff have also worked for EU institutions or have 
government backgrounds (CAN-E official 2010). 
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CAN-E’s professionalisation in particular of its new media technology, 
such as its website and intranet, has facilitated the communication of 
information and coordination of positions between its large numbers of 
member groups. The professionalisation of its media presence, both, online 
and offline, has moreover resulted in increased traffic on its websites and 
additional memberships. This is also a sign of acceptance by member 
groups as well as CAN-E’s work in the public. 
Professionalisation	in	new	media	technology	
The traditional professionalisation argument is based on a too narrow 
conception of professionalisation, which is mostly restricted to 
bureaucratisation (though social movement literature broadens the term 
professionalisation to include network structures Kriesi et al. 1995 in 
Saurugger 2005, 267) such as centralisation of organisational structures and 
specialised elite staff. It ignores crucial implications of professionalisation in 
new media technology for both representativeness dimensions, but 
particularly for the acceptance dimension.  
Though gyroscopic groups do not claim to represent members, their 
organisational structures of representation nevertheless have to facilitate 
input of member group experience in order to form their positions. 
Depending on the group structure and strategies, different degrees of 
feedback and input to positions via differing formal and informal channels 
are appropriate and have to be valued accordingly. Here, 
professionalisation understood as a concept going beyond the traditional 
account of bureaucratisation and instead including professionalisation in 
new media technologies, has the potential to enhance representativeness. 
For gyroscopic, and indeed for surrogate representativeness, new media 
professionalisation is significant.  
The statistics of the internet and Facebook usage express how new 
media technologies have entered the social and political lives of individuals. 
On 31 December 2011 there were 2,267 million internet users in the world 
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(32.7 per cent of the world population at the time). The population 
estimate of the world was 6,930 million. There were 900 million active 
Facebook users in May 2012 that is 39.7 per cent of the world's internet 
users. The population in Europe was 816.4 million, of which 500.7 million 
were internet users and 235.5 million were on Facebook.166 In other words 
61.3 per cent of the European population is online and 47 per cent of the 
internet users are on Facebook.167 If ‘Facebook.com’ were a country, it 
would be bigger than Europe population-wise. Interestingly, there are 
decisive national differences with regards to Facebook usage. 84 per cent of 
the UK population use the internet, of which 57.9 per cent are Facebook 
users. In Germany on the other hand, 82.7 per cent of the population are 
internet users and only 32.8 per cent of them are Facebook users.168 
Facebook has become a major source of information and 
communication for people. On the one hand this means people are 
changing their attitudes to where and how they look for information, but it 
also provides new ways of engaging with issues, for example by re-posting, 
commenting, messaging, liking. Campaigns are shared via social media, 
emails and online newsletters, which users subscribe to online, which they 
otherwise might not have. Engagement is quick, effortless and regardless of 
time and place (other than requiring an internet connected device).  
Importantly, being able to make use of new media software on new 
technology devices such as smart phones further impacts information, 
communication and participation attitudes. Advocacy groups have to 
respond to the changes in society and particularly changing attitudes of 
communication, participation and representation. Promissory and 
anticipatory groups who represent members’ interests have to respond to 
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their demands of how they wish to voice their interests. Gyroscopic and 
surrogate groups particularly have to use new media to expand and align 
their channels of acceptance to what supporters expect. Crucially, social 
media can build a sense of community and solidarity. 
Online channels are constantly improved, but their application by EU 
groups is still in its infancy and not using new media technology to its full 
potential. This is partly because EU groups tend to use it reactively to users 
demands as opposed to innovatively and experimental.169 
Impact	of	new	media	technology	on	the	two	dimensions	
New media technology has an impact on both representative 
dimensions. On the one hand, professionalisation in new media 
technologies facilitates expert knowledge and case study input to issues on 
the agenda and policy positions from member groups, essential for 
gyroscopic position formation. On the other hand, new media technology is 
a medium through which member groups, individual supporters and the 
general public can express their acceptance of a group as well as its policy 
positions, campaigns or goals.  
New media and acceptability 
New media technology helps to create and reinforce existing 
networks of communication and linkages between EU member groups as 
well as network members (Pickerill 2003:76). The linkages also enhance the 
relationship between national groups and their local member groups 
(Washbourne 2001, group officials 2010/11). New media can thus help 
inclusion amongst already existing member groups and supporters (Pickerill 
2003, 64). Moreover, it encourages individual staff working on policies to 
communicate, and spreads a sense of solidarity amongst staff in member 
                                                      
169
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slower and less innovative in their use of new media technologies, whilst small non-hierarchical 
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groups and supporters alike, reducing feelings of isolation (Warf and 
Grimes 1997). New media technology thus helps to facilitate local 
connection and coordination with EU offices as well as coordination and 
exchange of experiences between national member groups and with EU 
offices (environmental group officials 2010/11). This input and exchange of 
expertise in the field with EU groups is crucial to enable gyroscopic 
representation.  
There is a clear development towards incorporating new media 
technology into organisational and communication structures amongst the 
group interviewed. Organisational structures and strategies impact on how 
fast groups adopt the different new media technologies and the width 
(access) and depth (variety) of the new media tools employed. The 
application of tools in policy teams moreover depends on the computer 
knowledge officials have (environmental group officials 2010/11).  
Pickerill points out the need for groups to decide between the logic of 
numbers and the concentration on becoming particularly technically adept 
and concludes that it would be hard for a group to reconcile both the 
incorporation of more participants as well as complicated online actions 
(Pickerill 2003, 53). Her example is Greenpeace, however, this organisation 
actually seems to have been able to reconcile both, a huge number of 
supporters globally who at the same time have the possibility to participate 
online, volunteer and get active, if they so choose. The reality is that the 
majority prefer to simply pay their monthly subscriptions and let others do 
the advocacy and direct action. Existing studies on new media are assuming 
a desire for participation required for promissory representation which we 
do not find in all advocacy groups and certainly not in all environmental 
groups. Pickerill looks at environmental justice movements, who 
traditionally place a strong emphasis on participatory inclusion, such as 
Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland. But the 
emphasis on ‘what’ inclusiveness and ‘how’ this should be facilitated varies 
between different types of environmental groups. Inclusion can take place 
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via votes or other formal input, or via online participation, or direct action 
and volunteering. Again, the benefits of new media are assessed in terms 
of participatory democracy and inclusion, rather than the acceptability and 
acceptance dimensions. Moreover, the criticism is directed at the isolation 
or non-inclusion of individuals outside a group's network, but new media is 
considered to enhance participation within the existing groups network 
(Pickerill 2003, 46).  
Friends of the Earth Europe 
FoEE uses new media tools to supplement its formal decision-making. 
Most internal discussions take place and positions are formed via mailing-
lists and emails, next to phone calls and face-to-face meetings. Member 
groups confirm the extensive use of emails for communication on policies 
and positions. A BUND official confirms that meanwhile over 90 per cent of 
his communication is run over emails rather than the phone (BUND official 
2010). New media technologies provide an informal channel to exchange 
information and communicate and discuss issues and positions amongst 
FoEE and its member groups. FoEE moreover gets more general input for 
strategic directions and feedback on EU-wide campaigns from groups 
through online surveys. 
FoEE is still relatively new to social media. It has developed its 
Facebook (joined December 2010) and Twitter use over the last years and 
these sites are very actively used for communication between FoEE, 
member groups and international groups. FoEE has Twitter groups for 
communication between FoEE and member groups, as well as general 
Facebook and Twitter accounts for external communication with supporters 
and the public. Twitter also facilitates the following of specific issue groups, 
such as the EU climate group and leading individuals. FoEE runs a very 
active Twitter site called ‘FOE_groups_ppl’, which is a public Twitter site for 
FoE groups from around the world, with 71 member groups, to which in 
addition anyone from the public can subscribe. FoEE moreover gets 
feedback from supporters through Facebook likes and messages and 
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through tweets and re-tweets. Still Facebook and Twitter are 
predominantly external communication tools, partly because Facebook is a 
rather public place to have internal discussions and Twitter is limited to 140 
characters (FoEE official 2010). 
The input and exchange of local and national data and expertise with 
EU groups is crucial to enable gyroscopic representation. Examples are the 
FoEE issue of bee decline across Europe and the Save the Arctic campaign 
by Greenpeace. In both cases there is an exchange between EU and 
national groups as well as with local groups. The emphasis in the bee 
campaign varies between groups. FoEE relates the issue to GM, the UK 
group to biodiversity and the German group to biodiversity and pesticides 
killing a variety of insects, including bees. The three groups’ websites cross-
reference to each other as well as to national media articles providing 
updates on each other’s campaigns. Groups can thus exchange 
developments and news on the campaign to the EU office and the network 
and vice-versa in order to strengthen their campaign and position. 
FoE set up online structures amongst national and local groups, 
benefitting connectivity (Pickerill 2003, 54). Today, mailing-lists, including 
regional and topical mailing-lists, activist-led, campaign-specific and broad 
issue hubs which can be set up by activists and campaigners themselves, e-
petitions, Twitter and Facebook form an important part of the group’s 
communication and campaign repertoire.170 This mixed approach to new 
media technology also helps to provide the broadest access possible for the 
different type of ‘users’. 
Greenpeace EU 
The communication with member groups makes much use of new 
media technologies and has gone far beyond personal meetings and phone 
conversations, although these are still important tools. The EU office 
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 See FoE-ENWI’s website (accessed 20/09/2012: 
http://www.foe.co.uk/get_involved/act_online_index.html; 
www.foe.co.uk/resource/guides/campaign_hubs_guide.pdf).  
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informs via emails lists, there is an intranet for communication amongst 
professional employees, and there are Twitter, Facebook, the website and 
blogs. Internally and with Greenpeace offices, mailing lists and emails are 
crucial tools of communication, discussion of positions and exchange of 
views.  
The most effective and important tool for participation in the broader 
understanding, according to Greenpeace staff, is collecting signatures. But 
new media, in particular social media, is growing to be a key tool of not 
only communication, but also participation and expression of opinion and 
support, as one interviewee explains (Greenpeace EU official 2010): 
“Increasingly becoming important are social networks. 
Greenpeace is one of the organisations that is a front runner on 
these social networks and involvement in campaigns. In case 
supporters of Greenpeace or potential supporters of Greenpeace 
would not like our position or campaign they can use this network 
to voice their concerns or positions or just not show up.” 
National member groups also give feedback to Greenpeace EU and 
Greenpeace International via virtual discussion forums, blog posts, Twitter 
(and re-tweets) as well as Facebook for Greenpeace international. There is 
a global tweet list with “official Greenpeace tweets from around the world”, 
a Greenpeace staff Twitter list and issue-based Greenpeace lists such as on 
climate and nuclear-reactive issues. Also on a national level Twitter has 
become an actively used communication tool. Greenpeace UK for example 
has a public Twitter list for international Greenpeace groups (33 members 
and 17 subscribers) and one for Greenpeace supporter groups around the 
UK (40 members and 15 subscribers).171 
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 Greenpeace UK Twitter (accessed 24/02/2012: https://twitter.com/GreenpeaceUK/lists).  
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Climate Action Network Europe 
CAN-E relies heavily on new media technologies for its position 
formation. For CAN-E’s large network, emails and mailing lists are the most 
important communication and participation tools with member groups, 
next to online and phone conferences as well as phone calls (CAN-E, 
Germanwatch and DNR officials 2010). CAN-E uses its recently established 
Google-based mail system, which allows staff and member groups to share 
documents (Google docs) and intranet sites (Google sites)(CAN-E Report 
2010, 14). Personal meetings take place mostly with member groups in 
Brussels or in its proximity such as the Netherlands or France, apart from 
the general assemblies, which are very inclusive. The lack of personal 
contact is a disadvantage for groups situated further away, but phone 
conversations, online and phone conferences, emails and various mailing 
lists are crucial communication and participation technologies that are used 
to help overcome the distance. Phone conferences can include all member 
groups and everyone can join and participate and are mostly used for the 
work on specific topics. CAN-E uses mostly Skype or calls into a 
phone/online conference channel. Since CAN-E tends to work with a 
number of groups on each different policy rather than its entire 
membership of 152 groups, online conferences are a convenient tool for 
discussing specific policies. 
The decision-making on policy documents, for example, taking place 
throughout the year is carried out online. Statements of opinion by 
member groups on mostly pre-formulated positions by CAN-E are sent 
round via mailing lists often relatively early in the process of formulating a 
position (CAN-E, Germanwatch and DNR officials 2010). Expert studies are 
also contributed to the network and policy positions online by member 
groups (Germanwatch official 2010). Outside position formation, in order 
to make sure its work is connected to the bigger strategic and political goals 
in the interest of its member groups, CAN-E reports to its member groups 
on its activities via mailing lists. CAN-E’s member news section on its 
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website moreover informs the network on activities and news relevant to 
CAN-E policies.172 Beyond that, it carries out offline and online member 
group surveys to understand the interests of members, get feedback on its 
achievements and adapt and improve according to member group needs. 
For feedback and participatory purposes, CAN-E conducted its first online 
survey in 2010 (CAN-E Report 2010, 7):  
“With our new network coordinator in place, CAN Europe has 
been able to embark on a network survey in 2010 to try to 
ascertain the composition, needs and expectations of our bigger-
than-ever membership base. The survey was designed by CAN 
Europe secretariat staff and distributed to members in mid-2010. 
So far, the response from members has been greater than 
expected. Once all the surveys are complete, the results will be 
analysed and ready for presentation and discussion before the end 
of the year.”  
A number of CAN-E member groups, in particular those not based in 
Brussels, find it is 
“harder to be part of the daily tit-for-tat in Brussels. It is very 
easy to respond via the internet to media announcements. It is 
difficult to understand the 'feel' of where people are moving, 
harder for us to grasp the 'politics' of the debate, the human 
politics, which arguments are people swayed by. Membership with 
CAN-E has been very important for communicating that 
information” (Sandbag official 2011).  
For these groups new media technologies are an easy channel of 
access to information they indeed request from their membership with 
CAN-E. 
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 CAN-E website (accessed 03/09/2012: http://www.caneurope.org/). 
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New media and acceptance 
New media technology also has an impact also on the acceptance 
dimension of representativeness. Existing networks of communication and 
linkages between EU and member group staff as well as supporters 
encourage staff to connect on policies and help create and reinforce trust 
and solidarity (Pickerill 2003, 76), moreover reducing feelings of isolation 
(Warf and Grimes 1997). Solidarity is the basis for empathy and is 
particularly important for the acceptance of EU groups’ activities across 
national boundaries.  
Groups use the internet to create new channels of acceptance, by 
raising their profile, reach more audiences and gain media attention (see 
also Pickerill 2003, 71 on a short summary of examples). 
Friends of the Earth Europe 
New media is an important tool for FoEE to connect to individual 
supporters. Twitter and Facebook have been very actively used as external 
communication tools with supporters and the public since February 2011. 
FoEE joined Facebook in December 2010 and is very active since, with 
1,563 likes.173 Anyone can post and comment and there are frequent posts 
of FoE groups, other advocacy groups, movements, campaigns and 
individuals on the site. In addition, the FoEE site has a message function for 
direct contact. FoEE reports on its activities at EU level as well as formal 
decision-making at annual general meetings. It provides links to FoE videos 
and other informative sources explaining environmental issues the EU is 
facing. It shares links of other FoE Facebook groups, including local groups 
in the EU. The “likes” by the FoEE Facebook group itself are an expression 
of who and what FoEE agrees with and supports, making its views and 
opinions on current issues more transparent. There is a lot of information 
sharing of direct action and events of other environment-related 
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 FoEE Facebook (accessed 24/09/2012: 
http://www.facebook.com/FoEEurope?sk=app_139229522811253).  
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movements. A similar message is transpired by FoEE's slogan on Twitter: 
“Friends of the Earth folk in Brussels, representing people and planet, and 
campaigning for sustainable and just societies and the protection of the 
environment.”174 On Twitter FoEE has 2,149 followers and tweeted 959 
times since active. Tweets are about EU political decision-making, events, 
activities and direct action. Supporters have an overview of who FoEE 
supports or is interested in by checking out who it follows. At the same 
time FoEE can see what groups and people support or opine since anybody 
can tweet to FoEE. Media reports about FoEE are also important to help 
create its public image and trust. These media reports are then shared on 
the various FoE groups' Facebook sites, are tweeted and shared via other 
new media means. 
Input to support positions is greatly facilitated through online 
participation: “Our cyberactions give you the opportunity to be proactive 
and show your support for our international campaigns without leaving 
home.”175 Expressing support and thus acceptance online can take place for 
example by sending an email to policy-makers or in support of community 
activism, signing petitions or statements or calling on corporations to 
change their attitudes. All these cyberactions facilitate the support of 
specific actions and campaigns. A relatively new tool to express general 
support of the group is the option to “donate a tweet a day” to FoEE by 
simply signing up to Justcoz.176 
New media technologies are also a channel for FoEE member groups 
to connect with their supporters in turn. This is particularly relevant for 
financial supporters, who do not engage in activist events and have less or 
no personal contact. Here new media enables communication and 
enhancing individual supporters’ awareness: “We encourage [subscribers] 
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 FoEE Twitter page (accessed 23/09/2012: http://Twitter.com/foeeurope). 
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 FoEI website (accessed 20/09/2012: http://www.foei.org/en/get-involved/take-action). 
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 Justcoz website (accessed 20/09/2012: http://justcoz.org/). 
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to [become active in the local groups] through our online newsletters and 
magazines and websites” (FoE-EWNI official 2011). 
Surveys, as mentioned above, are means, which FoEE uses to keep up 
to date with structure, size and support of its campaigns and positions. An 
example is the survey FoEE undertook for its 25th anniversary in 2011, 
when it assessed the shape and strength of its network and how it has 
evolved since its formation in 1986 (FoEE Annual Review 2011, 13). 
A greater awareness of FoEE's activities in Brussels and its specific 
positions amongst member groups plays an important part for the 
acceptance dimension of FoEE's member groups. There are a number of 
ways through which FoEE communicates with and reports on its activities 
to member groups. One channel of communication is the annual review, 
where FoEE additionally reports on the FoEE network of national groups via 
the “highlights of our member groups’ achievements” section (2011), giving 
insights into the work of national group members from different countries. 
Also FoEE websites provide info on member groups, including latest tweets 
and newsfeeds.177  
But reports enhancing FoEE’s acceptance with member group 
members and supporters also takes place through the web by media 
corporations. This enhances its expert image, and promotes its publications 
and credibility with its broader constituency.178 
Greenpeace EU 
Greenpeace prides itself as frontrunner in the application of new and 
social media in advocacy and campaigning (Greenpeace EU official 2010). 
It’s recent ‘Save the Arctic’ campaign has a novel approach to linking up all 
its different new media tools for one campaign and its international 
Facebook site is one of the most ‘liked’ and active sites amongst advocacy 
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 FoEE website (accessed 20/09/2012: http://www.foeeurope.org/network). 
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For example on EurActive (accessed 23/09/2012: http://www.euractiv.de/wahlen-und-
macht/artikel/eu-parlamentarier-befuerchten-anschuldigungen-wegen-nebeneinkuenften-
006575?newsletter).  
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groups on Facebook. Greenpeace has a global environmental vision and 
strategy, detecting global environmental problems and connecting as a 
global organisation, to which ends it utilises new media technology 
extensively. Greenpeace uses an extensive variety of new media tools, 
tailored for different users, whether staff in the EU office or in national and 
subnational offices, activists, volunteers, lobbyist supporters or simply 
online supporters, subscribers and donators.  
Greenpeace EU uses a number of informal participation channels 
with its national member groups and Greenpeace International, in 
particular emails and mailing lists. Moreover it uses opinions polls, 
Facebook (Greenpeace International and national groups), Twitter, the 
comment section on its website, online surveys and virtual discussion 
forums as well as national opinion surveys as channels for feedback 
through which member groups and also individual supporters can show 
their acceptance or concerns. There is an abundance of ways for supporters 
to engage with Greenpeace International and its national and subnational 
member groups, donate or sign up for regular subscriptions and it is made 
clear that the money and engagement supports Greenpeace as a whole.179 
Additionally, there are information channels such as the general online 
supporter magazine and tailored newsletters for each activist and lobbyist 
volunteers and supporters. The tailored newsletters are a response to the 
supporter opinions and expectations generated in an online survey sent 
round to the supporter network via email. The get active email newsletter 
is particularly tailored to Greenpeace volunteers and activists informing 
about national and local activities. Greenpeace UK also carries out surveys 
with its active supporter network, in order to understand how Greenpeace 
communicates with its activists via the newsletter, including content, tone 
and timing (Greenpeace UK survey sent out via its 'get active' newsletter in 
January 2012). A relatively new tool to express general support of 
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  See for example Greenpeace International (accessed 22/08/2012: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/getinvolved/) and Greenpeace UK (accessed 
22/08/2012: http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/what-you-can-do). 
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Greenpeace is the option to “donate a tweet a day” to any Greenpeace 
group by simply signing up to Justcoz.180 
Moreover, Greenpeace implements global campaigns via global 
communication efforts, for example the 'Save the Arctic' campaign in 2012. 
The campaign is run consistently by the national groups and on the 
international and national Greenpeace websites. The national Facebook 
pages campaign for the 'Save the Arctic' global campaign in addition to 
their national foci. Generally, the Greenpeace international, UK and 
Germany Facebook sites all post similar information about international 
and national Greenpeace events, action, scientific data and studies and 
politics. The communication and hence the picture of Greenpeace and its 
work is thus very similar for all individual supporters. 
Greenpeace has recently integrated a number of existing and 
innovative new media technologies for its ‘Save the Arctic’ campaign. It has 
combined mailing-lists for activists and lobbyists with a massive global 
online campaign on all of its websites, social media sites, and YouTube 
channels and with an experimental and interactive beta-campaign site 
where individual campaign supporters can choose an Arctic animal avatar 
and join a game where the individuals with most points win a trip to the 
Arctic. By the 22 September 2012, the campaign had received almost two 
million signatures and raised over £82,000.181 
Although Greenpeace EU does not see this as its core task, there is 
communication between the EU office and individual supporters and 
activists as well. There is the supporters' magazine, which informs about 
what Greenpeace is doing around Europe and globally, and for national 
groups’ volunteer activists there are meetings and skill shares (Greenpeace 
EU official 2010). The Greenpeace EU office also gets indirect feedback 
through its work with member groups. For example in the climate team, 
the respective EU director works closely with the respective Greenpeace 
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 Justcoz website (accessed 20/09/2012: http://justcoz.org/). 
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 Save the Arctic campaign (accessed 22/08/2012: http://www.savethearctic.org/en).  
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Germany director, who himself is in close contact with supporters and 
activists. 
Greenpeace EU does not have a Facebook site of its own, but there is 
the Greenpeace International Facebook site, as well as national and local 
sites. The Greenpeace International Facebook site is one of the most active 
sites with amongst the most followers on Facebook. It joined Facebook in 
2008, has 1.2 million members and 81,011 users are sharing posts about or 
mention Greenpeace International (people 'talking about this' accounts for 
anything in the news feed, such as page likes, posts, liking, sharing and 
commenting, tagging and mentioning the page). Anyone can post, 
comment or send messages. The site informs about international and 
national campaigns and is extremely actively, used not only by Greenpeace 
but also by users, who comment, like and share posts. National Facebook 
sites tend to be equally popular and busy. Greenpeace Germany joined 
Facebook in August 2008 and the page has 70,249 likes and 7,510 are 
talking about it. Greenpeace UK joined Facebook in March 2008 and the 
page has 86,275 likes and 9,975 are talking about it.182  
Climate Action Network Europe 
CAN-E relies heavily on new media technologies also in order to live 
up to its own demands of openness, transparency and information, crucial 
for the acceptance dimension of its representativeness. For informational 
purposes and to increase visibility with its diverse audiences, whether 
member groups, supporters, decision-makers, journalists or the public, 
CAN-E revamped its website and broadened the range of communications 
tools in 2009, for both internal and external communications. This includes 
publishing the newsletter “Hotspot” and annual reports online. CAN-E also 
has Facebook and Twitter accounts, but they are still under development. It 
has undergone a major professionalisation of its electronic media presence 
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 Greenpeace Facebook pages (accessed 23/09/2012: 
http://www.facebook.com/greenpeace.international, http://en-gb.facebook.com/greenpeace.de 
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in 2009, which entailed a redesign of its office communications, ‘reinforcing 
its brand identity’ by using design templates (CAN-E Report 2010, 8). The 
move facilitates an easy recognition of CAN-E publications, creating a 
clearer picture of who it is and what it does (CAN-E Report 2010, 5f):  
“The [new web]site was launched in late 2009, just before 
the Copenhagen climate summit, and is a more user-friendly tool, 
which we hope will reinforce our brand recognition as well as 
providing an information portal for our members and the general 
public.”  
The redesign of its website included launching a new Content 
Management System (CMS)-based website, utilising dedicated intranet 
sites for members attending 2009’s final two UNFCCC negotiation sessions, 
upgrading the office’s IT systems, switching to Mac and moving to a Google-
based mail system, which allows for easy sharing of documents (Google 
docs) and intranet sites (Google sites). This intranet section of the website 
requires a login and allows for CAN-E staff and members to post documents 
for editing and comment, as well as providing a forum for additional 
discussions apart from email lists. The intranet and Google docs are useful 
for example for sharing information such as reports on general assembly’s 
or specific policy documents that CAN-E does not wish to be public (CAN-E 
official 2010).  
“These improved tools helped us to communicate and update 
our network more easily, as well as helping us greatly in our role as 
coordinators of EU level NGO climate work and communicating to 
the outside world. In 2009 we saw more media hits than ever 
before, evidence of our increased capacity and efficiency in 
communications” (CAN-E Report 2010, 8). 
CAN-E uses its website and blog for communication with the 
constituency beyond direct member groups. On the CAN-E website there is 
a media section with press releases giving information about its EU work as 
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well as updates on related policy issues and political developments. Social 
media is increasingly thought of as a crucial communication tool not only 
with member groups but beyond, however Facebook and Twitter are still in 
the process of being developed further. CAN-E joined Facebook at the 
beginning of 2010 and has 914 likes. The message function and 
recommendations function are tools for feedback. The page shows posts on 
EU political-decision-making, reports and assessments of EU politics, 
events, direct action and CAN-E in the media. CAN-E also itself ‘likes’ a 
number of other groups, which indicates who CAN-E agrees with, giving 
another insight to its views. Although posts can only be published by CAN-
E, the public can make comments. Press conferences, the newsletter called 
hotspot as well as annual reports are further important tools for 
communication with member groups and beyond. Interesting is that print 
seems to have followed electronic media, rather than the other way round 
and is in fact considered a backup for electronic media.  
Coordinating a large network of 152 member groups across Europe 
makes it difficult to keep personal contact. CAN-E uses online surveys in 
order to be reflective and responsive to member group interests and 
feedback (CAN-E official 2010):  
“We just did a survey on that, analysing the results. We have 
[152] members, you cannot call them all up. You really have to 
work with surveys to see what they think of the work we are doing, 
the activities, the products, the priorities. We did it ourselves 
within the office. We sent out a questionnaire by email. We got a 
lot of feedback, still analysing the results.”  
CAN-E consistently provides feedback to member groups and informs 
about the results of member opinion surveys (DNR official 2010). Online 
surveys thus help CAN-E to stay close to member group interests and views 
and enhance the acceptance of its work. 
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Campaigning is not a core participatory tool of CAN-E, but its 
campaign "time to leave" in 2008 collected signatures from citizens and 
forwarded their messages to policy-makers and thus enabled participation. 
CAN-E member groups are often themselves umbrella networks 
without individual supporters, such as the Deutscher Naturschutzring, Heal 
or Aprodev. Since CAN-E represents a single cause, member groups are 
generally aware of what CAN-E stands for and its positions. Likewise, their 
member groups and supporters in turn are likely to be supportive, since the 
issue will be in line with their groups’ vision and cause. Still, here, the 
communication of issues and transparency is particularly important for the 
acceptance dimension of representativeness. The member groups’ usage of 
new media and electronic and paper communication tools such as reports, 
magazines, and newsletters, Facebook and Twitter and their blogs are 
crucial for raising awareness amongst supporters of their group’s EU 
activities in order to enable them to express or decline support and thus 
acceptance. 
Conclusion	
Environmental groups form their positions based on scientific 
research and expertise on the ground, not because members and 
supporters have formed and formally voted on a position. The nature of the 
environmental cause they represent explains why the acceptability 
dimension here is gyroscopic. In addition, the acceptability dimension is 
surrogate, because they stand in for the environment and future 
generations, which themselves have no voice. They form positions around 
topics and points of view that are not, or only insufficiently, represented in 
the political discourse, such as nature, biodiversity or the poor in the 
developing countries. 
All three EU environmental and climate change groups interviewed 
form their policy position based on gyroscopic and surrogate 
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representation (acceptability dimension), relying on scientific data, 
expertise and experience on the ground. Expertise is the tool to reach a 
normative goal, which is set in a group’s mission and visions. Groups are 
professional in their use of scientific data and expertise. They moreover get 
and value the support of their member groups, individual supporters and 
beyond (acceptance dimension) for their position taken. The difference 
between the three groups is their organisational type, which has an impact 
on the way the acceptance dimension can be judged. For all groups the 
support of member groups for positions is considered important, but it 
varies according to the issue and member group interest to which degree 
this support is presented. Gyroscopic and surrogate representation is not 
independent from support through members and supporters. Rather than 
responding to direct votes on positions, these groups have to make sure 
that the scientific data they form their positions on is reliable, that the 
experience they draw on is relevant and that their arguments are in line 
with their group principles. If they do not follow these rules, their 
reputation and credibility are in danger and that in turn means loss of 
support and impact.  
The difference between the three groups is their organisational type, 
which has an impact on the way the acceptance dimension can be judged. 
Greenpeace EU is the EU representation of an international advocacy 
group, whose principles are known by national member groups as well as 
individual supporters to be global, thus the same at international, EU or 
national level. In the case of Greenpeace the acceptance dimension can 
thus be judged based on the number of supporters within Europe, since 
members and supporters have a sense of belonging to a global group with a 
global mission and strategy. Greenpeace-UK supporters understand that 
they belong to a group that is active EU-wide and globally. CAN-E on the 
other hand is an umbrella group of a network of independent national 
advocacy groups. The acceptance dimension is partly expressed by CAN-E’s 
group memberships, who have the choice of being members of the 
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umbrella and agreeing to CAN-E acting in their name. However, supporters 
of CAN-E’s national member groups do not necessarily realise that their 
groups are members of an EU umbrella representing their interests in 
Brussels or that as in the emission reductions study, national groups 
represent their interests through the CAN-E network and name at EU level. 
Here, the communication of issues and transparency according to 
supporter expectations is particularly important for the acceptance 
dimension of representativeness. However, the examples of the Deutscher 
Naturschutzring, Germanwatch and Sandbag show that their new media 
usage, such as websites, supporter newsletters, Facebook, Twitter and their 
blogs have the potential to raise awareness amongst supporters of their 
group’s EU activities. They thus enable their supporters to express or 
decline support and thus acceptance.  
Another mechanism for gyroscopic and surrogate groups to ensure 
positions are formed in the interest of the environment and specifically the 
general public and future generations are public opinion polls and surveys. 
The aim to reduce emissions relates to climate change. Opinion surveys 
reveal that action against and adaption to climate change are primary 
concerns of the European public. Over two thirds of Europeans see climate 
change as a ‘very serious problem’ and almost 80 per cent believe that 
fighting climate change can ‘boost the economy and jobs’. Europeans see 
climate change as ‘the second most serious problem facing the world’, 
‘more serious than the economic situation’ (TNS Political and Social 2011). 
Groups fighting against climate change thus form their position based on 
empathy with a constituency that goes beyond the member- and 
supportership and is in the general interest of the public. The fact that they 
do so thus strengthens the acceptability dimension of surrogate groups. 
The public opinion poll helps judge the strength of the (surrogate) 
acceptability dimensions in this case.  
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8	 Conclusion	
According to an important strand of the interest group literature, 
professionalisation of EU advocacy groups negatively affects their 
representativeness. According to these approaches, positions put forward 
by EU groups in Brussels no longer represent the interests of their members 
and supporters, because they have little or no say in the formation of EU 
positions (Sudbery 2003, 87; Warleigh 2001). 
This thesis has demonstrated that the impact of professionalisation 
on the representativeness of advocacy groups is significantly determined by 
organisational structure and strategies. The theoretical contribution has 
been to explain the diversity of EU environmental groups’ representation 
structures and the related acceptance of their representativeness by 
member groups and supporters. Groups examined were environmental 
cause groups active in the public and global interest. In addition, the thesis 
has contributed by exploring the relationship between new forms of 
professionalisation in new media technology and representation 
(acceptability) and acceptance structures and strategies. 
The empirical, theoretical and normative contributions are 
summarised below. In addition, suggestions for future research to build on 
these contributions, as well as practical advice for environmental advocacy 
groups and government institutions are outlined. 
Empirical	findings	
The empirical chapters of this thesis exemplify the representative 
behaviour and professionalisation of EU environmental groups. The 
cogency of the findings has benefitted from the adoption of 
methodological approaches incorporating new media measures channelling 
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member group input and exchange of experience and research, as well as 
facilitating the expression of support. The fact that positions are formed 
not through votes and participation, but based on scientific studies, 
experience and principles, has illuminated the hitherto overlooked 
acceptance dimension of representativeness. Taken together, these insights 
have enabled certain existing assumptions to be challenged whilst 
providing evidence for a series of new theoretical insights.  
The literature makes clear that the strategy of the European 
Commission to enhance its democratic credentials is based on the 
assumption that groups are representative of their members. A number of 
scholars believe that this strategy is doomed, because as groups become 
recognised, they professionalise and lose their representativeness. Yet from 
this perspective there is limited discussion of the relation between the 
organisational diversity of groups, the way they represent and what 
indicators make the different groups representative. Moreover, the 
application also does not consider how new media is applied to represent 
and facilitate the expression of support for a group and its positions. The 
aforementioned empirical enquiries give an important insight into these 
shortcomings through a combination of website, social media and 
governance document analysis of environmental groups, as well as in-
depth qualitative interviews with EU groups and their member groups 
(chapters four, five and six). The analysis makes clear that environmental 
cause groups make representative claims on behalf of the environment and 
they professionalise not only in their bureaucratic structures, but also in 
their new media presence and application. The results demonstrate that 
since groups also represent causes, this means representativeness needs to 
be thought of differently. 
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Figure 1: The representativeness indicators of advocacy groups 
Specifically, the results of interviews and the examination in the way 
new media was used shed new light on representativeness and make clear 
that representativeness is two-dimensional (see figure 1). They suggest on 
the one hand that the assessment depends on whether groups represent 
(human) members or (non-human) causes. Promissory and anticipatory 
advocacy groups representing members’ interests form their position based 
on participatory mechanisms, such as (re)electing the leadership and voting 
on positions, giving members authority over the formation of positions. 
Meanwhile, it is shown that environmental groups form their positions 
based on science, experience and principles (gyroscopic representation). 
Environmental groups also form their positions based on empathy with the 
beneficiaries, and express the voice of nature which has no voice itself in 
political decision-making (surrogate representation). The relevance of these 
insights for group representativeness and professionalisation is established 
in chapters five and six. These show that groups have different strategies 
regarding who or what they represent and crucially, that this determines 
what they base their positions on. If the strategy is to represent members, 
the structures will be participatory in order to represent members’ voices. 
If the strategy is to represent a cause, such as the environment (non-
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human), then the structures are likely to focus on incorporating science, 
expertise and experience in accordance with the group’s mission in order to 
represent in a way that is considered to benefit the environment.  
On the other hand, the acceptance of groups’ values and positions 
happens through separate structures and media. In groups representing 
members, the members express their acceptance of policy positions, group 
leadership, as well as the group itself, through the respective decision-
making structures. But the empirical results indicate that in groups forming 
their positions based on science, expertise and their mission, different 
mechanisms express acceptance at a separate point in time to the position 
formation. The representativeness is shown to depend on the type of group 
and the breadth of the cause it represents in order to judge the acceptance 
dimension in gyroscopic and surrogate (cause) groups. The examples of 
Greenpeace EU, WWF-EPO and FoEE indicate that their acceptance 
dimensions can be judged by the number of member groups as well as 
supporters these groups have. This is because as global advocacy groups, 
they have a global mission and values shared by all groups, and thus 
understood by member groups and supporters at any level. Thus local 
Greenpeace supporters know who and what they support also at the EU 
level.  
The examples of CAN-E and BirdLife Europe on the other hand 
suggest that the assessment of the acceptance dimension is more refined 
in EU network umbrella groups with independent member groups that 
moreover carry different names. Part of the acceptance dimension can be 
judged by the number of (direct) member groups, since with their 
membership they express acceptance that the EU group advocates their 
values. Acceptance by the members and supporters of these member 
groups in turn however is shown to depend on the breadth of the cause the 
EU group represents. Both CAN-E, which aims to halt climate change, and 
BirdLife Europe, which aims to protect birds and biodiversity, are active on 
single causes, unlike the European Environmental Bureau, for example, 
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which represents the general cause of the protection of the environment. 
The national member groups of both CAN-E and BirdLife Europe joined the 
umbrella because the latter’s single cause resembles their own values and 
interests. It is thus likely that their members and supporters are also in 
support of the cause, since they have signed up to the national group 
representing the same cause. Consequently, the acceptance dimensions 
here can also be judged by the number of member groups as well as 
supporters more broadly.  
In the case of umbrella networks representing a general cause, such 
as the European Environmental Bureau, however, the situation is different. 
Its member groups often represent single causes. Their members and 
supporters might not wish to support the more general causes the EU 
umbrella represents. Here it is crucial the member groups’ members and 
supporters are aware of their group’s activities at EU level or rather their 
membership in the EU umbrella. Only then can their continued support be 
judged as the acceptance of the EU umbrella and its values and positions. 
However, an EU umbrella group might put forward a specific position which 
is in line with the single cause of a member group, in which case it would 
be representative of the broader member and- supportership. 
Taken together, these insights have made a telling contribution not 
only to our understanding of the dynamics of representation, but also to 
our understanding of the impact of professionalisation. While a promissory 
group with participatory structures may potentially lose representativeness 
if it bureaucratises (table 2), this is shown to not be the case for cause 
groups, since their representativeness is based on science, experience and 
principles. However, in EU umbrella networks representing a general cause, 
bureaucratisation might impact communication structures and thus 
negatively affect the awareness of member group members and 
supporters. The latter might thus not realise that their national group is 
part of an EU umbrella and what this EU umbrella represents. 
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Table 2: The potential effects of professionalisation on group 
representativeness 
The analysis further demonstrates that groups professionalise their 
new media applications towards representative structures. The findings in 
chapter five and six connect the professionalisation in new media 
technology with the two dimensions of representativeness – acceptability 
and acceptance – in cause groups. Here it is shown that in general, all five 
EU environmental groups increasingly apply new media technology for both 
dimensions. New ways of eliciting feedback and input from member 
groups, such as emails, mailing-lists, Google docs, intranet, Skype and 
online conferences, enhance the acceptability dimension of groups. 
Moreover, the findings indicate that the communication between EU 
groups, member groups and their member and supporter networks is 
enhanced though new and social media such as Facebook, Twitter, blogs 
and online petitions. This enhances awareness of these groups’ activities 
and principles and enables individual supporters to express their support 
for the groups and their specific positions. The results also show that 
through enhanced and direct information and communication, new media 
has the potential to enhance sense of solidarity amongst those supporting 
the cause and empathy with the environment and the people benefitting 
from its protection.  
Testimony from the interviews also reveals that social media does not 
merely recreate the same offline practices online. Social media can be 
applied in a way that enables a unique dynamic of communication between 
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supporters and member groups, undisturbed by interference from the 
groups themselves. The example of the RSPB shows how the group 
leadership was able to observe through Facebook and Twitter how and 
where supporter conversations developed and what mattered to its 
supporters. The observations were used to help enhance the 
communication structures with groups in order to raise awareness but also 
be responsive to their interests, and enabled the group to develop online 
structures tailored to the ways supporters wish to engage with the group 
and express support. This suggests that the concepts of participation and 
representation need to adapt to behavioural changes as a result of new 
media technologies. 
However, the insights also confirmed certain restrictions of new 
media’s potential for representative structures and strategies. For one, the 
extent to which new media technologies enable representative dynamics 
depends on how groups and individual staff apply the tools. The 
professional application and thus the impacts on acceptability and 
acceptance were shown to vary between groups. Second, they need to 
vary. This is because it depends on what the member groups, as well as 
supporters, expect of new media technology to do for them. EU groups 
have diverse organisational structures and strategies and member groups 
accordingly were shown to have diverse expectancies of the type and 
degree of engagement and representative structures in place. Third, new 
media technologies can only add to participatory structures in promissory 
and anticipatory groups, but not replace them.  
Theoretical	contributions	
The thesis makes a number of theoretical contributions to our 
understanding of representativeness and the concept of 
professionalisation. Insights have been provided which directly connect the 
organisational structures and strategies of environmental groups with how 
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their positions are formed and supported. The two dimensions of 
representativeness (acceptability and acceptance) were then connected 
with a perception of how groups apply new media to support of 
representativeness. Theoretical contributions have been made to both the 
representation and professionalisation literatures on (EU) advocacy groups. 
The thesis connected a progressive understanding of representation with 
research in online and social media technology. In so doing, an interface 
between what were two largely unrelated research strands has been 
established. The thesis identifies hitherto undiscovered dynamics of 
representativeness which in turn change the relation between both 
representativeness and professionalisation. At the same time, the thesis’ 
understanding of group representativeness is placed within, and 
contributes to, the wider literature on interest representation. 
Many of the arguments put forward in this thesis have been informed 
by the traditional assumption that groups are promissory, i.e. represent 
members who thus have to have authority over the positions the groups 
puts forward (Kohler-Koch 2010, 111; Sudbery 2003; Warleigh 2001). From 
this premise comes another prevailing assumption that group 
professionalisation, leading to a loss of members’ say over EU groups’ 
positions, thus hampers representativeness (Frantz 2007, Maloney 2009, 
Saurugger 2008, Kohler-Koch 2008). The point of departure was to identify 
and explain the limitations of these assumptions (chapter one and two) 
with the initial insight of placing the underlying dynamics of 
representativeness in the EU professionalisation literature in a wider 
context of representation. The political party literature asserts that groups 
perform different types of representation (Mansbridge 2003) and the 
advocacy literature differentiates between groups representing humans 
and non-humans (Halpin 2006; O’Neill 2001). Combining these 
understandings shows that representation is structured differently 
according to what or whom groups claim to represent. It follows that the 
representativeness of groups has to be assessed accordingly. 
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Representativeness in promissory groups is judged by their organisational 
participation structures. Meanwhile, the representativeness of EU 
environmental cause groups is shown on the one hand to be judged based 
on the credibility of their science, expertise and their adherence to 
principles in forming positions. On the other the representativeness is 
judged by the degree of acceptance through member groups and their 
members and supporters in turn. Moreover, the initial insight from the 
professionalisation literature was placed in the wider context of the 
bureaucratisation and new media literatures. This shows that groups not 
only professionalise in the bureaucratic sense, they also increasingly 
professionalise their application of new media technologies in internal 
position formation and knowledge exchange as well as in external 
communication. Groups counteract certain bureaucratic tendencies, but 
importantly they gain new channels of representation and acceptance. 
Taken together, these conditions show that the professionalisation of cause 
groups frequently enhances their representativeness. 
These ideas are explained in relation to the representative claim a 
number of EU environmental groups make. Because they represent a cause, 
such as the protection of biodiversity or the halting of climate change, their 
representation is shown to be gyroscopic and surrogate. The mission to act 
in the interest of the environment leads groups to take a scientific approach 
to their position formation. Member input is important not for the need to 
represent their interests as such, but to receive experience on the ground 
and research findings in order to strengthen the position put forward by 
the EU group. Gyroscopic representation structures are shown to allow for 
member group influence over the general direction and broader strategic 
decisions of the EU group. This authority is further weighted by the fact 
that EU groups themselves have a reason for wanting to stay close to the 
interests of the European (and international) group network, because there 
is a sense of solidarity and understanding that without the support of the 
network the group loses its strength.  
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Incorporating the typology of representation built on the progressive 
literature of a diversity of representation that includes gyroscopic and 
surrogate representation, the thesis further provides theoretical insights 
into surrogate representation dynamics. The underlying environmental and 
global values provide a strong incentive for EU groups, as well as member 
groups and their supporters, to act in solidarity. Rather than representing 
the personal interests of members, there is empathy for “the people” and 
for the “beautiful planet”. These shared values lead groups to form their 
positions based on experience and professional knowledge that furthers 
the objective to protect the planet, but also generates trust and thus 
support within a network of like-minded.  
The thesis also provides additional theoretical insights into the 
dimensions of representativeness. The theoretical approach of using a 
more complex typology of representation dynamics highlights a limitation 
to the prevailing one-dimensional concept of representativeness.  Since in 
promissory and anticipatory groups the acceptance of the position is 
expressed at the same time as positions are voted upon or leaderships are 
elected, this two-dimensional character has not been obvious. However, in 
gyroscopic and surrogate groups, where the formation of positions is based 
on scientific indicators rather than members’ votes, the acceptance of a 
group, its positions and its leadership has not been expressed by its 
member groups and supporters during the formation of positions. Here 
groups are shown to rely on other channels of feedback and support.  
Chapters five and six also add another qualification to the view that 
groups represent members. The diversity of organisational structures and 
strategies of groups shows that members and supporters are equally 
diverse. The mission of a group gives an insight into what motivates 
national groups to join EU groups or individuals to join a national or sub-
national member group. The representativeness of a group is not only 
constituted by its function in representing, but also by the choice member 
groups and supporters make when they decide which group to join, with 
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which values and representation structures (acceptance). It is 
demonstrated that environmental groups do not claim to represent their 
members through democratic participation structures. Consequently, this is 
not why members join. The thesis suggests that the concept of 
representativeness is just as much about the character of a group as it is 
about how it represents. 
This insight has implications for the prevailing thesis of 
professionalisation limiting group representativeness. It is demonstrated 
that in addition to shared values, member groups choose to support EU 
umbrella networks precisely because they appreciate their professionalism 
in advocacy and expertise. Similarly, individuals choose to support 
international (or EU) advocacy groups because they trust in the expertise 
and professionalism of groups in their mission to represent and further 
shared values. This is shown to be particularly relevant to groups with the 
mission to represent environmental values through evidence-based 
indicators, rather than those representing members’ interests through 
membership logic. 
The theory highlights the consequences of professionalisation in new 
media technology for gyroscopic and surrogate representative behaviour. 
The indicators developed for the two representative dimensions reveal that 
EU groups come to rely on new media technology to take advantage of the 
expertise and experience from their members to form strong gyroscopic 
positions. Beyond the formation of positions, groups also use new media to 
raise awareness of issues and create the necessary sense of solidarity 
necessary for surrogate representation but also for the informed 
acceptance of groups’ positions and activities. Moreover, groups use new 
media to facilitate the expressions of support by their member groups but 
also by member groups’ members and supporters. 
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Normative	implications	
Collectively, the theoretical and empirical explanations of this thesis 
serve to increase our understanding of what makes groups representative, 
and how representative behaviour is shaped by professionalisation. As a 
consequence, a fuller and more dynamic picture of EU environmental 
groups’ representativeness emerges, giving rise to a number of normative 
implications for democratic decision-making in the EU. 
Here it is helpful to take Dahl’s concept of pluralism as a starting point 
for the discussion (Dahl 1978; 1999). In this framework, democracy is 
enhanced through the recognition of a diversity of organised interests 
participating in order to influence political outcomes, alongside the 
traditional mechanism of parliamentary or assembly votes (Czempiel and 
Rosenau 1992; Schulze 1994). Participation is based on the principle of 
democratic self-governance (Dahl 1999, 20; European Commission 2002, 
5), which implies that all affected interests must have equal opportunities 
to represent themselves in the decision-making process of these decisions 
(Steffek and Nanz 2008, 10). However, there are limitations to this 
approach, particularly regarding advocacy groups active in the general 
interest, such as environmentalists, who stand less chance in their 
competition for voice and influence with business and professional 
interests (Olson 1965, 159–167).  
The assumption then, as explained in chapter one, is that the 
European Commission, deriving its legitimacy as a bureaucratic actor 
substantially from a participatory conception of democracy, can enhance its 
democratic legitimacy by increasing access for and improving its dialogue 
with groups active in the general interest (European Commission 2001; 
Greenwood 2007; Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007; Saurugger 2008; Steffek et 
al. 2008). The implicit assumption is that advocacy groups are 
representative organisations where the leadership reflects the interests of 
its members and supporters. Groups channel grassroots’ interests and 
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opinions across the EU into Commission decision-making and thus bridge 
the gap between the Commission’s politics and European civil society (for 
reviews see Armstrong 2001; Greenwood 2007). However, a number of 
interest group scholars criticise this strategy, because as groups are 
recognised as political actors, they professionalise and lose their 
representativeness. Recognition is assumed to co-opt EU advocacy groups 
who then cease to be representative of their members, or grassroots 
(Kohler-Koch 2010, 111; Sudbery 2003; Warleigh 2001). The implications of 
this loss of representativeness are mainly considered at the system level as 
a deprived diversity of organised interests, creating an imbalance in the 
plurality of interests represented to the detriment of general interests 
(Saurugger 2006). 
The thesis offers insights into the extent to which professionalisation 
affects the internal organisational representation structures of advocacy 
groups and their representativeness. The findings suggest that at the 
individual organisational level the implications of professionalisation are 
dependent on organisational structures and strategies, given that groups 
represent different beneficiaries. Whilst promissory and anticipatory 
groups representing members risk losing their representativeness as a 
result of bureaucratisation, this assertion remains largely unconfirmed in 
the cases of gyroscopic and surrogate groups representing a cause with the 
support of their affiliates. Indeed, professionalisation in new media 
technology has the potential to counteract bureaucratisation tendencies 
(Pickerill 2003) and may enhance the representativeness of those groups 
who rely strongly on professionalism in their advocacy and representation 
of a cause.  
As a direct result of these insights, the exploration of environmental 
advocacy groups has yielded additional normative implications for the 
pluralism of interest representation in the Commission, and indeed at EU 
level. This thesis shows that the study of the impact of professionalisation 
on democracy through the mobilisation of participation in advocacy groups, 
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generated from democratic representation theory, fails to recognise the 
potential democratic contribution of advocacy groups. This perspective 
excludes gyroscopic and surrogate groups, who benefit from certain 
professionalisation and who are representative not because of internal 
participation but because of support expressed in its diverse forms. 
Pluralist interest representation is about recognising diverse interests, not 
about equal participation within groups. Gyroscopic and surrogate groups 
increase the diversity of interests represented, thus enriching pluralism and 
enhancing democracy.  
The normative implications for representativeness in this thesis are 
relevant not only for the EU, but for any instance of general interest 
representation. However, the limitation of the assumption that groups 
represent members who have to have authority over the positions groups 
put forward is particularly crucial in the context of the EU political 
environment. Here the literature emphasises an increased remoteness 
between the EU leadership and grassroots. This is owed to the multilevel 
structure of EU decision-making. Tensions are exacerbated because groups 
work in confederations and networks spanning multiple political levels, 
nationalities and cultures, which adds new dimensions also to the position 
formation. The requirement of additional levels of expertise due to the 
particularly technical and complex nature of EU policies, however, also 
fortifies the argument that professionalisation will be welcomed by 
supporters of knowledge-based cause groups. 
In addition, the extension of the professionalisation concept to 
include new media applications carries normative implications for 
participations and representation. The traditional understanding that 
formal structures of participation and representation carry more normative 
power reduces participation and representation to those who have the 
time and resources to actively participate and be represented. It also 
ignores the choices individuals and groups make with regards to the ways 
they choose to participate and be represented. 
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However, the issue of professionalisation, whilst troubling for the 
democratic legitimacy of the Commission’s and indeed the EU’s decision-
making, may in fact stem less from the characteristics of general or diffuse 
interests than from organisational logic. Recognition has had similar effects 
for example on political parties and trade unions. Political party and 
corporatist literatures reveal similar trends towards professionalisation and 
a marginalisation of the linkage function between the EU level organisation 
and its local members. The implication may be that professionalisation is 
not a trend restricted to the particular institutional approach to advocacy 
groups, but may indeed be a necessary consequence of recognition due to 
organisational logic. 
The thesis confirms a limit to media professionalisation also for 
gyroscopic and surrogate groups (Frantz 2007). EU groups seeking to 
present themselves in a more favourable light in order to attract members 
and supporters and creating a misleading image about their principles and 
values (leading members and supporters to make choices against their 
values) misrepresent support. Credibility and trust in groups depends as 
much on their professionalism in advocacy and awareness-raising as in 
knowing the limits to professional media and marketing performance. 
Critical reports in the media indicate that some groups have already 
crossed the line (Frantz 2007, 193). The response however is likely to be a 
loss of support, since the professional but credible representation of 
shared-values is a crucial factor motivating people to join cause groups.  
It is worth noting that accepting the reality of ‘professionalisation’ in 
the sense of an increased advocacy focus as opposed to grassroots 
participation in itself is disputed. It is questionable whether there has ever 
been transnational cooperation amongst groups mobilising grassroots input 
at EU level. The assumption of a “golden era” of the ideal traditional 
representative organisation is contested (Fielding 2001, 28; Ward and 
Gibson 2009). Professionalisation of political communication might just be 
a myth and we are simply experiencing the continuous modernisation of 
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society and the adaptation of groups to resulting changes in practices and 
cultures, as argued in the case of political parties (Negrine and Lilleker 
2002).  
Through this focus on the internal representativeness of groups, the 
extent to which professionalisation also impacts on the diversity and 
representativeness of the interest representation system is highlighted. 
Moreover, with reference to the on-going debate over the Commission’s 
alleged democratic deficit, this discussion not only has resonance for a 
participatory concept of democracy, but also for a representative one. This 
is because, as Dahl suggests, there is a need for a constant supply of 
countervailing policy input in the space between elections in order to 
prevent elites or interests seeking private goods from dominating the policy 
process. 
Future	Research	
This thesis has opened up a number of avenues for further research. 
The most prominent are listed below, within both the representativeness 
and professionalisation context. 
The analysis has contributed to our understanding of how the 
professionalisation of advocacy groups affects their representativeness 
depending on organisational structures and strategies. It has given 
examples that show representativeness in advocacy is more diverse and 
dynamic than hitherto assumed. The next step is on the one hand to 
explore environmental cause groups in more detail and on the other hand 
to apply the same theoretical approach across gyroscopic and surrogate 
groups in other issue areas, such as animal or human rights. A particular 
issue arising in the debate on surrogate representation is where groups 
represent people of communities other than themselves, such as the North 
representing the South. In groups representing the voices of the vulnerable, 
i.e. farmers in the global South or illegal immigrants, the line between the 
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representation of humans and a cause becomes unclear. These groups do 
not represent the voices of these people directly, but interests claimed 
beneficial to them. Even more complicated are cases where for example 
women’s groups in the North explicitly claim to represent women in the 
South, hence speaking for other constituents without their consultation.  
Furthermore, since part of the thesis has given examples of 
opportunities of informal communication and participation and the 
representation of interests through new media, it remains to be explored 
in-depth and at a broader level what the normative implications are for 
participation and representation in light of modern technology and 
behaviour. What does participation mean for the individual social media 
user? How do people want their voices heard and interests represented, as 
new media technology opens up new possibilities to do so? What are the 
implications for interest group representation?  
This links directly to another field of future research. The thesis 
moves the emphasis away from representing as a protective and promoting 
measure towards representativeness encompassing ‘who a group is’ and 
what motivates people to join. The assertion in the literature that EU 
institutions are interested mostly in what groups do (functional 
representation), as opposed to who they are, may have particular 
implications for the genuine acceptance and consideration of the voices of 
civil society in EU interest group representation. The thesis has contributed 
to our knowledge of how bureaucratisation and new media 
professionalisation affect representativeness. The insight into the more 
diverse dynamics of representativeness established in this thesis have 
important empirical and normative implications. Future research should 
continue to explore how the Commission’s strategy to engage with 
advocacy groups affects cause groups in particular and in detail. 
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Benefit	to	practitioners	
This research is of interest to environmentalists, cause groups and 
advocacy groups more generally, because it provides a typology and 
indicators to understand and judge their representativeness. This 
strengthens their position vis-à-vis decision-makers, but also enhances 
their credibility in the public and media. The findings can further used as a 
guide in how to improve representative structures. 
A better understanding of why and which groups are representative 
also helps decision-makers, such as the Commission, but also other EU and 
national government institutions, in their task to be inclusive of the diverse 
voices of civil society and evaluate advocacy group input appropriately. For 
environment ministries or Directorate Generals, the insight is useful to 
strengthen their own arguments, since they can point not only to the 
expertise, but also the representativeness of the groups they have behind 
their positions. 
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Appendix	
Number Date Interviewee 
1 21/09/2010 Greenpeace European Unit 
2 21/09/2010 Oxfam EU office 
3 21/09/2010 Birdlife European Division 
4 21/09/2010 WWF European Policy Office (EPO) 
5 21/09/2010 WWF European Policy Office (EPO) 
6 22/09/2010 DG CLIMA 
7 22/09/2010 DG CLIMA 
8 22/09/2010 DG ENV 
9 22/09/2010 FERN 
10 23/09/2010 DG AGRI 
11 23/09/2010 DG ENV 
12 23/09/2010 DG ENV 
13 27/09/2010 ENV cabinet of Commissioner  Potocnik 
14 22/09/2010 CAN Europe 
15 28/09/2010 DG CLIMA 
16 28/09/2010 DG ENV 
17 30/09/2010 DG AGRI 
18 30/09/2010 WWF European Policy Office (EPO) 
19 27/10/2010 Grüne Liga 
20 28/10/2010 NABU 
21 30/10/2010 DNR  
22 01/11/2010 WEED 
23 02/11/2010 Nature Conservancy Europe 
24 03/11/2010 Greenpeace Deutschland HH 
25 04/11/2010 NABU-HH 
26 05/11/2010 BUND 
27 08/11/2010 Germanwatch 
28 09/11/2010 Robin Wood 
29 09/11/2010 DUH 
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30 10/11/2010 WWF  Germany 
31 07/12/2010 Greenpeace Deutschland Berlin 
32 05/01/2011 RSPB 
33 06/01/2011 The LINK 
34 09/02/2011 WWF UK 
35 11/02/2011 Waterwise 
36 14/02/2011 FoEE 
37 14/02/2011 RSPB 
38 16/02/2011 EUr Policy 
39 17/02/2011 CPRE 
40 17/02/2011 Sandbag 
41 25/02/2011 RSPB 
42 01/03/2011 FoE EWNI 
43 01/03/2011 Greenpeace Norwich 
44 25/02/2011 RSPB 
45 25/02/2011 RSPB 
46 25/02/2011 RSPB 
47 20/12/2010 FERN 
48 09/11/2010 Forum für Umwelt und Entwicklung 
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Glossary	
BUND Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz 
CAN Climate Action Network 
CAN-E Climate Action Network Europe 
CPRE The Campaign to Protect Rural England 
DNR Der Deutsche Naturschutzring 
EU European Union 
FERN Forests and the European Union Resource 
Network 
FoE Friends of the Earth 
FoEE Friends of the Earth Europe 
FoE-EWNI Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
FoEI Friends of the Earth International 
FUE Forum für Umwelt und Entwicklung 
NABU Naturschutzbund Deutschland 
RSPB Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
WEED World Economy, Ecology and Development 
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature 
WWF-EPO World Wide Fund for Nature European Policy Office 
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